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Chapter 1
Introduction
Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the
Indian economy to grow like Indonesia’s or Egypt’s? If so, what, exactly? If
not, what is it about the ‘nature of India’ that makes it so? The consequences
for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once
one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.
Robert Lucas (1988, p. 5)
R
obert Lucas’ celebrated quote is often paraphrased as “once you start thinking
about economic growth, it is hard to think about anything else”. While Lucas
would certainly select two different countries for his example today and many
parts of the world have seen large welfare increases since the late 1980s, the quote has
not lost its relevance. Understanding why some countries are poor and others are rich,
and how this gap can be closed, remains the most fundamental problem in development
economics, macroeconomics and economic history.
The answers economists have offered to this question varied over the decades and
can be characterized by a progression from proximate to ultimate causality (Maddison,
1988; Szirmai, 2012). Early neoclassical growth theory provided important insights
into the proximate sources of growth; that is, the fundamental role played by capital
accumulation, labor and productivity in determining the level of income per capita (Solow,
1956). Endogenous growth theory added increasing returns to scale by incorporating
human capital and innovation capacity (Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988). Yet these
contributions only explain part of the puzzle. The way they look at developing countries
usually takes well-functioning markets and efficient governments as a given; features of
modern economies that are usually absent, incomplete or under construction in developing
countries.
Economic historians have long searched for more “ultimate” sources of economic
growth to explain the onset of the industrial revolution or the ‘great divergence’
(Pritchett, 1997; Pomeranz, 2009). New Institutional Economics (NIE) combined
historical analysis with the Coasian transaction cost approach and unified the analysis of
institutions, rules and norms with the neoclassical perspective (e.g. North and Thomas,
1973; Williamson, 1985; North, 1990; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000). This rediscovery of
the primacy of institutions is also chiefly responsible for reintegrating political economy
into mainstream micro and macroeconomics, both through advances in formal theory
1
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(e.g. Milgrom et al., 1990; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;
Greif, 2006; Besley and Persson, 2011b) and a flurry of empirical studies highlighting
the effects of (political) institutions on economic growth (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Knack and
Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
As a result, NIE also represents a major analytical break with its antecedents – early
institutionalism (e.g. Veblen, 1899; Commons, 1936; Mitchell, 1910a,b) and post-WWII
institutionalism (e.g. Gruchy, 1947; Hirschman, 1958; Myrdal, 1968).
Today, few economists would disagree that political and economic institutions are
among the fundamental sources of long-run growth. We may call this paradigm shift
the ‘institutional turn’ in economics. It refers to a convergence around the idea that
inclusive or open access institutions promote development in the long run, while extractive
or limited access institutions retard growth or at best allow it to occur temporarily
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; North et al., 2009). According to this perspective,
fundamental changes in institutions are rare and only occur at ‘critical junctures’ which,
as in the case of colonialism, can potentially reverse the relative position of countries
in the world income distribution (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2002).
However, the causes of long-run development remain a vibrant and disputed field of
research. Many other – often complementary, sometimes contradictory – sources of
growth are being championed in the empirical and theoretical literatures. The suggestions
range from culture (Weber, 1905; Tabellini, 2008) over geography (Diamond, 1997; Gallup
et al., 1999) and technology (Schumpeter, 1934; Nelson and Winter, 1982) to genetic
diversity (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Ashraf and Galor, 2013), but interactions among
these various sources of growth are only poorly understood.
Disappointing growth experiences, policy experiments and academic thought
interacted throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. The failure of the Washington
consensus – with its narrow focus on macroeconomic stability, trade liberalization and
price stabilization – to generate sustained growth put institutions and political economy
considerations back on the map. Two reactions emerged to this perceived failure: i) the
reforms did not go far enough (Krueger, 2002; Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, but also
see the discussion in Rodrik, 2006), and ii) the reform agenda should be broadened to
include neostructuralist ideas, second-best solutions and more socially-oriented reforms
(e.g. Stiglitz, 2008). The first reaction brought about the term ‘good governance’ within
the international financial institutions (IFIs) and coincided with the institutional turn.
In addition, the renewed attention from policy circles quickly revealed that early studies
of the economic effects of institutions did not include much in the way of “useful ideas
on how to implement institutional reforms” (Na´ım, 2000, p. 94), or, helpful suggestions
with respect to which particular institutions require reform, for that matter.
The instability of growth itself received renewed attention as the developed world
experienced the ‘great moderation’ from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s, while
economic volatility remained high in the developing world and it was noted that there
is little persistence of growth across decades (Easterly et al., 1993). Such stylized facts
spurred a body of research that questioned the established practice of analyzing growth
determinants by looking at levels or average growth rates of GDP per capita (including
the focus on conditional or unconditional convergence as in Barro, 1991). Instead, it
highlighted the uneven nature of growth in the developing world which can be much more
easily characterized by sequences of qualitatively different episodes, such as accelerations,
collapses, stagnation and recovery (e.g. Pritchett, 2000; Hausmann et al., 2005; Jones
and Olken, 2008). While this certainly expanded our understanding of the dynamics of
3growth, most of the literature did not explore the theoretical underpinnings of unstable
growth. Interestingly, only a few lines before his famous quote, Robert Lucas also reflected
on two growth collapses: the declines in Angola and in Iran from the 1960s to the 1970s.
He then asserted that we do not need an “economic theory for an account of either of
these declines” (Lucas, 1988, p.4). However, we do need a political economy theory of
uneven growth to be in a better position to understand what separates developed country
business cycles from the immense welfare losses the developing world is experiencing
frequently. Could it be that it is not the lack of rapid growth which creates the dividing
line between catching up and falling behind, but the failure to achieve sustained growth
and to preserve earlier welfare gains because of social conflict and mismanagement? If
so, then is fundamentally a political and economic problem.
Taking a political economy perspective when trying to explain uneven growth paths
turns Lucas’ quote on its head. The question is no longer what a government should
do, but why is it that the government of India does not undertake an action that would
otherwise lead the Indian economy to grow like Egypt’s? Or even worse, why do some
governments take actions that clearly precipitate economic declines? And, how can we
change or influence the behavior of such governments? While it is now well-established
that institutions matter, many of these related questions have not yet been convincingly
answered. We know very little about the (political) economics of switching between
different growth regimes, or how political and economic institutions affect contemporary
growth rates vis-a`-vis their strong effect on long-run development (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
Similarly, the welfare consequences of such interrupted growth paths are only beginning
to be explored.
Alluding to Moses Abramovitz (1989), “thinking about growth” is not equivalent
to thinking about human welfare or the lack thereof. If we narrowly define poverty as
income or consumption poverty, then the poverty of nations is strongly associated with the
poverty of people. The relationship between growth, inequality and poverty is inherently
non-linear and within-country inequalities play an important role. There is substantial
heterogeneity in how different countries deal with (or have historically dealt with) the
type of growth that occurs and the distributional concerns it raises. Understanding
this process thoroughly is both an empirical challenge, due to paucity of data and the
complexity of income distributions, and a theoretical challenge, for there is not much
known about how political institutions indirectly influence poverty through economic
growth and, more importantly, changes in distribution.
This dissertation is about the empirical analysis and political economics of growth and
inequality. It contributes to fragments of the larger questions posed in this introduction.
It addresses different aspects of the development puzzle in two parts: understanding how
political institutions affect economic crises, and understanding the relationship between
growth, inequality and poverty reduction. Part I is a collection of three essays focusing
on the empirics and theory of political institutions and economic crises. The first essay
empirically examines the role of institutions and macroeconomic factors in how countries
switch in and out of stagnation episodes. The second essay focuses on the econometric
identification of the duration of economic declines and shows that high ethnic diversity
in combination with weak political institutions is associated with longer declines. The
third and final essay of Part I outlines and tests a political economy theory of delayed
cooperation during economic slumps which can both explain the findings of the second
essay and generate interesting additional insights. Part II consists of two empirical
essays on growth, distribution and poverty. The fourth essay is a contribution to the
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poverty decomposition literature. It is an applied econometrics paper that outlines a new
framework for estimating poverty elasticities and predicting poverty headcount ratios
with important substantive implications. The last essay then uses this framework to
study a policy question, namely: can extreme poverty be ended by 2030?
The remainder of this introduction outlines the arguments made in the following
chapters, focusing on the main research questions, the contributions to the respective
literatures and the common themes.
Part I: Political institutions and economic crises
In the spirit of Douglas North (1990), we understand institutions as the humanly devised
constraints that structure human interaction; that is, institutions are the rules of the
game. To a large extent, institutions determine the scope and degrees of freedom for
policy making. Together with policies and culture, they provide the incentives which
guide the behavior of economic actors. This definition of institutions is deliberately open-
ended and encompasses formal, as well as informal institutions, norms and customs, but
not culture as is sometimes done in other characterizations (e.g. Greif, 2006).
Throughout the development process, politics and economics are first intimately
linked and then become separated through the formalization of rights, the creation
of independent organizations and a diffusion of political and economic power (North
et al., 2009). There is some disagreement in the literature on the primacy of
economic institutions (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000) versus political institutions (e.g.
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; North et al., 2009). By focusing on the role of political
institutions, this dissertation implicitly relies on the ‘hierarchy of institutions’ outlined by
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) which states that political institutions define the structure
and scope of economic institutions. Power is constrained by political institutions and
exercised through them. The economic theory of democratization is a classic example of
this hierarchy. In non-democracies, ruling elites may not be able to credibly promise to
implement economic institutions that are favorable to the citizens and may instead choose
to stave off a threat of revolution by democratizing (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Thus
only a change of political institutions brings about more egalitarian economic institutions.
The overarching research question for the chapters in Part I is: how do political
institutions affect economic crises? The answer necessarily remains partial. The first two
essays examine two different aspects of related phenomena: i) the transition into and out
of economic stagnation and ii) the duration of economic declines. The central insight
derived from the empirical analysis is that institutional quality, which changes slowly,
cannot be convincingly linked to the timing of transitions into and out of stagnation
episodes. However, it does affect the duration of the decline segment; that is, the time
until a recovery starts. Furthermore, being able to identify an effect of institutions on
crises hinges on the definition of a crisis and what types of crises are being examined.
The overarching themes that reoccur throughout these chapters are: the econometric
identification and analysis of crises, non-linearities in the growth process, and how
political institutions interact with different types of ethno-political heterogeneity.
The first essay in Chapter 2 borrows a very simple definition of an economic stagnation
episode from Hausmann et al. (2008). A stagnation episode begins with a contraction
in GDP per capita at a time when GDP per capita was higher than ever before and
ends when it is again at or above its pre-stagnation level. The chapter then proceeds to
5analyze the transitions in and out of such periods of economic stagnation in a panel of
countries. We address two questions within the wider research agenda on the instability
of growth. First, we ask if institutional characteristics and political shocks determine
the incidence of stagnation, and then we ask how these effects compare to standard
macroeconomic explanations. In terms of political variables this involves positive and
negative regime changes, sudden exits of leaders, and outright wars or civil conflict. In
terms of macroeconomic variables, this refers to inflation, financial openness or trade
openness, among others. Second, we analyze if any of the included variables have a
different impact on the onset of stagnation than on its continuation. In other words,
we examine if the variables associated with a higher or lower probability of falling
into stagnation are the same as those associated with a higher or lower probability of
continuing to be in stagnation.
Econometrically, we study the determinants of stagnation episodes using dynamic
linear and non-linear models; that is, fixed effects models, Generalized Method of
Moments (system GMM), fixed effects logit, and a dynamic random effects probit
estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005). We treat stagnation spells as a dynamic
problem, subject to state dependence, and pay special attention to the estimation of
partial effects of interactions in non-linear (dynamic) models. The main findings are that
inflation, negative regime changes, real exchange rate undervaluation, financial openness,
and trade openness have statistically and economically significant effects on both the onset
and the continuation of stagnation. Only for trade openness there is robust evidence of a
differential impact: open economies have a significantly lower probability of falling into
stagnation, but once in stagnation they do not recover faster. Overall, predicting the
onset of stagnation with macroeconomic factors works rather well, while institutional
factors other than negative regime changes are not robustly related to the incidence of
stagnation episodes. This finding is not too surprising, since institutions change slowly
while we can observe countries moving in and out of stagnation from year to year.
Motivated by the conclusions and lessons learned in the previous chapter, Chapter 3
takes a different approach. In this chapter, we characterize economic crises by a trend
break or shift in the growth regime with a restricted pattern. The main idea is twofold.
On the one hand, we want to exclude business cycle recessions and instead focus on large,
unexpected and negative departures from a previously positive trend in GDP per capita.
We call these episodes economic slumps. On the other hand, we now focus exclusively
on the decline phase, as the dynamics of decline and recovery may be very different
(both empirically and theoretically). We address three larger research questions. First,
how can we identify large economic slumps empirically? Second, is there any evidence
of institutional change when slumps occur? Third, conditional on the occurrence of a
slump, do weak institutions prolong the duration of the decline phase?
To identify slumps and their associated declines, we use a variant of a restricted
structural change approach (Papell and Prodan, 2012) together with a bootstrap
significance test (Diebold and Chen, 1996) and then date the empirical trough using
a simple rule. These techniques draw on the insights of a large literature on sequential
and multiple testing for structural breaks in econometrics (e.g. Bai, 1997, 1999; Bai
and Perron, 1998, 2003) which inspired a number of studies in the growth literature
(Hausmann et al., 2005; Jones and Olken, 2008; Berg et al., 2012). We identify 58 slumps
in GDP per capita in 138 countries between 1950 and 2008. Three findings stand out.
First, slumps occur frequently and in many cases the decline phase lasts for a long time.
Second, we find systematic evidence of weak political institutions before slumps hit and
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positive institutional change during and in the immediate aftermath of slumps. Third,
the duration of declines decreases with stronger political institutions but increases with
greater degrees of ethnic cleavages (ethno-linguistic fractionalization). We also provide
evidence of a more subtle non-linear effect suggesting that strong political institutions can
potentially help to overcome the adverse effects of ethnic heterogeneity. It turns out that
the onset of a slump may be brought about by many factors which are not necessarily
related to a country’s political institutions or level of social cohesion, but the duration of
declines is strongly associated with these two variables. Could it be that the duration of
declines depends on ethno-political groups agreeing on coordinated responses and on the
political institutions governing this process?
Chapter 4 provides a political economy theory of delayed recovery that can explain the
empirical findings from Chapter 3 and then empirically evaluates the theory. The focus
is now on the process of agreement on a policy response during the decline phase of a
slump. In this chapter, we draw on insights from the literatures on policy reform (Alesina
and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991), political institutions (e.g. Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Besley and Persson, 2011a), and the effects of ethnic diversity on
growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005) and suggest a novel
answer to the question why economic declines in some parts of the globe last so much
longer than in others. Our main contribution is to illustrate a simple mechanism of
how weak constraints on the political executive can lead to longer declines in ethnically
heterogeneous countries. We emphasize a commitment problem among potential winners
and losers of the recovery process. Uncertain post-recovery incomes and changes in
the political power distribution may lead to a ‘winner-take-all’ effect that renders a
cooperative equilibrium inaccessible. Absent constraints on the political executive, groups
might find it in their interest to hold out and delay their cooperation in order to reduce
uncertainty about the future distribution of income. Placing strong constraints on the
executive solves this commitment problem by reducing the uncertainty and limiting the
potential losses, which brings about cooperation earlier on than under weak constraints.
We derive several theoretical and empirical predictions from the model. First, delay
can occur in equilibrium. Weak constraints on the executive are a political economy
friction in ethnically diverse countries that can lead to large social inefficiencies. Second,
stronger political institutions can entirely resolve this issue and bring about cooperation
early on. Third, the commitment problem is getting worse when the number of groups
increases. We then show empirically that the partial correlations are consistent with the
proposed theory. The effect of executive constraints on the length of declines is very
large in heterogeneous countries, but practically disappears in ethnically homogeneous
societies. More subtle predictions of the model are confirmed as well. Finally, we suggest
that these results are particularly relevant for understanding economic declines in Africa
where the longest and deepest declines tend to occur, where politics are shaped by
ethnicity, and where weak institutions govern the political executive.
7Part II: Growth, distribution and poverty
The second part of this dissertation examines how poverty reacts to income growth and
changes in inequality. Before summarizing the individual contributions, it is useful to
settle on a definition of poverty that is used throughout the dissertation. While poverty
is undeniably a multidimensional phenomenon, this dissertation focuses exclusively on
monetary poverty, specifically income or consumption poverty. Monetary poverty is still
the benchmark for global poverty measurement, can be considered a multidimensional
index capturing all things money can buy, and is well-defined by a wealth of literature
dealing with the mathematical and statistical properties of income distributions. There
are many measures of poverty which typically vary in their degree of sensitivity to
distributional concerns. The most commonly used are the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)
class of poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984). We limit our attention to the simplest of
all: the fraction of the population that is poor, or the poverty headcount ratio.
Looking at this research question from the perspective of development economics
means that the emphasis is on absolute poverty, where the poverty line is typically fixed
at comparatively low values, and not relative poverty, where the poverty line varies with
a measure of the general standard of living such as the mean or median (see also Foster,
1998). Absolute poverty is still pervasive in the developing world – in 2010 more than
20% of the world population were living below $1.25 a day (in 2005 PPPs) – whereas
relative poverty also occurs in the developed world (Chen and Ravallion, 2013). Both
chapters deal with global poverty rates and thus rely on the well-established, although
controversial, $1.25 and $2 a day international poverty lines (in 2005 PPPs). This places
the following discussion firmly in the tradition of contributions like Ravallion et al. (1991),
Ravallion et al. (2009), and Chen and Ravallion (2010).
The main research question in this part is: how much does the poverty headcount
ratio react to changes in average income and distribution? The essays look at this issue
in two complementary ways: i) how have income (consumption) growth and changes in
income (consumption) inequality affected poverty reduction in the past (from 1981 to
2010), and ii) what are the likely trends in the future, and what are the implications
for the formulation of global development goals. The main lessons are also twofold.
First, using a new econometric framework we detect a stable relationship between these
three variables in the past and argue that semi-elasticities identify a larger role for
redistribution than previously suggested. Second, moving this relationship forward under
sensible assumptions suggests that extreme poverty is not likely to end by 2030, even with
improvements in distribution. Geographically, poverty will be heavily concentrated in
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Other key themes that reoccur in these chapters are:
the econometrics of limited dependent variables (specifically fractions), the estimation and
interpretation of income and inequality elasticities of poverty versus semi-elasticities, and
the complex issues surrounding poverty measurement.
Chapter 5 revisits the debate on the pace of poverty reduction through growth versus
redistribution – a key question in development economics. Earlier contributions have
generated important insights. For example, we know that poverty is linked to income
and distribution through a decomposition identity and that poverty reduction depends on
the initial levels of income and inequality (Bourguignon, 2003). Regional heterogeneity in
these initial levels also explains most of the regional heterogeneity in income elasticities
(Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007) and about two thirds of poverty reduction in the last decades
can be attributed to growth (Kraay, 2006). In this chapter, we suggest that the previous
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literature (Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Bourguignon, 2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007)
misses an important point, namely that the poverty headcount ratio is a fraction. These
studies usually rely on linear specifications and present estimates of income and inequality
elasticities that are both inaccurate away from the overall mean and imprecisely estimated
over the cross-country distribution of income and inequality. Our main contribution is
to directly build in the inherent boundedness of the poverty headcount ratio. To this
end, we propose a ‘fractional response approach’ to estimating poverty elasticities, which
is able to very closely approximate the distribution of income or consumption near the
poverty line without making specific distributional assumptions.
We then estimate income and inequality (semi-)elasticities for the $2 and $1.25 a day
poverty lines using the largest data set to-date. Econometrically, this is a challenging
enterprise as there are countless differences in how household surveys are conducted across
countries, both incomes and poverty rates are likely to suffer from measurement error, and
surveys are undertaken at very infrequent intervals. Building on Papke and Wooldridge
(1996, 2008) and Wooldridge (2010), we present extensions of the fractional response
approach that solve these issues by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity, measurement
error, and unbalancedness of the panel. We then show that we can precisely estimate these
quantities of interest over their entire distribution with our framework, and highlight the
relevance of focusing on semi-elasticities, not elasticities, for poverty reduction policies.
In addition, the chapter shows that this method can be used as direct way of projecting
poverty rates into the future.
Chapter 6 is a policy-oriented contribution. In this chapter, we apply the empirical
framework from Chapter 5 to study the feasibility of the World Bank’s new goal of
reducing the $1.25 a day global poverty rate to 3% by 2030 (from about 20% in 2010).
We begin by discussing the origins of the dollar-a-day poverty line, conduct a sensitivity
analysis of this line, and describe the historical trends in poverty and inequality around
the world. This serves two purposes. First, we want to highlight that the extreme poverty
line of $1.25 a day is not a fixture but subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty.
Many other lines are plausible. Second, and more importantly, we emphasize that
precisely those countries that have historically contributed most to poverty reduction
are not likely to do so in the future; they experienced GDP (consumption) growth at
unusually fast rates in the last two decades. As a result, this changing geography of
world poverty has profound implications for the pace of poverty reduction in the future.
We then proceed to empirically evaluate a pessimistic, moderate and an optimistic
growth scenario, as well as a pro-poor, distribution neutral and pro-rich scenario for the
evolution of inequality. This analysis leads us to two main findings. First, the pace of
poverty reduction at $1.25 a day is likely to slow down. Even our most optimistic scenarios
suggest a global poverty rate of 8% to 9% in 2030, far short of the World Bank’s new target
of 3%. Second, rapid progress can be maintained at $2 a day, with an additional one billion
people crossing that line by 2030. Both of these results include significant reductions in
within-country inequality. On this basis, we propose two new ‘twin targets’ which are
aspirational but also achievable. We suggest reducing the proportion of the population
living below $1.25 to 8% by 2030 and reducing the proportion of the population living
below $2 a day to 18% by 2030. Reaching these targets requires an additional acceleration
of growth or significant improvements in distribution.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It answers the two overarching research
questions, looks back on the lessons learned and looks forward by discussing open issues.
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Part I
Political institutions and economic
crises

Chapter 2
The dynamics of stagnation
A panel analysis of the onset and continuation of stagnation∗
Abstract
This chapter analyzes periods of economic stagnation in a panel of
countries. We test whether stagnation can be predicted by institutional
characteristics and political shocks, and compare the impacts of such
variables with those of traditional macroeconomic variables. We examine
the determinants of stagnation episodes using dynamic linear and non-linear
models. In addition, we analyze whether the effects of the included variables
on the onset of stagnation differ from the effects on the continuation of
stagnation. We find that inflation, negative regime changes, real exchange
rate undervaluation, financial openness, and trade openness have significant
effects on both the onset and the continuation of stagnation. Only for trade
openness there is robust evidence of a differential impact. Open economies
have a significantly lower probability of falling into stagnation, but once in
stagnation they do not recover faster.
Keywords: growth episodes, stagnation, institutions, dynamic panel data
JEL Classification: O11, O43, C25
∗This chapter is based on Bluhm, R., de Crombrugghe, D. and A. Szirmai. 2012. Explaining the
dynamics of stagnation: An empirical examination of the North, Wallis and Weingast approach, MERIT
Working Papers 040, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on
Innovation and Technology (MERIT), forthcoming in Macroeconomic Dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1950s, many countries across the globe have experienced substantial increases
in GDP per capita brought about by years of economic growth. However, while these
gains are mainly the result of steady positive growth rates in the developed world (at least
prior to 2008), growth in developing countries has often been erratic and volatile. Most
emerging economies have experienced periods of economic stagnation between positive
growth spurts and for several countries the absence of sustained growth has proved to
be a persistent phenomenon, often lasting for several years or even decades. Explaining
why some countries experience more periods of stagnation than others may thus prove
essential to the understanding of contemporary differences in levels of development.
Rather than focusing on differences in average growth rates, recent research
increasingly aims to unveil the specific characteristics of different growth episodes such as
accelerated growth, growth collapses, recoveries, or stagnation. We address two questions
within this wider research agenda. First, we ask if institutional characteristics and
external or internal political shocks determine the incidence of stagnation, and how these
effects compare to standard macroeconomic explanations. Second, we analyze if any of
the included variables have a different impact on the onset of stagnation than on its
continuation. In other words, we examine if the factors affecting the probability of falling
into stagnation are the same as those affecting the probability of continuing to be in
stagnation.
Most of the empirical literature on growth episodes uses static models to study factors
that are correlated with the onset of a growth spell and, more recently, began to examine
factors associated with the duration of growth episodes. Our contribution is to analyze
stagnation spells as a dynamic problem, subject to state dependence and interactions
between the lagged state and the independent variables. This approach allows the
probability of stagnation to depend on whether a country was already in stagnation in the
preceding year (state dependence). It lets the data decide whether the included variables
have a different effect on the onset of a stagnation episode than its continuation. We
estimate the dynamic models using linear probability models, GMM, fixed effects logit,
and a dynamic random effects probit estimator proposed by Wooldridge (2005).
Our results indicate that political regime shifts towards autocracy have strong positive
effects on the incidence of stagnation (onset and continuation), but other proxies for
institutions and political shocks do not have significant effects. Macroeconomic factors
explain the onset of stagnation rather well. Higher inflation positively predicts stagnation,
while financial openness, trade openness, and real exchange rate undervaluation are
associated with a reduced likelihood of stagnation. We find little evidence that the
effects of these variables differ between the onset and continuation of stagnation spells.
Only trade openness has robustly different effects. It substantially reduces the chances
of falling into stagnation, but the ‘protective’ effect of openness vanishes once a country
is in a stagnation spell. In addition, we find that stagnation spells exhibit a moderate
degree of state dependence, which is consistent with other results in the literature on the
duration of growth collapses.
The sequel is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on
institutions and growth, and discusses applications of the growth episodes approach.
Section 3 defines stagnation episodes and explores their correlations with GDP levels and
institutions. Section 4 describes the variables and data. Section 5 outlines the empirical
strategy. Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Related literature
An increasingly large body of literature in economics argues that differences in
institutional characteristics are the key to understanding the differences in long-
run economic performance of nations. While modern institutional theory has many
antecedents, it started from the hypothesis that one explanation for the historical rise
of the West is well-developed property rights (e.g. North and Thomas, 1973). Since
the 1990s, this literature has been extended to view growth-promoting institutions less
narrowly. More recent contributions argue, for example, that institutions for growth
are multifaceted (Rodrik, 2000), interact with geography and inequality (Engerman and
Sokoloff, 1997), develop semi-endogenously (Greif, 2006), and are embedded in informal
arrangements (North, Wallis, and Weingast, 2009).1
In terms of econometric evidence, several papers have suggested that differences in
institutions explain a large part – if not most – of the cross-country variation in levels
of GDP per capita.2 However, many of these studies have also been criticized for their
underlying assumptions (e.g. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004) and
do generally not establish a link between institutions and growth rates (Crombrugghe
and Farla, 2012). Potentially bridging this gap in theory, several authors have recently
suggested that there is a link between institutional susceptibility to various external
or internal shocks and different growth outcomes. North et al. (2009), for example,
identify two distinct types of social orders. Open access orders are economically and
politically highly developed, experience relatively smooth patterns of economic growth,
have active civil societies, many long-lived organizations, heavily formalized rules, and
strong rule of law. Large segments of the population have access to political and economic
organizations. Limited access orders, on the contrary, are dominated by elites that exclude
large parts of the population from access to economic and political organizations. The
rents created in this process are then distributed among members of the ruling coalition, in
order to achieve a basic degree of social stability and control over violence. Limited access
orders typically experience volatile growth patterns and are characterized by polities
without broad democratic consent, few organizations, informal rules, weak and unequally
enforced rule of law, insecure property rights, and high levels of inequality.
North et al. (2009) suggest that limited access orders are inflexible and less able to cope
with shocks, thus causing a higher propensity towards growth collapses and stagnation.
Rodrik (1999) links negative growth experiences to terms of trade shocks, latent social
conflict, and the ability of institutions to contain conflict and absorb the destructive
potential of such shocks. A key question for this chapter is to what extent an empirical
analysis of stagnation episodes supports these theories. Therefore, we hypothesize that (a)
institutional characteristics play an important role in explaining the onset of stagnation
and (b) weak institutions prolong the incidence of stagnation spells.
As Pritchett (2000) pointed out, a problem in traditional panel studies of growth rates
is that they focus on average trends over a fixed period, while in reality growth is often
erratic and may be contingent on very different growth regimes. This conjecture gave
birth to a rapidly growing literature, which since has analyzed growth differentials across
decades (Rodrik, 1999), growth accelerations (Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik, 2005),
1For a review of the debates see Bluhm and Szirmai (2012) and for an earlier survey see Aron (2000).
2The list of empirical studies investigating this issue is long and growing but the seminal papers are
Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002), and
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004).
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switching among multiple growth regimes (Jerzmanowski, 2006), the duration of growth
collapses (Hausmann, Rodriguez, and Wagner, 2008), start and stop growth (Jones and
Olken, 2008), real income stagnation (Reddy and Minoiu, 2009), and the duration of
growth accelerations (Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer, 2012).
This chapter relates most to studies focusing on negative growth experiences. Rodrik
(1999) provides first evidence that growth collapses are linked to terms of trade shocks,
latent conflict, and the conflict management capacity of institutions. Hausmann et al.
(2008) examine the onset and duration of growth collapses. They mainly find that
weak export performance and high inflation coincide with the onset of stagnation,
but downturns also occur together with wars, sudden stops, and political transitions.
However, most of these factors have little influence on the duration of collapses, which is
only correlated with a measure of the flexibility of a country’s export basket. Last, Reddy
and Minoiu (2009) investigate the incidence of stagnation spells (periods of negative
growth) and find that these are correlated with weak export performance, low investment,
primary commodity exports, and weak institutions.
The study of stagnation spells and other negative growth episodes is also related to
the business cycle literature and the literature on economic crises. Although the focus of
this chapter is primarily on longer-run growth episodes and not on short-run fluctuations,
these literatures provide relevant insights and hypotheses (e.g. see Diebold et al. 1993,
on duration dependence, Cerra and Saxena 2008, on post-crisis growth, and Bussie`re and
Fratzscher 2006, on recession probabilities).
Most papers in the growth episodes literature use a methodology that can be
summarized in two steps. First, a rule-based or statistical filter is applied to the data
to identify a single (or multiple) turning point(s) in the GDP series. If the filter is rule-
based, then it often includes a criterion implicitly or explicitly defining the length of the
spell. If the filter is statistical, then it may find more than one break in the data and
thus lead to the identification of distinct growth episodes. In the second step, correlates
of these episodes are examined either by testing for differences in means of potentially
correlated variables (before and during), or by estimating probit models. The unexamined
assumption in these studies is that factors affecting the onset of an episode are the same
as those determining if an episode will continue. Further, most studies of growth episodes
take very few measures to account for the possible endogeneity of the included regressors.
3 Growth episodes and long-run growth
Defining the growth episodes
Our classification of growth episodes is a modification of the approach to growth collapses
in Hausmann et al. (2008). We define a stagnation episode (or stagnation spell) as an
event that begins with a contraction of GDP per capita at a time it was higher than ever
before, and ends when GDP per capita is again at or above its pre-stagnation level. We
denote (for the purpose of this section) the log of GDP per capita in country i in year t
by Yit (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , Ti). Defined formally, a stagnation episode begins when
Yit < Yi,t−1 and Yi,t−1 ≥ maxt−1x=1 Yi,x, and lasts as long as Yi,t+p < Yi,t−1 (p = 1, 2, . . . ).
When Yi,t+p ≥ Yi,t−1, the stagnation spell is over. Conversely, we define all years when
a country is not stagnating as expansion years. In other words, an expansion episode
begins the first year a country has left (or has not yet experienced) a stagnation spell
and lasts until the beginning of the next stagnation spell.
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Apart from being very simple, these definitions have several desirable properties. A
completed stagnation episode has a net effect of zero on the level of GDP per capita,
since it includes both the downturn and the associated recovery. Conversely, the effect of
an expansion episode on the level of GDP per capita is always positive. This definition
of an expansion explicitly excludes growth that is merely restoring what was lost in past
crises, as such growth does not account for long-run increases in GDP per capita. Some
commonly used filters, such as the Hausmann et al. (2005) growth accelerations filter, do
not make this distinction between recoveries and expansions. Thus some of their growth
accelerations include recoveries. (See also Bussie`re and Fratzscher, 2006, on ‘post-crisis
bias’.)
An episode has a minimum duration of one year but can actually last for the entire
length of the sampled period (1951–2007). Based on this definition, we can identify
long stagnation episodes that may include recurring short-run recessions with incomplete
recoveries – incomplete in the sense that the maximum level of GDP per capita prior to
the crisis has not been recovered. Stagnation episodes thus deliberately subsume many
short-run business cycle fluctuations.
We further differentiate expansions and periods of stagnation into two sub-spells each.
For stagnation episodes, we distinguish between crises, lasting from the beginning of the
stagnation episode to the trough, and recoveries, lasting from the year after the trough
until the end of the stagnation spell. We define the trough to occur at the minimum
level of output occurring during a stagnation episode. For expansions, we distinguish
between moderate expansions with an average growth rate up to 5% per annum, and
rapid expansions with an average growth rate surpassing 5% per annum.3 In the – rare –
case where growth in the first recovery year is so rapid that pre-crisis output is regained in
one year, we consider that year part of an expansion, and exclude it from the stagnation
spell.
Figure 1 – Examples of growth episodes: Angola and France
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3More precisely, we measure the growth rate across an expansion as: g¯t,t+q = q
−1[lnYi,t+q − lnYit],
where q is the duration of the expansion. We classify an episode as rapid if g¯t,t+q > 0.05, and slow to
moderate if g¯t,t+q ≤ 0.05.
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We apply these definitions to GDP per capita data from the Penn World Table 6.3
(Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009). Excluding countries with less than one million
inhabitants at the latest recorded year as well as countries with less than 20 years of
data, we observe 127 countries for a period of at least 20 years between 1950 and 2007.
Within this sample, hence before the beginning of the 2007 financial upheaval, we find a
total of 578 stagnation episodes, or 3,276 country-years of stagnation.
Figure 1 illustrates how our filter works graphically as applied to Angola and France.
These two examples are typical for the different growth experiences of developed and
developing countries and show that the filter works reasonably well in identifying episodes
of interest. While Angola has had many years of positive growth throughout the sample
period, we find only three short expansion spells of which only the last is a rapid
expansion. Instead, most of the time, Angola was in one protracted stagnation episode
lasting from 1975 until the end of 2004, including significant volatility in between. On the
contrary, the French economy grew steadily since 1951 and is characterized by protracted
periods of moderate expansion, which are only temporarily interrupted by very short
stagnation spells. In the light of these two stylized cases, we propose that the incidence
of stagnation spells may explain a large part of the difference in long-run levels of GDP
per capita.
Growth profiles
Before focusing on the dynamics of moving in and out of stagnation spells, we first
take a more detailed look at the distribution of growth episodes across countries and
time. Do developing countries spend more of their time in crisis or stagnation than
advanced economies? Are they more prone to experience crisis and stagnation? Using
the previously defined growth episodes, Table 1 addresses these issues in more detail.
Table 1 – Growth episodes by income levels in 2007
% Country-years in ... Low Low-Mid Mid-High High Total
Panel A: Two episode types
Expansion 22.12 41.33 54.97 73.14 48.31
Stagnation 77.88 58.67 45.03 26.86 51.69
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: Four episode types
Expansion (above 5%) 10.21 11.52 23.18 22.66 16.99
Expansion (5% or less) 11.91 29.81 31.79 50.49 31.32
Crisis 49.90 30.63 23.81 17.42 30.18
Recovery 27.98 28.04 21.22 9.44 21.51
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: 127 countries, number of observations 6,338, percentages calculated over 1951 to 2007.
Table 1 groups the relative incidence of each type of growth episode from 1951 to
2007 by quartiles of GDP per capita in 2007. The table shows that low-income countries
spend most of their time in stagnation, upper middle-income countries almost half the
time and high-income countries only about a quarter. In other words, this suggests that
the different propensity to experience stagnation spells is closely linked to development
outcomes today. Further, using the finer classification of four distinct growth episodes
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– crisis, recovery, expansion, rapid expansion – we find that a high proportion of time
spent in crises at low income and lower-middle income levels is driving this relationship.
Once we exclude recoveries from the positive growth experiences, there is little indication
that lower income countries experience rapid growth more frequently than high income
countries during expansions (as unconditional convergence would imply). In fact, the
opposite seems to be the case. While countries in the lowest income group spend relatively
more of their expansions growing rapidly (10.21/22.12 ≈ 46.15%), upper-middle income
and high-income countries spend more time growing rapidly in total. Table 1 confirms
that currently poor countries have experienced fewer years of positive growth than rich
countries. It contradicts the assertion that once poor countries grow, they do so more
rapidly than the rich.4
As mentioned earlier, North et al. (2009) suggest lasting institutional differences
between limited access orders and open access orders as one possible explanation for
the lack of generalized convergence among economies. Developing countries with limited
access orders are less adaptive, less able to adjust to various external and internal shocks,
and more prone to economic crises and stagnation.
Table 2 – Growth episodes by institutional indicators
% Country-years in ... Low Low-Mid Mid-High High Total
Panel A: Formalization of regulations
Expansion 30.49 40.92 54.61 76.41 51.06
Stagnation 69.51 59.08 45.39 23.59 48.94
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 14.49 16.15 20.86 18.38 17.47
Expansion (5% or less) 16.00 24.78 33.75 58.03 33.60
Crisis 40.29 37.13 21.80 14.51 28.29
Recovery 29.22 21.95 23.59 9.08 20.65
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Panel B: Control and intervention
Expansion 54.98 68.17 50.56 30.55 51.06
Stagnation 45.02 31.83 49.44 69.45 48.94
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Expansion (above 5%) 25.36 13.77 20.68 11.67 17.47
Expansion (5% or less) 29.62 54.40 29.87 18.88 33.60
Crisis 26.81 18.13 28.39 39.96 28.29
Recovery 18.21 13.70 21.05 29.49 20.65
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Notes: 47 countries in 1951, 107 countries in 2007, total number of observations 5,405 (Panel A
and Panel B), percentages calculated on the basis of all years between 1951 and 2007.
Table 2 links the conjecture of North et al. (2009) and similar theories to the
approach developed in this chapter by cross-tabulating the different growth episodes
with two indices of institutional characteristics; namely, institutional formalization of
regulations and degree of control and intervention by the state. These indices are derived
from Crombrugghe and Farla (2012), who aggregate a large number of indicators from
4We constructed a similar table classifying countries by their GDP per capita in 1960 rather than at
the end of the period. Though there were some differences, the basic finding that rich countries spend
less of their time in crisis than poor countries is confirmed.
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the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) 2009 using principal components analysis.5
Similarly to the income classification used before, we group the scores on each component
into quartiles ranked from low to high. The upper panel in Table 2 shows the results for
the first component and the lower panel the results for the second.
There is a moderate negative correlation (about −0.5 for 2007) between the index of
institutional formalization of regulations and the incidence of stagnation episodes. The
countries belonging to the highest quartile on this index are in stagnation less than 25%
of the sample period, while those ranked in the lowest quartile stagnate almost 70% of
the time. In many ways these results resemble those using income groups. For example,
fast expansions occur more frequently in the upper middle quartile and crises occur
gradually less often at higher quartiles of the index. This suggests that higher institutional
formalization of regulations is associated with fewer stagnation spells and increasingly
steady growth. However, there is a strong correlation (about 0.8) between GDP per
capita and the formalization index, so the direction of causality remains indeterminate.
The bottom panel of Table 2 gives a more differentiated picture. The second principal
component, which can be interpreted as the degree of the state’s involvement in the
private economy but also as its degree of authoritarianism, is associated with more
frequent stagnation spells. The lowest incidence of stagnation spells (31.83%) occurs
within the group of countries scoring in the lower middle quartile of the index, whereas
countries in the highest quartile stagnated during nearly 70% of the sample period. As
Crombrugghe and Farla (2012, p. 17) point out, “Western European countries, the USA,
Canada, and Australia are at neither extreme of the [index]”, which suggests that very low
scores represent weak states and very high scores represent mostly authoritarian regimes.
This explains why the most stable growth profile is located in the lower middle quartile
rather than at either end of the spectrum.
This brief overview of different growth episodes between 1950 and 2007 highlights
two points. First, the incidence of stagnation spells is much higher in lower and middle
income countries than in high income countries. Second, weak institutions and especially
a lack of formalized rules and regulations could be driving less steady growth and more
frequent stagnation, but this aspect requires further analysis.
4 Explanatory variables
In the preceding section, we have reported how we defined and obtained our sample
of stagnation spells and examined their distribution. In this section, before we start
modeling the incidence of stagnation, we briefly outline the sources for and construction of
explanatory variables. These broadly belong to two categories: macroeconomic indicators
and variables describing political institutions as well as external or internal shocks to these
institutions. Table A-1 in Appendix A provides an overview.
Macroeconomic variables. We include a wide range of variables that are typically
associated with sound macroeconomic management. Most of these variables have been
found to significantly affect growth performance in traditional panel studies using annual,
quinquennial (5-year) or decennial (10-year) growth rates.
5For more details on the construction of the indices see Crombrugghe and Farla (2012). The IPD
2009 is publicly accessible at www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/recherche/bases-ipd.
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In order to control for the level of development, we include the lagged log of GDP per
capita (Log GDPC(t−1)) in nearly all models. Its expected effect is negative, considering
that richer countries tend to experience fewer and shorter stagnation spells. Controlling
for the level of GDP also serves a practical purpose. As indicated in the previous section,
indices measuring the quality of institutions and GDP are strongly correlated, so that
including both will avoid erroneously attributing effects of one to the other.
Maintaining price stability is a core task of central banks and its importance is
emphasized in the related literature (e.g. Berg et al., 2012). We expect high inflation
to be positively correlated with the onset of stagnation spells. However, the role of
inflation is likely to be ambiguous for the continuation of stagnation as it could be
instrumental – together with the exchange rate – in bringing about devaluation and
regaining competitiveness. Our measure of inflation is 100 times the log of 1 plus the
annual inflation rate. This measure is close to the actual inflation rate when that rate is
small, but also reduces the influence of larger values (e.g. rare periods of hyperinflation).
The annual inflation data is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS),
complemented with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) whenever the
former is missing.
We also measure whether the exchange rate is overvalued or undervalued in real
terms. Recent research finds that depreciations are beneficial for growth accelerations
(Hausmann et al., 2005) and stimulate growth in general (Rodrik, 2008). This positive
effect may operate through many channels, but is most commonly linked to export-
led growth and the relative price of manufactured products. On the negative side,
abrupt movements of the exchange rate can also be an omen of excessive volatility
and an upcoming currency crisis. If the positive consequences are dominant, exchange
rate undervaluation may diminish the likelihood of stagnation spells. To capture this
effect, we follow Rodrik (2008) in constructing an index of exchange rate undervaluation
(RER V alue(t−1)).6 The index is centered at zero, with higher values indicating exchange
rate undervaluation and lower values indicating overvaluation.
We include two measures of trade performance. First, we measure the price of exports
relative to imports, the terms of trade (∆ ToT(t−1)), as the annual log difference in the
net barter terms of trade from the WDI, and supplement this series with data from the
IFS when there are gaps in the WDI series. Terms of trade growth, declines and shocks
have been linked to growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999; Hausmann et al., 2008), accelerations
(Hausmann et al., 2005), and the premature end of fast growth spells (Berg et al., 2012).
Second, we also estimate the effects of changes in the value of real merchandise exports
(∆ Real Exports(t−1)), which we measure as the annual log difference in the exports
volume index from the WDI, appended with data from the IFS to extend coverage.
Growth in real exports has been found to significantly reduce the probability of the onset
of a stagnation spell (Hausmann et al., 2008). We examine if this is also the case in the
presence of dynamics.
Further, the growth literature has identified de jure financial and trade openness
as two key policy variables that positively influence growth outcomes. To account
for the former, we include the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of financial openness
(Fin. Openness(t−1)). This index is the first principal component of the inverses of
four variables measuring restrictions on external accounts, based on the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). To account
for the latter, we use a dummy measure for economic liberalization (Trade Openness(t−1))
6This index is based on the PWT 6.3 and its construction is described in more detail in Table A-1.
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developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). This
indicator is coded as one in years a given country is completely open to trade and zero
otherwise. While the index’s authors have linked their respective measures to average
growth rates, the growth episodes literature has found financial openness to precede
growth accelerations (Hausmann et al., 2005) and trade liberalization to reduce the risk
that a fast growth spell ends (Berg et al., 2012). Financial liberalization can lead to
both increasing capital inflows and financial deepening but also enable capital flight and
generally volatile capital flows. The sign of its effect is not clear ex ante. On the contrary,
we expect trade openness to unequivocally reduce the probability of stagnation.
Last, we include a measure for income inequality after taxes and transfers
(Inequality(t−1)). Net income inequality is not only an economic variable but just as
much influenced by a country’s political institutions. Most of the growth episodes
literature does not systematically analyze the role of inequality, with the exception of
an early study by Rodrik (1999) and recent evidence of a negative effect on the length
of positive growth spells (Berg et al., 2012). The effect of inequality on average growth
rates remains disputed in panel studies.7 However, parts of neo-institutional theory
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) and earlier work on the interaction of inequality and
growth collapses (Rodrik, 1999) suggest a negative sign for inequality, while earlier
theories suggests that inequality rises alongside rapid development and falls again at
higher income levels (Kuznets, 1955). Our data for net income inequality is taken
from Solt (2009), who appends, benchmarks, and standardizes data from UNU-WIDER’s
World Income Inequality Database (WIID).
Institutional and ‘shock’ variables. This set of variables aims to capture some
observable cross-country heterogeneity that can be attributed to institutions, as well as
various shocks which require a response from policy makers and economic actors within
the constraints of the political and institutional structure. These shocks may be external
or internal but have in common that they pose a challenge to the prevailing regime and/or
a country’s institutional set-up.
Cross-sectional studies of GDP levels find strong support that institutions explain
large parts of long-run growth (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu
et al., 2001, 2002) and also provide evidence that growth-enhancing institutions (e.g.
property rights or executive constraints) contribute to lower growth volatility (Acemoglu
et al., 2003). We expect that more open and democratically constrained institutions
will reduce the probability of experiencing a stagnation spell. Our measure of political
institutions is the revised combined polity score (Polity2(t−1)) from the Polity IV project
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). This measure is the difference between a country’s score
on the aggregate institutionalized democracy index and the score on the institutionalized
autocracy index coded by the Polity IV project. It has a range from −10 (hereditary
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). For studies requiring time-series, the Polity
IV data is uniquely suitable as it provides annual data, starting as early as 1800. The
Polity data mainly measures the limits on executive authority and the degree of political
participation. Although imperfect, we consider this data most closely aligned with our
notion of political institutions.8 Other regime type indicators focus purely on elections,
7See Perotti (1996), Deininger and Squire (1998), Barro (2000), and Forbes (2000).
8Polity IV scores countries on five indices capturing the openness of the political process and the
constraints placed on individual actors. We interpret the data as measuring the degree of open institutions
with narrow mandates.
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political freedoms, or the power of the elite, which makes them more suitable in other
contexts (also see Cheibub et al., 2010, for a discussion).
From Polity IV, we also derive two additional measures of political shocks. We code a
dummy for positive regime changes (Regchange +(t−1)) as major positive changes of the
political structure identified by at least a three-point improvement in the polity score.
Conversely, we code negative regime changes (Regchange −(t−1)) as a negative change of
at least three points in the polity score, including interregna and state failure. We expect
negative regime changes to increase the probability of stagnation, while positive regime
changes may have a stagnation deterring effect. Yet, regime transitions may also be a
sign of political instability or consolidation of power.
We also include a dummy for the irregular exit of leaders (Leader Exit(t−1)) based on
Archigos 2.9 (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009) as a proxy for internal shocks to
a country’s political regime. This variable codes an irregular exit whenever a country’s
major leader (president, chancellor, dictator, and so forth) lost power by violating
established rules and conventions. Such cases include, but are not limited to, the loss of
power due to the removal by foreign intervention, assassinations, ill health, and domestic
popular protest with foreign support. We focus on leader exit and not entry, as our aim
is to link periods of stagnation to unexpected adverse events and not to their possible
resolution. Some studies of growth accelerations have accounted for the sudden death of
leaders in office but usually not other types of exit (Hausmann et al., 2005; Jones and
Olken, 2008).
In order to investigate the impact of large scale violence on stagnation spells, we
include a dummy for the occurrence of War/Conflict(t−1) based on the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). We expect countries that are
the location of an interstate war or large civil strife to be especially prone to falling into
a stagnation spell. Our measure codes a war if UCDP/PRIO records a conflict intensity
of two or higher, corresponding to at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a country-year,
and if the country is recorded as a location of war. In the case of multiple conflicts, we
select the conflict with the highest intensity.
5 Empirical strategy
Most extant studies of growth episodes use pooled probit or non-linear panel methods
to study the onset of specific growth episodes, such as accelerations or collapses. We
know of only two papers concerned with modeling the duration of growth spells using
observations within the episode (Hausmann et al., 2008; Berg et al., 2012). Other studies
exploit only part of the data, either retaining only the first observation of the episodes of
interest, or comparing averages of covariates before and after a regime change (e.g. Jones
and Olken, 2008). However, we are unaware of any theoretical justification for assuming
that determinants of stagnation explain only its onset and not its continuation. Apart
from the obvious loss of efficiency, the neglect of information from within episodes also
brings with it the risk of rare event bias (King and Zeng, 2001).
In fact, state dependence is likely be a crucial feature of growth episodes in general
and of stagnation spells in particular. Yet, apart from Jerzmanowski’s (2006) Markov-
switching models, the literature does not model the incidence of a growth spell as a
dynamic process. The likely explanation is that, in dynamic non-linear models, special
efforts are required to address econometric issues such as spurious state dependence,
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endogeneity of the lagged state, unobserved heterogeneity, the initial conditions problem,
and non-linear interaction effects.
We propose to phase the issues and first introduce dynamics in a generic linear model
of stagnation episodes. This generic model will be used for an initial screening and
selection of potential explanatory variables. The linear estimates will also be used to
provide initial variance estimates for more complex nonlinear models. Ultimately, linear
estimates remain interesting as they are much less demanding in terms of statistical
assumptions than the potentially more efficient nonlinear models and provide a robust
benchmark.
For ease of exposition, we write the general model in index form, leaving the functional
form unspecified.
yit = 1[αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + x
′
ityi,t−1γ + µi + νit > 0], i = 1, . . . , N, t = 2, . . . , Ti (1)
where yit indicates whether or not a country i is stagnating in year t, yi,t−1 is the lagged
state, xit is a vector of covariates, α, β and γ are parameters to be estimated, µi is
a time-invariant unobserved country effect, and νit a residual time-varying error. The
interaction term (x′ityi,t−1γ) allows the impact of the covariates to be different in (or just
after) a stagnation spell than in expansions. For now, the unobserved effects may be of
the ‘fixed’ or ‘random’ variety: nothing is assumed about their distribution or the absence
of correlation with the explanatory variables. In most specifications, we will also include
quinquennial dummies among the regressors though not their interactions with yi,t−1.
In the linear case, the elements of the parameter vector γ can be interpreted as slope
shifts in the effects of the variables in xit if a country is or has just been in a stagnation
spell (i.e. yi,t−1 = 1), while mean shifts are captured by α. This model allows us to test
the hypothesis that specific elements or subsets of γ are equal to zero. Macroeconomics
and political economy theory provide little guidance as to whether and how some effects
should differ in the initial and later stages of a stagnation episode. Our modeling strategy
is to “let the data decide” which variables in xit require an interaction term with yi,t−1
and which do not. We proceed in four steps. First, we estimate fully interacted linear
probability models specified according to eq. (1). Second, we test whether the interaction
terms that are individually insignificant at the 10% level may also be considered jointly
insignificant. Third, based on these tests, we specify a ‘parsimonious’ reference model
retaining only those interactions that pass our inclusion criteria. Fourth, we compare the
preceding results with those found using non-linear probability models.
Linear probability models
Simplest of all is to estimate eq. (1) as a linear probability model (LPM) with country
fixed effects (FE). This approach is particularly attractive, as FE-OLS requires no
distributional assumptions about the unobserved effects and the OLS coefficients are
usually a good approximation of the partial effects near the means of the variables.
However, the variance of the dependent variable is known to be of the form x′itβ(1−x′itβ),
making the LPM inherently heteroskedastic. Furthermore, the LPM can predict
probabilities outside the unit interval and hence non-positive variances, unless the
predictions are arbitrarily trimmed.
In model (1), the LPM has two further shortcomings. First, it implies awkward
restrictions on the unobserved effects. Second, since the same unobserved effects (µi) also
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appear in the lagged state yi,t−1, their presence means that the ‘Within’ OLS estimate
of α is downward biased (Nickell, 1981). The ‘Nickell bias’ is decreasing in T . Our panel
has an average length of about 18 years; therefore the bias should be moderate.
For comparison, we also estimate eq. (1) using differenced and system Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators. Differenced GMM uses lagged levels of order
two and higher as instruments for the endogenous regressors in a differenced equation
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). To alleviate problems of weak
instrumentation, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the
‘system GMM’ estimator that instruments levels with lagged differences and estimates
the equation both in differences and in levels simultaneously. Under the appropriate
conditions system GMM is consistent and more efficient than differenced GMM. The
extra moment conditions require that the lagged differences are not correlated with the
unobserved effects. In addition, system GMM requires that the initial conditions (yi1)
represent a stationary equilibrium, which is arguably an unnatural assumption for the
analysis of stagnation spells. We apply two-step system GMM with a small sample
correction due to Windmeijer (2005).
System GMM is not a universal panacea. Bun and Windmeijer (2010) recently showed
that the level equation in system GMM also suffers from a weak instruments problem.
Differenced or system GMM estimates are also often unstable and strongly depend on
the instrument matrix used (Roodman, 2009). For this reason, we do not use GMM for
model selection but only apply it to the ‘parsimonious’ specification to check whether the
results remain within a reasonable range of the FE-OLS estimates.
Non-linear probability models
Simple within or first-difference transformations cannot eliminate unobserved
heterogeneity in non-linear probability models like logit and probit models. Instead,
the assumptions made on the structure of the unobserved effects determine which type
of model can be estimated. We apply two techniques: fixed effects logit and dynamic
random-effects probit. On the one hand, the fixed effects logit estimator is less restrictive
in its assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity but similarly to the LPM with
FE, it does not deal with the endogeneity of the lagged state. On the other hand,
the dynamic random effects probit estimator requires explicit assumptions about the
unobserved heterogeneity, but has been modified to account for the endogeneity of the
lagged state, including solutions for the initial conditions problem.
Fixed effects logit. The dummy variables fixed effects logit model estimated by
unconditional Maximum Likelihood (ML) runs into a statistical problem. Even in a
simplified version of eq. (1) without the lagged state, we need a consistent estimate over
t = 1, ..., Ti for each of the unobserved effects µi. Any inconsistency introduced there will
contaminate the estimate of β. This is the well-known incidental parameters problem
which, for balanced panels, creates a bias in the ML estimator of β in the order of 1/T
(Neyman and Scott, 1948). Given the lengths of our series, we do not expect the bias to
be large.
Chamberlain (1980) observed that there is a computational trick that allows consistent
estimation of the parameter vector but not the constants by conditioning on the sum of
observed outcomes within groups (
∑Ti
t=1 yit). In the conditional logit model the incidental
parameters (µi) drop out. However, conditioning on the sum of the observed outcomes
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comes at a cost. Since groups in which yit does not change over Ti provide no information
for the likelihood, they drop out of the log-likelihood. If there is strong persistence the
number of observations used in the estimation may fall a lot. Likewise, time-invariant
effects cancel out of the estimation equation. They cannot be estimated, neither can
partial effects since these depend on the expected value of the unobserved effects.
Given the expectation that the unconditional ML estimator is not too strongly biased
and allows estimation of partial effects, we estimate both models and compare their
results.
Dynamic random effects probit. Conditioning on the sum of the observed outcomes
does not work for the equivalent probit model. Furthermore, the standard random effects
probit model assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is strictly unrelated to the
explanatory variables. The presence of the lagged state (yi,t−1) together with µi violates
this assumption even if α is actually zero (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 626). This is the problem
of true versus spurious state dependence. The estimated effect of yi,t−1 depends on three
sources: (1) serial correlation in the errors, (2) correlation with the unobserved effects,
and (3) true state dependence (Greene, 2011, p. 769). In such a setting, the ordinary fixed
or random effects estimation techniques do not provide consistent estimates. In addition,
the outcome path may be severely influenced by the initial conditions (yi1), which enter
the unconditional likelihood function and prohibit integrating out the unobserved effects
(µi). We are faced with two related problems: the violation of strict exogeneity in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, and the treatment of the initial condition in the
log-likelihood.
A relaxation of the strict exogeneity assumption known as correlated random effects
has been developed for static models following the ideas of Mundlak (1978) and
Chamberlain (1984). The approach allows for correlation between xit and µi but restricts
the unobserved effects to depend on means (or other values) of the explanatory variables
according to µi = η0 + x¯
′
iη2 + εi, where the εi are assumed to be i.i.d. and normally
distributed. The vector x¯i consists of time-averages (or other values, like initial levels) of
the regressors xit.
9 While this approach relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption, it does
not address the issue of dynamics and the related initial conditions problem.
Several solutions to the initial conditions problem have been proposed (see Heckman,
1981; Orme, 2001; Wooldridge, 2005). Wooldridge (2005) suggests to condition the
density (yi1, ..., yiTi) on the observed history of the covariates and the initial values by
specifying a distribution of the unobserved effects given the initial conditions. Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal (2013) show that this simple method performs well in general and
Akay (2012) provides Monte Carlo evidence that a constrained model (with time-averages)
also works well in unbalanced panels as long the time series lengths are moderately large.
Concretely, Wooldridge (2005) proposes to condition on the entire time series of the
strictly exogenous variables less the initial period plus the initial condition (yi1) – an
approach that easily extends to interactions. A convenient way to specify the conditional
distribution of the unobserved effects is µi|yi1, x¯i ∼ N (η0 + η1yi1 + x¯′iη2 + x¯′iyi1η3, σ2ε),
where x¯i are the time-averages as in Mundlak-Chamberlain. This implies the following
parametric specification for the unobserved effects: µi = η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2 + x¯
′
iyi1η3 + εi,
where the εi are normal, i.i.d., and independent of (yi1, x¯i).
9Further, this model implies Corr(εi + νit, εi + νis) = σ
2
ε/(σ
2
ε + σ
2
ν) for any t 6= s.
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As a final model, we specify the constrained probit version of eq. (1):
(2)P (yit = 1|xi2, . . . ,xiTi , yi,t−1, . . . , yi1, εi) =
Φ(αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + x
′
ityi,t−1γ + η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2 + x¯
′
iyi1η3 + εi)
where xit is the vector of explanatory variables, yi,t−1 is the lagged state, x¯i is the vector of
time-averages of the covariates, the vector γ allows for differential effects of the covariates
depending on the state (xityi,t−1), η1 measures the effect of the initial condition (yi1), and
the vector η3 measures the effect of the averaged covariates depending on the initial
condition (x¯iyi1). Estimation still proceeds over i = 1, ..., N and t = 2, ..., Ti.
Appendix B outlines why the average partial effects (APEs), which are not identified
in the conditional logit model, are in fact identified in this random effects probit model.
This model addresses all three fundamental issues involved in our research problem. It
specifies a data-coherent functional form, relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption, and
consistently estimates the APE of time-varying variables and the lagged state variable in
the presence of unobserved effects.
Partial effects of interactions. It is well known that the partial effects in non-linear
models are not constant and that the model coefficients only indicate the direction and
approximate significance of the effects. A somewhat less well known fact is that non-
linearity necessarily implies that the coefficients of the interaction terms do not represent
the sign, size or significance of the underlying interaction effect (e.g. see Ai and Norton,
2003; Greene, 2010).
Let F (wit;θ) = F (αyi,t−1 + x′itβ+ x
′
ityi,t−1γ +µi) denote a generic non-linear version
of our interaction model with an implicit error, and let hats indicate estimated values.
The change in the partial effect of xk,it ∈ xit due to a regime switch into stagnation
(∆yi,t−1 = 1) is
PE(γˆk)it = ∆F
′
k(wit; θˆ) = F
′
k(wit; θˆ|yi,t−1 = 1)− F ′k(wit; θˆ|yi,t−1 = 0) (3)
where F ′k(wit; θˆ) can denote either a partial derivative with respect to xk,it or a difference,
depending on whether xk,it is discrete or continuous, and in either case we write
F ′k(wit; θˆ) = ∂F (wit; θˆ)/∂xk,it.
Clearly, γˆk is not equal to the interaction effect as it would be in a linear model. Now
it is straightforward to also compute the APE for either ∆yi,t−1 = 1 or ∆yi,t−1 = −1 as
APE(γˆk) =
1
N(T¯ − 1)
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=2
∆F ′(wit; θˆ)
∆yi,t−1
(4)
where T¯ is the average panel size.
We compute the standard errors of the APEs using the delta method, so that the
asymptotic variance of the APE of an interaction with the lagged state is
ÂVar[APE(γˆk)] =
∂APE(γˆk)
∂θˆ′
Ω̂
∂APE(γˆk)
∂θˆ
(5)
and Ω̂ is the ML estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of θˆ. For the observation-
specific partial effects the Jacobian vectors are not averaged.
30 Chapter 2. The dynamics of stagnation
6 Results and discussion
Linear models. Table 3 reports the results from variations of the LPM. Since we
primarily use the linear models for variable selection, we only briefly discuss the results
and defer the economic interpretation until the description of the preferred specification
in the next subsection. Column (1) is the standard fixed effects model with standard
errors clustered at the country level. Column (2) is similar but allows for arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within both country and time clusters (Cameron,
Gelbach, and Miller, 2011). Column (3) shows the FGLS estimator with clustering at
the country level via the weights. Column (4) is the parsimonious FGLS specification
discarding those interaction terms that are individually and jointly insignificant. Columns
(5) and (6) re-estimate (4) using system GMM.
Two joint hypothesis tests reported in Table 3 are key to our model-building approach.
First, we test if the coefficients of the interactions with the lagged state and the coefficient
of the lagged state are jointly zero; taken together these variables comprise Set I. In all
models this hypothesis is rejected, indicating the presence of dynamics. Second, we test
whether the interactions with the lagged state that are individually insignificant at the
10% level (i.e., Set II) can also be jointly omitted. In columns (1) to (4), the insignificant
interactions pass this joint-exclusion test, but not in the GMM estimates.
All fully-interacted specifications provide very similar results. Inflation, financial
openness, trade openness, and negative regime changes clearly affect the probability of
entering a stagnation spell. Considering the interactions, the coefficients of inflation, trade
openness, and negative regime changes are significant in most but not all specifications.
Interestingly, the interaction terms often have the opposite sign of the non-interacted
coefficients, indicating that the respective effects are weaker within a stagnation spell.
Column (4) only retains the significant interactions and represents our parsimonious
specification which we later re-estimate with non-linear techniques. We still find evidence
that inflation, trade openness, and negative regime changes have a different impact within
the spell than on the onset probabilities. However, the interaction effect of financial
openness is, again, insignificant.
The system GMM specifications in columns (5) and (6) assess the stability of the
parameter estimates once we account for the endogeneity of the lagged state and the
interactions with the lagged state. While the significance of individual coefficients
changes between the two GMM models, the sizes and signs of the previously highlighted
coefficients remain broadly similar. In column (5) we use the second and third lag of
the predetermined variables as instruments. Nevertheless, the J-test indicates that the
number of instruments is too large relative to the group size. We address this concern in
column (6) by collapsing the instrument set (see Roodman, 2009). There is no evidence
of instrument endogeneity and the estimated parameters come closer to the earlier least-
squares estimates. However, applying GMM in our context is not ideal. A moderate
T¯ quickly leads to instrument proliferation and problems in identifying an instrument
set that balances efficiency gains with decreasing relevance. Accordingly, we place less
emphasis on the GMM results and rely more on verifying the results from the preceding
linear models with non-linear techniques.
The linear models point to several preliminary conclusions. First, we find that
inflation, financial openness, trade openness, and negative regime changes have a
statistically significant effect on the probability of stagnation, and so do to a lesser extent
exchange rate undervaluation and inequality. Second, state dependence plays a large
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role in determining whether a country experiences a stagnation episode or not. Third,
in all specifications there is considerable evidence of unobserved heterogeneity at the
country level. Fourth, all significant interaction terms with the lagged state point into
the direction opposite of their linear counterparts.
Non-linear models. Turning to the non-linear models, we first discuss the
heterogeneity of the interaction effects using a logit specification and then present the
results from the dynamic random effects probit estimator (our preferred specification).
Table 4 shows the estimation results from two types of fixed effects logit estimators.
As a reference, column (1) shows the fully interacted model estimated using conditional
maximum likelihood, where the fixed effects are not estimated but drop out. Column (2)
is the conditional logit equivalent of the parsimonious linear model, and column (3a) is
the same model using dummy variables for the country fixed effects. The last column
(3b) reports the APEs based on column (3a). The APEs of interaction terms are reported
similarly to coefficients of a linear model; that is, if yi,t−1 = 0, the APE is reported in the
row of the non-interacted variable and, for yi,t−1 = 1, the total APE is the sum of the
former and the APE of the interaction term.
A complication in interpreting the results of the conditional logit models is that the
APEs are not identified, for the simple reason that the individual country effects are
not estimated. In order to approximate the APEs, we estimate the equivalent dummy
variables fixed effects logit model and compute the APEs based on its results. Columns
(2) and (3a) show that the parameter estimates and the corresponding standard errors
remain very similar, justifying this approach.
We still find evidence that inflation, financial openness, trade liberalization, and
negative regime changes significantly affect the probability of stagnation. However,
for all but negative regime changes, the APEs of the interaction terms are statistically
insignificant and, in the case of financial openness, the interaction effect no longer points
in the opposite direction. Applying fixed effects logit also substantially reduces the
estimation sample to 1314 observations in 62 countries, for lack of within-group variation.
This loss of observations makes it impossible to identify the effect of the negative regime
change interaction term; as a consequence, the interaction is dropped from the earlier
parsimonious model.
The APEs are close to the linear approximation in terms of size. Notable changes
are that now the effects of changes in the terms of trade, real exchange rate (RER)
undervaluation, and inequality are all significant at the 10% level and have increased
substantially in absolute size. The degree of state dependence identified by the logit
model is also somewhat higher than in the linear approximation (a 32.1 percentage points
higher probability of continuation if a country was stagnating the year before).
Table 4 may seem to provide little evidence that some variables have a different impact
on the onset of a stagnation spell than on its continuation. However, in non-linear models,
the partial effects of the interaction can be very heterogeneous at the observation level
and may be individually significant for a substantial subset of observations. By definition,
APEs ‘average out’ this type of heterogeneity which can be especially troublesome if the
partial effects switch signs. In Figure 2 we examine these non-linearities more closely.
The figure graphs the distributions of partial effects for the interaction terms of inflation,
financial openness, and trade openness over the predicted probability of stagnation, as
well as the associated p-values of a Wald-test of the null that the interaction effect at
each particular observation is zero.
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Table 4 – Logit Models – Probability of Stagnation
(1) (2) (3a) (3b)
Independent Variable Logit CML S.E. Logit CML S.E. Logit ML S.E. APEs S.E.
Log GDPC(t−1) 0.417 0.707 0.430 0.695 0.430 0.738 0.058 0.099
Inflation(t−1) 0.037 0.025 0.043 0.026 0.046 0.028 0.006* 0.004
∆ ToT(t−1) -0.556 0.571 -0.828* 0.479 -0.885* 0.516 -0.119* 0.070
∆ Real Exports(t−1) -0.784 1.163 -0.621 0.735 -0.681 0.795 -0.091 0.107
RER Value(t−1) -1.375** 0.567 -0.957* 0.503 -1.020* 0.533 -0.137* 0.071
Fin. Openness(t−1) -0.453*** 0.121 -0.396*** 0.110 -0.421*** 0.118 -0.058*** 0.016
Trade Openness(t−1) -1.441*** 0.486 -1.424*** 0.456 -1.527*** 0.489 -0.259*** 0.091
Inequality(t−1) -0.050 0.031 -0.052* 0.029 -0.054* 0.030 -0.007* 0.004
Polity2(t−1) -0.066 0.044 -0.051 0.033 -0.054 0.036 -0.007 0.005
Regchange +(t−1) 0.193 0.561 0.129 0.376 0.136 0.397 0.018 0.054
Regchange −(t−1) 2.102** 0.900 1.945** 0.938 2.038** 0.991 0.288** 0.135
Leader Exit(t−1) -0.501 0.426 -0.060 0.317 -0.058 0.334 -0.007 0.044
War/Conflict(t−1) 0.115 0.382 -0.428 0.342 -0.454 0.357 -0.059 0.045
Log GDPC(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.082 0.284
Inflation(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.012 0.012 -0.019 0.015 -0.021 0.016 -0.002 0.002
∆ ToT(t−1) × y(t−1) -1.128 1.025
∆ Real Exports(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.290 1.244
RER Value(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.859 0.624
Fin. Openness(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.144 0.117 0.045 0.107 0.045 0.116 -0.011 0.022
Trade Openness(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.947* 0.528 0.885* 0.487 0.939* 0.521 0.153 0.094
Inequality(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.003 0.019
Polity2(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.013 0.042
Regchange +(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.164 0.620
Leader Exit(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.833* 0.506
War/Conflict(t−1) × y(t−1) -1.051* 0.537
y(t−1) -0.004 2.813 1.189*** 0.456 1.282*** 0.487 0.321*** 0.029
Observations 1314 1314 1314
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
5 Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Errors [Country] Yes Yes Yes
Countries 62 62 62
Log-pseudolikelihood -465.864 -469.311 -555.547
Notes: In column (1) Regchange −(t−1) × y(t−1) had been dropped due to a lack of within-group
variance. The asymptotic standard errors of the APEs are computed via the delta method.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
Clearly, the partial effects of all three interaction terms are extremely non-linear
and tend to include both positive and negative values. In the case of inflation, we find
that for some observations the partial effect is positive, while for most observations it
is negative and insignificant. The effect is significant only at negative values for a very
small fraction of the distribution (30 observations) and ranges from −0.95% to 0.39%,
which is moderately large compared to an APE of 0.6% when yi,t−1 = 0. The predicted
partial effects group into two families of curves with an S-shape. The curves at lower
stagnation probabilities are the partial effects for observations where yi,t−1 = 0 (symbol:
o) and the curves going across higher stagnation probabilities are the predicted effects
for observations where yi,t−1 = 1 (symbol: x). The dashed line refers to the APE in the
upper panel and the p-value of a Wald test that the APE is zero in the lower panel.
The interaction effect for financial openness is also S-shaped but sloping upwards and
ranges from −6.9% to 7.6%. The partial effect is statistically significant for 14% of the
predicted outcomes at both negative and positive values. However, similarly to inflation,
the large range of insignificant negative and positive values supports the conclusion that
the effect is not different from zero on average. In contrast, the evidence of a significant
interaction is relatively strong for trade openness. For most observations the partial effect
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Figure 2 – Partial Effects of Interaction Terms in Logit Model
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Notes: The dashed line refers to the APE in the upper panel and the p-value of a Wald test that
the APE is zero in the lower panel.“Predicted Probability” is the probability of stagnation
P (yit = 1).
of the interaction term is positive and very large, with an overall range from −3% to 30%.
For about 32% of the observations in the sample the partial effect of the interaction term
is individually significant at the 5% level.
Overall, the logit specifications confirm the findings of the linear models given a few
refinements. Inflation, financial openness, trade openness, and negative regime changes
remain significant predictors of being in stagnation. Furthermore, these estimates suggest
that exchange rate undervaluation, changes in the terms of trade, and inequality affect
the probability of stagnation. However, the evidence in favor of interaction effects with
the lagged state for any other variable than trade openness is weak; the estimates suggest
that only trade openness has a different impact on the onset of a stagnation spell than
its continuation.
We now turn to the last and final set of estimates. Table 5 presents the random
effects probit estimates of the dynamic panel model. For comparison purposes, we first
report the na¨ıve pooled probit version of the fully-interacted dynamic model and then its
random effects counterpart estimated according to the Wooldridge approach – columns
(1) and (2), respectively. Column (3a) is parsimonious version of the dynamic random
effects model in column (2) and our preferred specification. Column (3b) reports the
APEs of the variables of interest and their associated standard errors.
We report several additional rows in Table 5 to display the regression results more
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Table 5 – Probit Models – Probability of Stagnation
(1) (2) (3a) (3b)
Independent Variable Probit S.E. Woold S.E. Woold S.E. APEs S.E.
Log GDPC(t−1) 0.027 0.103 0.449 0.377 0.398 0.367 0.083 0.076
Inflation(t−1) 0.017*** 0.006 0.012 0.008 0.020*** 0.008 0.005*** 0.002
∆ ToT(t−1) -0.328 0.300 -0.435 0.476 -0.321 0.349 -0.067 0.072
∆ Real Exports(t−1) -0.226 0.540 -0.570 0.565 -0.362 0.358 -0.075 0.074
RER Value(t−1) -0.719*** 0.202 -0.786** 0.331 -0.513* 0.278 -0.106* 0.058
Fin. Openness(t−1) -0.056 0.039 -0.205*** 0.074 -0.153** 0.073 -0.038** 0.018
Trade Openness(t−1) -0.567*** 0.217 -0.926*** 0.240 -0.774*** 0.228 -0.218*** 0.068
Inequality(t−1) 0.014** 0.007 -0.026 0.016 -0.022 0.015 -0.004 0.003
Polity2(t−1) -0.014 0.013 -0.031 0.020 -0.027* 0.016 -0.006* 0.003
Regchange +(t−1) 0.039 0.269 0.138 0.405 0.066 0.220 0.014 0.046
Regchange −(t−1) 1.074* 0.557 1.238** 0.617 1.047* 0.584 0.214* 0.112
Leader Exit(t−1) -0.196 0.188 -0.118 0.235 -0.006 0.171 -0.001 0.035
War/Conflict(t−1) 0.110 0.257 0.280 0.374 -0.199 0.246 -0.041 0.051
Log GDPC(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.259 0.182 -0.129 0.154
Inflation(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.008 0.006 -0.004 0.008 -0.012 0.008 -0.003 0.002
∆ ToT(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.091 0.393 -0.097 0.750
∆ Real Exports(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.435 0.574 0.286 0.745
RER Value(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.635 0.390 0.532* 0.308
Fin. Openness(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.096 0.060 0.086 0.078 -0.019 0.068 -0.006 0.017
Trade Openness(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.474 0.321 0.816*** 0.262 0.646*** 0.238 0.186*** 0.067
Inequality(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.011
Polity2(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.008 0.022 0.005 0.020
Regchange +(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.166 0.284 -0.137 0.482
Leader Exit(t−1) × y(t−1) 0.290 0.259 0.201 0.290
War/Conflict(t−1) × y(t−1) -0.267 0.404 -0.803* 0.458
y0 0.969 2.621 1.244*** 0.477
y(t−1) 3.407* 1.787 1.554 1.569 1.020*** 0.229 0.389*** 0.035
Constant -1.287 1.105 -0.733 2.482 -2.958 1.871
Observations 1586 1471 1596
η2-estimated? NO YES YES
η3-estimated? NO YES YES
5-Year FE YES YES YES
Countries 90 81 90
Pseudo-R2 0.423 0.269 0.255
Log-likelihood -632.218 -574.211 -596.272
Notes: In column (1) Regchange −(t−1) × y(t−1) had been dropped due to a lack of within-group
variance. The asymptotic standard errors of the APEs are computed via the delta method.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗ p < 0.1.
succinctly. The row “η2-estimated?” refers to whether the Mundlak-Chamberlain time-
averages are included. As these are not interesting by themselves, we do not report their
coefficients and partial effects. Similarly, the row “η3-estimated?” reports whether the
interaction terms are included twice, once as an interaction with the lagged state and
once as an interaction with the initial condition. We also do not report the parameter
estimates of the latter, as they primarily account for the non-random nature of the
unobserved effects.
The random effects probit model gives different (and superior) estimates compared
to the pooled probit version.10 Several parameters exhibit sign changes and substantial
changes in significance levels. More interestingly, even though the Wooldridge estimator
of the dynamic model includes several additional terms and requires the assumption
that the regressors are only correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity through their
10The coefficients are scaled differently. The comparison should be done in terms of relative sizes,
signs, and significance levels – where appropriate.
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averages, the results are remarkably similar to those of the linear models (in Table 3) and
logit specifications (in Table 4). We do not compute the partial effects at the observation-
level as only the APEs across the entire distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity are
identified (see Appendix B and Wooldridge, 2005).
The APE of inflation is similar to that in the previous models. According to the
Wooldridge estimator, a unit increase in the inflation index in t − 1 translates into 0.5
percentage points higher probability of stagnation in year t, if the country was not in
stagnation in t − 1. The APE of the interaction effect is −0.3% and insignificant at all
conventional levels, supporting the view that inflation increases the chances of stagnation,
no matter if this occurs within or outside of a stagnation spell. We find no evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that (higher) inflation helps exiting a stagnation spell.
Next, the effect of financial openness is also similar to that estimated by the linear
probability model. A unit increase in the Chinn-Ito index towards more openness reduces
the probability of stagnation by 3.8 percentage points. The APE of the interaction term is
small and insignificant (−0.6%), suggesting that there is no difference between onset and
continuation probabilities. This result is particularly interesting, since capital account
openness is sometimes restricted during crises to avert capital flight. Yet we find no
evidence that it increases the risk of stagnation when a country is already stagnating,
but instead it seems to be associated with a lower probability of crisis throughout.
In the case of trade openness, a discrete change towards openness when yi,t−1 = 0
has an average partial effect of −21.8%, which is similar to the previous results. The
interaction term is highly significant and has a very large effect on the predicted
probability of stagnation (18.6%). Adding these two effects, we get the APE for the
probability of continued stagnation if yi,t−1 = 1 and the country is open to trade which
is still negative but statistically insignificant (−3.2%). Trade openness has already
been shown to affect growth rates (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008), growth accelerations
(Hausmann et al., 2005), and the duration of positive growth spells (Berg et al., 2012).
Our results add that open economies are significantly less likely to fall into a stagnation
spell – it is the single largest effect of a non-political variable in all specifications – but
also that openness does not significantly improve the chances of exiting a stagnation spell.
This finding suggests that, on top of typically being linked to higher average growth
rates, trade openness is ‘good for growth’ in the sense that it protects countries from
stagnation. While trade benefits growth through specialization, technological diffusion,
and higher investment levels, it can also stabilize and accelerate growth but it does
not necessarily lead to shorter crises (especially when these are caused by international
factors). Arguably, the weaker within-stagnation effect could also be driven by the fact
that countries often liberalize in response to an ongoing crisis which often yields no
immediate benefits and can temporarily increase volatility (Wacziarg and Welch, 2008).
Regarding the political shocks, the confidence interval of the APE of negative regime
changes widens a bit (the t-statistic is 1.90), but the absolute size of the effect remains
large. If a country experiences a negative regime change, then the probability of
stagnation increases by 21.4 percentage points. As in the logit models, we could not
include the interaction term due to a lack of time variation. Whereas negative regime
changes were previously linked to the onset of growth accelerations (Hausmann et al.,
2005), our analysis reveals the more plausible result that they strongly predict stagnation
episodes. None of the other political variables, that is positive regime changes, irregular
leader exits or the Polity score, are robustly related with the incidence of stagnation
spells. This finding stands in sharp contrast to the ‘institutions trump other factors’
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perspective (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al., 2004) but could be driven
by our focus on annual transitions in and out of crises (which are likely to be caused by
more proximate factors). Aidt and Gassebner (2010), for example, find that the level of
trade integration is endogenous to the political regime. Autocratic countries trade less
than democracies, but steps towards improving the accountability of leaders can lead to
higher trade integration in the medium-run.
Undervaluation of the real exchange rate has a moderate and marginally significant
effect on the probability of stagnation. A one standard deviation change in the
undervaluation index reduces the probability of both the onset and continuation of
stagnation by about 4%. We cannot corroborate the results from the logit model that
changes in the terms of trade and inequality have any meaningful effect on the probability
of stagnation. In addition, wars, and civil conflict do not predict stagnation spells, and
there is no evidence of an effect of the level of GDP per capita.
Table 5 also reveals that the degree of state dependence is underestimated by both
the LPM and FE logit model. If a country experienced stagnation in the previous year,
it is 38.9 percentage points more likely to be in stagnation in the current year. Path
dependence is thus an important feature of the stagnation process. The models also fit
the data reasonably well (Pseudo-R2 = 0.255) and the fit compares favorably to the onset
models used elsewhere (e.g. Hausmann et al., 2005, 2008) – although these goodness of fit
criteria are not strictly comparable. Hence, we find that dynamic models a) allow us to
test refined hypotheses about the difference between onset and continuation of stagnation
spells, and b) lead to better predictions of when stagnation occurs.
To summarize, the main results are robust to different specifications, assumptions
about the unobserved effects, and correlation between the observed variables and
unobserved country-effects. Most of the preferred specifications identify the lags of
inflation and negative regime changes as strong predictors of stagnation episodes. Several
models also identify trade openness and financial openness as relevant. The non-linear
models add three important insights. First, there is less evidence of interaction effects
with the lagged state than the LPM suggests. The interactions are highly non-linear
and vary significantly across the sample, but only in the case of trade openness we
find convincing evidence that its effect differs depending on whether the country was
in stagnation before or not. The evidence of interaction effects between the lagged state
and inflation, financial openness, or negative regime changes is weak. Second, the non-
linear models show that the real exchange rate matters for stagnation. An overvalued real
exchange rate raises the chances of stagnation, while undervaluation reduces it. Third,
the level of state dependence is still moderate, but larger than estimated by the linear
models with fixed effects.
We also find that lagging all included regressors by one year to assure that they
are at least contemporaneously exogenous results in identifying very different factors as
significant than if the issue of endogeneity is left unaddressed. For example Hausmann
et al. (2008), who studied the onset of stagnation, found that exports, inflation, wars,
and political transitions matter. We do not find significant effects for exports and wars,
although we do confirm their results for inflation and negative regime changes.
Interestingly, we cannot confirm two central results of the previous literature. First,
we find little evidence that, apart from negative regime changes, institutions generally
affect the incidence of stagnation. Consistent with the institutionalist literature, we find
that poor countries are more prone to stagnation and crisis, but our analysis contradicts
the hypotheses that weak institutions increase the incidence of stagnation. On the
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contrary, traditional macroeconomic variables predict the incidence of stagnation rather
well. Second and contrary to previous research (Rodrik, 1999; Hausmann et al., 2008),
our data does not support the finding that changes in real exports or terms of trade affect
the probability of stagnation.
7 Concluding remarks
This chapter provides a dynamic analysis of the incidence of stagnation and examines
if stagnation spells are determined by institutional factors, various shocks, or
macroeconomic factors. Building on a recent contribution by Hausmann et al. (2008), we
define stagnation spells as episodes in which GDP per capita is below previously achieved
levels. We then use fixed effects linear models, GMM, fixed effects logit, and dynamic
random effects probit to assess the role of institutions, political shocks, and economic
factors. In contrast to the previous literature, we explicitly examine the hypothesis that
the effects of variables on the onset of stagnation and on the continuation of stagnation
may be different.
We identify several factors that explain the incidence of stagnation spells. Adverse
regime changes have the single largest effect on the incidence of stagnation, while higher
inflation increases the chances of being in stagnation. More surprisingly, we find that real
exchange rate undervaluation, financial openness, and trade openness help reduce the
chances of stagnation. Additionally, we evidence that trade openness primarily protects
against falling into stagnation, but does not speed up recovery. For all other variables
there is no evidence of a differential impact on onset versus continuation.
Though traditional macroeconomic factors have the upper hand in our explanations
of stagnation compared to institutional factors, we do not yet know to what extent
macroeconomic factors are in turn influenced by underlying institutional characteristics.
The use of more differentiated measures and time series for institutions as well as
additional techniques for dealing with endogeneity might add further insights. This is a
promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix A: Variables definitions
Table A-1 – Independent Variables, Description, Construction and Sources
Name Description Construction Data Source
Log GDPC(t−1) Logarithm of GDP per capita ln(RGDPCHi,t−1) PWT 6.3
Inflation(t−1) Change in consumer prices 100× ln(1 + [gCPIi,t−1]) IFS & WDIa
∆ ToT(t−1) Change in terms of trade ln(TOTi,t−1)− ln(TOTi,t−2) WDI & IFSb
∆ Real Exports(t−1) Change in exports volumes ln(EXPi,t−1)− ln(EXPi,t−2) WDI & IFSc
RER Value(t−1) Real exchange rate valuation see noted PWT 6.3
Fin. Openness(t−1) Capital account openness KAOPENi,t−1 Chinn-Ito ’09
Trade Openness(t−1) Trade liberalization measure 1 if open in t− 1 W-W ’08
Inequality(t−1) Gini coefficient for income GINIi,t−1 Solt ’09
Polity2(t−1) Revised combined polity score DEMOCi,t−1−AUTOCi,t−1 Polity IV
Regchange +(t−1) Positive regime change based on REGTRANSi,t−1e Polity IV
Regchange −(t−1) Negative regime change based on REGTRANSi,t−1e Polity IV
Leader Exit(t−1) Irregular exit of leader 1 if EXITi,t−1 6= 1g Archigos 2.9
War/Conflict(t−1) Conflicts (≥ 1000 deaths) see notef UCDP/PRIO
a We use the IFS series (CPI y-o-y %-change based on line 64) as a benchmark and append it with the
WDI series in 59 cases where the former has missing data.
b We use the WDI series as a benchmark (which comprises of UNCTAD and IFS data) and append it
with the export volume index from the IFS for missing years/countries.
c From the WDI 2011, we use the series ‘net barter terms of trade’, and from the IFS, we derive the
equivalent net barter terms of trade by dividing the unit value of exports (line 74) by the unit value
of imports (line 75) and multiplying the result by 100. We then append the WDI series of growth
rates with the growth rates from the IFS series whenever the former has missing information.
d Rodrik (2008) proposes a simple way to calculate an index of “real” exchange rate (RER)
overvaluation based only on the Penn World Tables. The method involves three steps. (1) compute the
PPP-adjusted exchange rate: ln(RERit) = ln(XRATit/PPPit). (2) Estimate the Balassa-Samuelson
effect: ln(RERit) = α+β ln(RGDPCHit)+γt+uit. (3) Take the difference between the actual RER
and the predicted RER from (2), hence: RER Value(i,t−1) = ln(RER(i,t−1)− ln( ̂RERi,t−1).
e We use the Polity IV variable REGTRANS to identify regime changes in either direction based on
a minimum 3-point change in a country’s democracy or autocracy score. We exclude the code 0 for
“minor changes”, which denotes any change in the democracy or autocracy scores. Further, we do
not code -77 for “interregna”, -66 for (foreign) “interruptions” and -88 for regime “transitions” as
negative regime changes to avoid collinearity with the leader exit and war/conflict dummies.
f This dummy is constructed based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946– 2010.
We first converted the conflict-year database into country-year format and then coded the intensity
levels for the highest intensity conflict in any given country-year. The dummy is unity if the intensity
level of the conflict was coded as 2 in t− 1 and the country was listed as a location of the conflict.
g The Archigos 2.9 time-series database records entries, tenure and exits of country leaders and the
conditions on which they entered and exited. In some instances there are multiple observations per
country-year, in such an event we code an irregular exit if any one observation within that year is
identified as “irregular”. Irregular exit refers to leaders that died in office, committed suicide, or left
office due to ill health, other irregular means or the deposition by another state.
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Appendix B: Average partial effects
Wooldridge (2005) shows that in the dynamic random effects probit model, a consistent
and
√
N -asymptotically normal estimator of the APEs of time-varying variables is
available. However, the APEs of time-invariant covariates are not identified. Using
the same assumptions as in Section 5, we can write the conditional expectation over the
distribution of µi as:
E[Φ(αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + µi)] = E[Φ(αyi,t−1 + x
′
itβ + η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2 + εi)] (B-1)
where xit denotes time-varying regressors, x¯i their time-averages, and εi = µi − η0 −
η1yi1 − x¯′iη2. The expectation runs over the distribution of (yi1, x¯i, εi).
Following Wooldridge (2005), we can get rid of the unobserved effects by applying the
law of iterated expectations and defining the average structural function (ASF):
ASF(xit, yi,t−1) = E[E[Φ(αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2 + εi)|yi1, x¯i]] (B-2)
= E[Φ[(αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2)× (1 + σ2ε)−1/2]] (B-3)
= E[Φ(αεyi,t−1 + x′itβε + ηε,0 + ηε,1yi1 + x¯
′
iηε,2)] (B-4)
Assuming that εi ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2ε) and εi ⊥ (yi1, x¯i), the scaled parameters in (B-4)
are what standard random effects probit estimates. The panel-level likelihood based on
the density of (yi1, ..., yiTi) given (yi1, x¯i) can be written as
Li =
∫
R
[
Ti∏
t=2
Φ (qit(αyi,t−1 + x′itβ + η0 + η1yi1 + x¯
′
iη2 + εi))
]
σ−1ε φ(εi/σε)dεi (B-5)
where qit = (2yit − 1) and φ(·) is the standard normal pdf. The model log-likelihood is
lnL = ∑Ni=1 lnLi.
The scaled parameters also show up directly in the average structural function (ASF).
A consistent estimator of the ASF is the simple average across all observations. The
derivative of the ASF with respect to a continuous time-varying regressor, the finite
difference for a binary regressor, or a mix thereof, is equivalent to the APE of that variable.
This approach can be easily extended to include interactions with the lagged state and
other non-linearities. Wooldridge’s device to get to the APEs is to always average across
the distribution of (yi1, x¯i) first and then to specify the derivatives/differences. E.g., the
APE of a continuous time-varying variable (without an interaction) in xit is:
APE(βk) = βε,k
[
1
N(T¯ − 1)
N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=2
φ
(
αεyi,t−1 + x′itβε + ηε,0 + ηε,1yi1 + x¯
′
iηε,2
)]
(B-6)
where we also average over time to obtain a single scale factor. It is straightforward to
apply the results of Section 5 to the APEs of the interaction terms.
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Do weak institutions prolong crises?
On the identification, characteristics, and duration of
declines during economic slumps∗
Abstract
This chapter characterizes economic slumps by a trend break or shift
in the growth regime with a restricted pattern. We identify 58 episodes
between 1950 and 2008 among 138 countries, and then examine the duration
of the decline phase. Some declines last very long and we put several
contributing factors to the test. We find evidence that weak political
institutions precede crises and reforms occur thereafter. Strong political
institutions shorten the duration of declines, while ethnic cleavages prolong
them. Furthermore, we observe an interaction effect between institutions and
ethnic cleavages, suggesting that strong institutions can overcome the adverse
effects of fractionalization.
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1 Introduction
The last sixty years of growth have been far from steady. For every “growth miracle”
we can easily find a counterpart in the form of a collapse. For example, the East Asian
miracle was interrupted by the Asian financial crisis, China’s take-off in 1978 was preceded
by decades of adverse economic policies, Latin America was frequently rocked by political
turmoil and economic volatility, and several African nations went from “up and coming”
in the 1950s to stagnation after 1973. Moreover, during the post-war period, there is
a long list of relatively short-lived advanced economy crises. What can we learn from
such abrupt changes in growth? Why do some countries deal better with negative growth
shocks than others?
The instability of growth is of great concern in economics because it affects short-
run and medium-run growth performance (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995). A growing
literature on trend breaks has established that growth is often not steady but instead
characterized by switching among growth regimes. Growth does not follow a constant
trend but consists of qualitatively different episodes, such as crises, recoveries, periods
of stagnation, and accelerations. This perspective provides new stylized facts. For
example, growth is relatively easy to ignite (Hausmann et al., 2005) but much harder
to sustain (Berg et al., 2012). However, the negative implications of volatile growth are
just beginning to be explored. Long-lasting slumps can nullify decades of positive growth
and there is no guarantee that lost potential output is ever fully recouped (Cerra and
Saxena, 2008). It thus becomes important to ask, why do some declines last so much
longer than others?
A potential explanation is that the duration of declines during slumps is driven by the
prevailing structure and quality of institutions. Institutions create specific political and
economic incentives, solve or worsen coordination failures and define the set of feasible
policies. Seminal contributions to the institutions and growth literature link stronger
institutions to higher levels of GDP per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002). Others
have shown that strong institutions, democracy and political stability bring about reduced
output volatility (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2003; Mobarak, 2005). However, there is still a lack
of evidence convincingly linking institutions to short and medium-run growth dynamics.
Each type of growth episode has distinct characteristics. We can analyze the switching
among growth regimes, the rate of growth within a regime, the duration of a regime, or
even the typical sequence of regime switches that makes up a growth path. Out of
this plethora of possibilities, this chapter focuses on three points. First, how can we
identify large economic slumps empirically? Second, is there any evidence of institutional
change when slumps occur? Third, conditionally on the occurrence of a slump, do weak
institutions prolong the duration of the decline phase?
We specifically focus on the duration of declines, as the onset of economic crises can
be triggered by a variety of external or internal factors which are not (always) linked
to weak institutions. However, the way a country deals with a negative shock, and
whether the decline phase takes longer than in other countries, depends on the political
system’s ability to react with coordinated policies and avert outright social conflict.
This notion derives from a large body of political economy theory putting social tension
and the ability of resilient political institutions to manage such conflict at the center of
development theory (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; North et al., 2009; Besley and
Persson, 2011). Some of these theories argue that weakly institutionalized societies, or
‘limited access orders’, are prone to collapses, and that the declining rents associated with
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a crisis undermine the institutional set-up and the prevailing political arrangements (e.g.
North et al., 2009). Weak institutions thus bring with them an increased vulnerability
to crises and potentially much longer declines once slumps occur. Similar mechanisms
are suggested in the literature on institutions and macroeconomic volatility (Acemoglu
et al., 2003). Even if sound policy responses are available, a combination of coordination
failures, rent seeking and power struggles combined with ethnic cleavages may lead to
longer declines in weakly institutionalized environments.
Ethnic heterogeneity itself has been linked to a variety of coordination failures leading
to inadequate policies, low provision of public goods and conflict.1 However, diversity
may also be beneficial. In fact, a particular level of heterogeneity may be optimal
(Ashraf and Galor, 2013) and necessary to reap the advantages of skill complementaries
in highly diversified economies (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). Even if there are no benefits
to diversity, its negative effects may become muted as “richer societies have developed
institutional features that allow them to better cope with the conflict element intrinsic in
diversity” (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005, p. 763). We show that in the context of economic
declines the (negative) effects of heterogeneity depend on political institutions.
The ‘delayed stabilizations’ literature provides another perspective on how conflict
over the costs of adjustment always leads to delayed reform (Alesina and Drazen, 1991)
and how political institutions affect the timing of the adjustment (Spolaore, 2004).
Similarly, the model of policy non-adoption by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) outlines
a status-quo bias due to uncertainty about the benefits of reform when the losers cannot
be compensated ex post. These ideas naturally carry over to the process of formulating
policy responses during slumps where more group heterogeneity can increase delay.
Our findings are consistent with these theoretical perspectives. First, there is evidence
of weak political institutions preceding slumps and signs of political reforms in the
following years. Second, longer decline phases are robustly linked to weak institutions and
particularly strongly to a measure of ethnic cleavages (ethno-linguistic fractionalization).
Ethnic cleavages are especially important for understanding declines in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Third, we show that political institutions and ethnic fractionalization interact.
In weakly institutionalized and highly fragmented societies declines last considerably
longer than in more homogeneous countries or countries with stronger constraints on the
executive. Current political economy theory does not sufficiently capture these findings.
We also provide evidence suggesting that these factors determine the depth of a slump,
but exclusively through the duration of declines and not the average rate of contraction.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the identification of slumps and
defines the decline phase. Section 3 briefly discusses the data and characteristics of the
estimated slumps, and provides evidence of endogenous institutional change. Section 4
analyzes the duration of the decline phase and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Identifying slumps
Restricted structural breaks
Beginning with Pritchett’s (2000) classification of post-World War II growth experiences
into “Hills, Plateaus, Mountains, and Plains”, a growing literature analyzes the
characteristics of different types of growth episodes. These papers usually employ either
1For a review see Alesina and Ferrara (2005).
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simple or more complex tests of structural stability to define and identify the episode of
interest.2 For example, Hausmann et al. (2005) use economic criteria to isolate growth
accelerations and then date their beginning with a simple breakpoint test. Other authors,
such as Jones and Olken (2008) and Berg et al. (2012), use versions of the Bai and Perron
(1998, 2003) test for multiple structural breaks to classify growth episodes. A third set of
papers solely relies on economic criteria to identify and date the episode of interest (e.g.
Hausmann et al., 2008).
Not every change in growth rates amounts to a regime switch. The main advantage
of econometric tests for multiple structural breaks over any set of predefined economic
criteria is that they allow for an inferential approach to identifying growth regimes and
measuring their duration. Methods based on deterministic economic criteria cannot
discriminate among multiple plausible starting points or assess whether an episode truly
constitutes a departure from the previous growth regime. However, since standard
structural break methods leave the particular type of structural change unspecified, these
tests may not identify the theoretically desired type of regime switch but rather any form
of significant change which must then be classified ex post. Furthermore, while break
estimators work well for identifying growth spurts, they perform poorly when it comes
to identifying recessions or growth collapses.3
To improve the identification of what we interchangeably refer to as deep recessions,
slumps, or growth collapses, Papell and Prodan (2012) propose a two-break model with
parameter restrictions. They demonstrate that this modified structural change approach
consistently identifies well-known slumps, such as the Great Depression in the United
States. The key innovation is to impose features of the desired pattern directly instead of
searching for unrestricted structural changes. Their two-break model accounts for three
growth regimes (a pre-slump regime, a contraction/ recovery regime, and a post-slump
regime) and places sign restrictions onto the estimated coefficients to ensure the breaks
occur in the desired direction. Since this approach is a version of Bai’s (1999) sequential
likelihood ratio test, the number of slumps – which is not known in advance – can then be
estimated by recursively applying the model on ever smaller sub-samples until all breaks
in the GDP per capita series have been found.
The restricted structural change approach can easily be modified in principle to allow
for other plausible structures, such as three-break models (e.g., to estimate a pre-slump
regime, a decline, a recovery and a post-slump regime). However, estimating three
or more breaks for each slump quickly becomes computationally expensive and does
not necessarily provide better results than a simpler two-break model.4 While Papell
and Prodan (2012) focus on the question whether growth in a few developed countries
eventually returns to its pre-slump trend path, we apply a variant of this method to
identify slumps in a large sample of countries over the period from 1950 to 2008.
We define slumps according to three criteria. First, a slump is a departure from
a previously positive trend. Second, a slump must begin with negative growth in the
first year. Third, all slumps should be pronounced regime switches and not just minor
business cycle fluctuations. The precise meaning of ‘pronounced’ will vary and depend
2With the exception of the Markov-switching models used in Jerzmanowski (2006).
3As Papell and Prodan (2012) point out, this applies to the entire class of “generic” tests for single
and multiple breaks.
4Let q = T − 2τT − h, where τ is the trimming fraction and h is the distance between breaks, then
the two-break model estimates (q2 + q)/2 regressions for the first iteration, while a three-break model
already requires
∑q
i=1(i
2 + i)/2 = (1/12)q(q + 1)(2q + 4) − 1, with q = T − 2τT − 2h to now allow for
three breaks. Additional results are available on request.
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on the country’s idiosyncratic growth process.
We capture these criteria in the following partial structural change model:
yt = α+βt+γ01(t > tb1)+γ1(t− tb1)1(t > tb1)+γ2(t− tb2)1(t > tb2)+
p∑
i=1
δiyt−i+t (1)
where yt is the log of GDP per capita, β is a time trend, γ0 is the coefficient on an intercept
break occurring together with a trend change (γ1) after the first break at time tb1, γ2
is the coefficient for a second trend change occurring after the second break at time tb2,
1(·) is an indicator function selecting the regime, p is the optimal lag order determined
by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to parametrically adjust for the presence of
serial correlation, and {t} is a martingale difference sequence satisfying E[|t|] <∞ and
E[t|t−1, t−2, . . . ] = 0.
Eq. (1) formalizes the notion that the evolution of GDP per capita around a slump is
a simple function of time split into three different growth regimes: (1) a pre-slump regime
from the beginning of the time series of a country until time tb1, (2) a slump/recovery
regime lasting from time tb1 +1 to time tb2, and (3) a post-slump regime from time tb2 +1
onwards. The true location of the breakpoints is not assumed known but estimated within
the model. We impose two restrictions to make sure we only select breaks meeting our
definition of slumps. First, we require β > 0, so that growth must be positive in the
years before a slump begins. Second, we also impose the condition that γ0 < 0, so that
a slump always starts with a drop in the intercept.5 Slope shifts are left unrestricted,
so that the model can catch unfinished slumps (e.g., declines from tb1 onwards, possibly
lasting until the end of a country’s time series).
We implement the sequential break search algorithm as follows. First, we fit the
structural change model specified in eq. (1) for all possible combinations of tb1 and tb2.
We always exclude 5% of the observations at the beginning and end of the sample to
avoid registering spurious breaks. Second, we compute the sup-W test statistic, that is,
the supremum of a Wald test of the null hypothesis of no structural change (H0 : γ0 =
γ1 = γ2 = 0) over all pairs of break dates implying estimates satisfying both restrictions.
Third, we bootstrap the empirical distribution of the sup-W statistic. If the bootstrap
test rejects at the 10% significance level, we record the break pair (t̂b1, t̂b2) and split
the sample into a series running until the first break and a series starting just after the
second break. The process starts again on each sub-sample until the bootstrap test fails
to reject the null hypothesis of no breaks or the sample gets too small. A key issue in
evaluating the statistical significance of breakpoints is that the individual Wald tests over
which the sup-W statistic is computed are not independent. Asymptotic tests have been
derived but they tend to underreject in finite samples (Prodan, 2008) and an asymptotic
distribution for our particular version of restricted structural change is not available. We
construct a bootstrap Monte Carlo test in order to circumvent both issues. Appendix A
gives a formal description of the break search algorithm and the bootstrap.
The structural break methods applied in this chapter assume that GDP per capita
is regime-wise trend stationary. This is not a trivial requirement. Ever since the issue
was first raised by Nelson and Plosser (1982), a vibrant literature has been debating the
question whether most GDP series are unit-root processes or can be considered trend
stationary. Originally, the conflicting views evolved around a clear divide. If an output
5The intercept shift implies that we assume that there is an instantaneous drop. However, by not
restricting the coinciding trend break we also allow for longer lasting declines.
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series is non-stationary, i.e., it has a unit root, then any stochastic shock to the economy
is permanent. If the series is trend stationary, then stochastic shocks are temporary;
after a while GDP is back on track as if the shock never occurred. Given the available
data, this issue cannot be fully resolved. It is generally difficult – if not impossible – to
convincingly differentiate between non-stationary and stationary time series when T is
only moderately large.
More recently the debate has shifted. A process that is subject to structural breaks
is an intermediate case. Broken-trend stationarity only implies that, within each regime,
growth can be approximated by a deterministic trend, but from one regime to the next
the trend path may change due to (semi-)permanent shocks. This allows for a flexible
description of the growth process as several different types of trend breaks can occur. In
fact, there is mounting evidence that once trend breaks are incorporated, many of the
GDP series previously thought to have unit roots may in fact be broken-trend stationary
(e.g. Zivot and Andrews, 1992; Ben-David and Papell, 1995). Broken trends blur the
conceptual distinction. A unit root process can be thought of as a trend-stationary
process with a trend that changes every year.6
We do not attempt to characterize all types of breaks an economy can experience, or
to formally test for unit roots. Our approach is flexible and allows for different growth
regimes occurring before, during and after an unknown number of slumps. We assume
that there is some structure in the growth process, but do not assume that it is necessarily
generated by neoclassical steady-state growth, endogenous growth or any other standard
growth model. In fact, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) recently highlighted that growth in
emerging markets can be characterized by shocks to trend growth rather than transitory
fluctuations around a stable trend. Thus, under certain conditions, broken trends are
compatible with various models of aggregate output.
The duration of declines
Within a slump, we separate the decline from the recovery phase and focus solely on the
decline phase. This is based on the conjecture that these two processes are potentially
subject to very different dynamics and explained by different covariates. This “to the
bottom” approach stands in contrast to the earlier literature which typically focuses
on the entire duration of the slump (until the pre-slump level of GDP is regained).
Instead, we argue that political institutions and ethnic cleavages matter particularly
for the duration of the decline phase where policy solutions need to be agreed upon to
achieve a turnaround, as opposed to the length of the recovery process which depends on
the success of the chosen policy and, more generally, the type of crisis.
We define the end of a slump to have occurred with certainty in the first year a > t̂b1
where ya ≥ yt̂b1 . In other words, a slump is over as soon as the level of GDP per
capita preceding the slump has been recovered; until then, the slump is continuing.7 It is
important to note that the end of the slump does not in general coincide with the second
break and is used only as a device to identify the trough. Once the endpoint of a slump
is known, the trough is simply the year with the lowest level of GDP per capita during
the slump. The duration of the slump is censored if GDP per capita does not reach the
6Every year, or at any other observation frequency.
7This also implies that we exclude a small number of episodes found by the sequential algorithm
if these begin before the previous slump is certain to have ended. Avoiding this issue would imply
estimating a third breakpoint (see footnote 4).
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pre-slump level again by the end of the sample. In such a case, even if GDP per capita
seems to be recovering, we do not know how long the slump may last. The censoring
indicator is defined as c = 1(maxj∈(t̂b1,T ] yj < yt̂b1).
Given the set of possible end years A = {a | a ∈ (t̂b1, T ] and ya ≥ yt̂b1}, define
a0 = minA, corresponding to the (certain) end of the slump. If the set A is empty,
then the slump is unfinished, and the length of the episode is censored. We estimate the
trough to occur at time:
tˆmin =
{
argminj∈(t̂b1,a0] yj, if c = 0
argminj∈(t̂b1,T ] yj, if c = 1.
(2)
A provisional trough occurs when yt attains a minimum after t̂b1. The duration of
the decline phase lasting from the beginning of the slump to the estimated trough will
be denoted t˜D = tˆmin − t̂b1.
These definitions also imply that in some cases we date the trough after the estimated
second break, which is purely a consequence of allowing for unfinished episodes. If the
slump is still ongoing, the second break may have been placed at an arbitrary point
maximizing the Wald statistic but not corresponding to the start of a new growth regime.8
The true trough may lie in the future, that is, beyond the end of the sample. Treating such
spells as censored implies that in the later analysis we only incorporate the information
that (certain) exit from the slump has not yet occurred after a duration t˜D.
Figure 1 illustrates the diversity of slumps identified by this method. Panel (a) shows
a finished slump in Mexico where the trend growth rate is nearly unchanged after the
second break. The slump begins in 1982 and encompasses more than a decade of political
volatility, hyperinflation, high debt and low growth. The trough is found in 1988. Another
short downturn occurs during the Tequila crisis in 1994 after which the Mexican economy
returns to its pre-1982 growth path. Panel (b) shows a finished slump in Switzerland
where the trend growth rate decelerated after the second break. In 1975, the Swiss
economy was strongly affected by the Oil crisis of the mid-1970s, leading to a 7.87% drop
in GDP per capita within one year. After the second break, Switzerland enters a low
growth regime typical for the high income economies in Western Europe of the 1980s and
1990s. Panel (c) shows a finished slump in Albania occurring at the time of the post-
communist transition with an accelerated trend after the second break. The estimated
first break occurs in 1990, the trough is located in 1991, and the second break occurs in
2002, a few years after the end of the slump. While the duration of the decline phase is
only one year, output contracted considerably. GDP per capita in 1991 was 15.32% lower
than in 1990. Last but not least, panel (d) shows an unfinished slump with a continuing
decline in Togo. Togo grew rapidly for over a decade following independence from France
in 1960 but then experienced a dramatic collapse. The first break occurs in 1979, but the
second break is placed at an (economically) arbitrary point to accommodate the lasting
decline. Togo’s GDP per capita did not recover to its pre-slump level for the next 29
years. At the end of the observed period, the decline is ongoing and the provisional
trough coincides with the censoring cutoff in 2008.
8A solution avoiding this problem would be to test if a restricted one-break model fits better than a
restricted two-break model for those cases.
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Figure 1 – Four types of slumps
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Note(s): Models refitted using the estimated breaks t̂b1 and t̂b2 but without the optimal AR(p)
terms to emphasize the trend breaks. The bold vertical lines are at t̂b1 and t̂b2, respectively. The
dashed vertical line indicates tˆmin.
3 Data and characteristics of slumps
We apply the sequential algorithm to the entire Penn World Table (v7.0) yielding a total
of 58 slumps between 1950 and 2008.9 We deliberately stop in 2008 to avoid the global
recession of 2009 which is too close to the end of the sample for reliable break estimation.
The mean duration from the first break to the trough is about 7.7 years and the median
duration is three years. Ten out of the 58 slumps are censored. For these spells the
location of the trough is not yet definitive. Table B-2 in the Appendix lists all episodes
and provides some summary statistics.
Many covariates used in the sequel are from well-known sources and will be
9We only run the algorithm on countries with a population of at least one million (excluding very
small countries and island economies), and at least 20 years of data. In addition, we discard some episodes
that are driven by positive breaks in the slope coefficient but fail the negative growth criterion due to
the presence of the AR(p) terms. A simple rule is applied to these cases. We define a valid episode as
an interval of two break dates t̂b1, t̂b2 ∈ [τT, (1− τ)T ] satisfying: ∃j ∈ (t̂b1, t̂b2] such that min yj < yt̂b1 ,
where τ is the trimming fraction and T is the length of the estimation sample. This rule only requires
that a contraction occurs within the range of the two estimated breaks, otherwise there is no slump.
Data and characteristics of slumps 53
discussed only summarily here. We include four major categories of variables: 1)
a variety of measures for different aspects of institutions, politics and social conflict,
2) macroeconomic indicators of prices, trade and exports, 3) a set of variables for
domestic and international finance, and 4) several other growth determinants (such as
life expectancy or years of schooling). Table C-1 in the Appendix provides an exhaustive
list of all variable names, data sources and a basic set of summary statistics for the data
used throughout the chapter. Some data may not be entirely satisfactory but are simply
the best available. For example, we use the Polity IV database as our primary proxy
for institutional development because of a lack of other time series data capturing the
characteristics of political and economic institutions.
We observe several well-known growth collapses and deep recessions. Most slumps
begin between the 1970s and the early 1990s. Seven downbreaks occur following the oil
shock in 1973–1974, eleven declines begin between 1979 and 1981 during the debt crisis
of the early 1980s, and nine slumps follow the post-communist transitions of 1989–1990.
Due to trimming and the cut-off in 2008, we find no beginnings of slumps in the period
of the early 2000s and tranquil mid-2000s. Generally, the period between the 1970s and
early 1980s is marked by heightened volatility, as has been documented in a number of
studies (Easterly et al., 1993; Rodrik, 1999; Pritchett, 2000; Jones and Olken, 2008).
Table 1 – Depth and Duration by Income Level and Geographical Region
Mean Mean Median Number Censored Number of
Depth Duration Duration of Spells Spells Countries
Income Level
High Income (OECD) -7.12 2.00 1 12 0 29
High Income (Other) -20.84 5.38 2 8 1 12
Upper Middle Income -21.20 5.39 2 16 2 30
Lower Middle Income -27.40 6.00 3 11 3 34
Low Income -34.17 15.75 16 11 4 33
Geographical Region
East Asia & Pacific -13.63 2.30 2 10 0 17
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -19.70 3.40 2 5 0 10
Europe (excl. Eastern Europe) -8.37 1.50 1 6 0 22
Latin America & Caribbean -17.34 5.27 3 15 1 23
Middle East & North Africa -33.24 8.66 9 7 3 17
North America -2.51 1.00 1 1 0 2
South Asia -5.33 1.00 1 1 0 6
Sub-Saharan Africa -37.14 17.74 16 13 6 41
Total -21.87 7.69 3 58 10 138
Note(s): Depth is defined as the percent decrease in GDP per capita at the trough relative to GDP
per capita before the slump (not log difference). Mean and median duration are expressed in years.
As a result of some spells being censored, both mean duration and depth are underestimated. The
number of countries refers to countries with more than one million inhabitants and more than 20
observations of GDP per capita in a particular income group or region.
Table 1 summarizes the distributions of depth, duration, and number of spells across
income groups and geographical regions. For this purpose, we define the depth of a
decline as the percent decrease of GDP per capita at the trough relative to its pre-slump
level. We detect considerably deeper slumps in low-income and middle-income countries
than in high-income (OECD) countries. The spread of depth and duration is very large.
High-income (OECD) countries experience relatively short declines with a comparatively
soft landing. The median duration is only one year with a mean depth of about -7.1%. In
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the middle, there is little substantial variation between non-OECD high-income countries
and upper/lower-middle-income countries. In all of these three groups, the mean depth is
in the range of -20.8% to -27.4% and the mean (median) duration varies between about
5.4 to 6 (2 to 3) years. Low-income countries experience the most dramatic declines.
Both mean and median duration are about 16 years, with an associated average depth
of -34.2%. Interestingly, the number of spells itself is distributed relatively evenly across
the different income groups, suggesting that developed countries, too, experience their
fair share of (milder) volatility.
The geographical distribution reveals three interesting patterns. First, Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East & North Africa are the two regions experiencing both the
deepest and longest declines. The depth in these regions is particularly striking in
comparison to the other regions. The mean decline is -37.1% in Sub-Saharan Africa
and -33.2% in the Middle East & North Africa, which is about double of the average
decline in Latin America & the Caribbean. The duration is longest in Sub-Saharan
Africa, with the median spell lasting 16 years and the mean spell lasting over 17 years.
Declines are shorter in the Middle East & North Africa, where the mean and median do
not exceed nine years. Both regions also have the most censored/unfinished spells due
to their long duration. Second, countries in Latin America & the Caribbean experienced
slumps most frequently, but the average decline was only moderately deep and lasted for
about five years. Third, we find similar mean and median durations when comparing
Eastern Europe & Central Asia to East Asia & Pacific, but much deeper slumps in the
former. As expected, there are comparatively few, short and mild declines in North
America, Europe (excluding Eastern Europe), and – more surprisingly – South Asia.
Table 1 suggests a relatively strong association of both the mean duration and mean
depth of the decline phase with different income levels. This is particularly interesting,
since we subsequently model these observed differences in duration between high and
low income economies with more fundamental factors such as institutions and ethnic
fractionalization. Furthermore, there is substantial regional heterogeneity which will
have to be taken into account in the analysis.
Is there evidence of institutional change occurring before, during or after a slump?
To study this question descriptively, we employ an event methodology often used in the
literature on currency and banking crises (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1995; Gourinchas and
Obstfeld, 2012). The basic idea is to use dummy variables indicating the imminence or
recentness of the start of the slump as a means of detecting changes in the relative mean
of each time-varying covariate. The coefficients of the dummies measure if and how the
covariate changes around the time the slump hits, and their standard errors quantify the
associated uncertainty.
We run the following regression for each measure of institutions: xit =∑5
s=−5 δt,t̂b1+sβs + µi + it where δt,t̂b1+s is the Kronecker delta which is equal to one
if t = t̂b1 + s and zero otherwise, βs are coefficients, µi is an unobserved country effect
and it is an idiosyncratic error term. We set s ∈ {−5, . . . , 0, . . . , 5}, so that the result
is an 11-year window around the break date t̂b1. The first year of the slump is s = 1
corresponding to t = t̂b1+1. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and also
autocorrelation within both country and time clusters (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller,
2011). We plot the estimates of the coefficients (including 95% confidence bands) as they
represent the conditional expectation of the covariate xit at time s relative to “normal”
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times.10
Figure 2 shows how certain institutional and political dynamics evolve around the
downbreak. The Polity score is much lower before a slump occurs, but increases towards
normal levels thereafter. In the five years before a slump, the conditional expectation
is between 2.5 and 3.1 points lower than in normal times and until the break date
these differences are significant at the 5%-level. This suggests that prior deficiencies
in institutions increase vulnerability to slumps and institutions start to improve when
slumps occur. All the subcomponents of the combined Polity score, including constraints
on the executive, exhibit very similar trends (not shown, available on request). Conversely,
the ICRG’s 6-point corruption indicator shows a moderate, yet insignificant, decrease in
corruption in the first two years of a slump. The ICRG series suffers from low coverage;
it begins only in 1984 while a majority of the slumps in our sample start earlier.
Figure 2 – Institutions & Politics
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The association of reforms and slumps is confirmed by the time profile of the
probabilities of negative or positive regime changes, measured as a minimum three-point
downward or upward change in the Polity score. There is little evidence that negative
regime changes precede downbreaks or systematically occur thereafter. Interestingly,
there is an upward trend in the probability of positive regime changes from the eve of
the slump onwards. In the first and second year of a slump, the probability is 10-12%
higher than in normal times. While these point estimates are individually significant, the
sequence of positive estimates is even more convincing.
This pattern suggests a new stylized fact: slumps are often preceded by weak
10In this case, “normal” refers to all observations other than the 11 years around the downbreak. The
working paper version of this chapter also reports this analysis for a host of other growth determinants.
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institutions. However, it seems that sharply negative growth creates room for political
reforms. A bold interpretation would be that given prior institutional deficiencies, slumps
bring about a form of creative political destruction by altering power relations and
increasing the pressure on governments to pursue institutional change (North et al., 2009).
In other words, deep slumps offer a window of opportunity for institutional improvements,
illustrating the endogenous nature of reforms.
4 The duration of declines
Methodology
There are two major approaches to dealing with duration data: semi-parametric Cox
models and parametric models. The main advantage of Cox regression is that the so-called
baseline hazard can have any shape (as long as the conditional hazard is proportional).
Parametric models, on the contrary, require more explicit assumptions about the shape
of the baseline hazard but in turn also allow more detailed predictions.
We take a parametric approach. Parametric models can either be cast as proportional
hazard (PH) or as accelerated failure time (AFT) models. PH models directly begin
with a log-linear specification of the hazard function. In other words, they model the
instantaneous probability of an event occurring at a particular time conditional on the
event not having occurred before. Proportionality then implies that the hazard function
for each subject in the sample is a multiple of the baseline; that is, the baseline hazard
is scaled up and down by the different realizations of the covariates. From the hazard
function, we can derive the survival function which expresses the cumulative probability
of the event not having occurred until the observed time. The event of interest is usually
defined as the ‘exit’ from an ‘initial state’. In our case, the ‘initial state’ corresponds to
the decline phase and ‘exit’ corresponds to entering the recovery phase. If a country is
observed to exit the decline phase at some time, its contribution to the likelihood is the
probability of the recovery starting at that particular time (conditional on the decline
phase lasting until that time). If there is no observed exit from the decline phase, then
the observation is censored and only the survival probability enters the likelihood. AFT
models describe the same relationships but begin with a log-linear model of time itself.
Hence, AFT models closely resemble linear regression. The hazard function and survival
function are then characterized indirectly (and without the restriction of proportionality)
by the distribution of the error terms in the log-linear model.
All parametric models assume a certain shape of the baseline hazard. The exponential
model assumes that the hazard is constant over the entire duration process. Models
with a Weibull or Gompertz distribution allow for flat, monotonically increasing or
monotonically decreasing hazard rates. Log-normal and log-logistic models provide a
non-monotonic function that is first increasing and then decreasing. Alternatively, the
generalized gamma distribution is very flexible and encompasses the exponential, Weibull
and log-normal distributions but is more demanding to estimate.
We have no strong theoretical prior that the hazard function must follow a particular
shape. We may expect some countries to exit rather quickly and others to take longer, but
it is difficult to determine ex ante if remaining in the decline phase for very long leads to
a deterioration of fundamentals and thus a decreasing hazard, or if the probability of exit
is actually increasing because countries are bound to enter the recovery phase eventually.
Figure 3 shows the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimate of the unconditional
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Figure 3 – Unconditional Survival and Hazard Functions
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Note(s): The Kaplan-Meier survival curve is a non-parametric estimate of the probability of
remaining in the decline state at each unit of analysis time. 95% confidence intervals are shown in
grey. The corresponding hazard function has been smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with
boundary adjustment and bandwidth 3.
survival function and the (smoothed) Gaussian hazard function. About 47% of the spells
in our sample end after only two years of decline, but the unconditional probability
of exiting the decline phase is monotonically decreasing. Nevertheless, the shape of the
conditional hazard may be very different. We take a flexible approach by first relying on a
log-normal parameterization and then testing the robustness of our preferred specification
under different distributional assumptions. It is important to note that the log-normal
model does not imply proportionality of the conditional hazard function. Hence, it can
not be represented in PH form. We provide a more detailed description of how log-normal
AFT models are estimated in Section 5.
Let analysis time be t˜, where t˜ ≡ t − t0 and t0 = t̂b1, so that we can refer to the
calendar times t and t0 when necessary. We specify the following regression equation for
crisis durations in AFT form:
ln t˜ ≡ ln(t− t0) = α + βINS0 + γELF + x′0ξ + z′tζ + t (3)
where INS0 is a measure of institutions fixed at t0, ELF is a time-invariant measure of
ethnic fractionalization, x0 = (x0,1, x0,2, . . . , x0,k) is a k × 1 vector of controls fixed at t0,
zt = (zt,1, zt,2, . . . , zt,m) is an m × 1 vector of strictly exogenous time-varying controls,
and – for the log-normal model – t is distributed N (0, σ2 ). All parameters, including σ2 ,
are estimated with Maximum Likelihood (ML). Unfinished spells are accounted for but
censoring is assumed independent of the duration. Our coefficients of interest are β and
γ. We suppress the country-spell index to simplify the exposition.
The estimated coefficients are semi-elasticities of the expected duration with respect to
the covariates, or elasticities if the covariate is in logs. The term ‘accelerated failure time’
derives from the interpretation of the implied effects. If the coefficient of the covariate
is positive, then the expected duration until the event is prolonged by larger realizations
of the covariate. In our case, this is equivalent to delayed exit from the decline phase
(later start of the recovery). If the coefficient is negative, then the expected duration is
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shortened and the recovery will start earlier.
A complication of using time-varying covariates is possible feedback running from
the duration to the covariates. If such feedback occurs, the estimated coefficients are
biased and the usual test statistics are invalid (Lancaster, 1990; Kalbfleisch and Prentice,
2002). In order to avoid this problem, we simply take the last pre-slump value of all
potentially endogenous covariates at t0, including our measure of political institutions,
so that no feedback from slumps to the covariates is possible. Hence, we can rule out
simultaneous causality. This is particularly important given that the previous section
highlights that political institutions may endogenously respond to crises. On the other
hand, ethnic fractionalization is assumed to be strictly exogenous; we do not expect the
ethnic configuration of a country to change as a short-run response to a crisis.
The fact that countries can have several recurrent slumps is a minor concern in our
application; only eight of the 58 spells in our data are not the first spell for a given country.
To account for this dependence, we allow the variances of the parameter estimates to be
correlated across spells in the same country. This procedure assumes that the sequence
of repeated spells does not matter. We show in the robustness section that our results
hold when this assumption is relaxed.
Dealing with at most 48 exits in 58 decline spells over the entire period of 1950
to 2008 requires a careful approach to model selection, since we have to match these
episodes with data over the almost six decades spanned by them. Including many control
variables with different patterns of missing data then easily results in small samples, so
that including a large set of controls is not feasible. Even at more moderate sample sizes,
care needs to be taken to guard against overfitting. We employ a two-step approach to
arrive at a parsimonious specification. First, we fit variable-by-variable regressions and
reduce the set of controls based on statistical significance (p-value < .1). We select only
those variables clearly exhibiting a correlation with the duration of declines. Results of
this step are relegated to Appendix E. Second, using the smaller set of controls, we then
extend our base specification in several ways and examine its robustness.
Results
We model the duration of declines as a function of executive constraints, ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, initial GDP per capita, and the real US interest rate. Constraints on
the executive is our preferred proxy of institutional quality for two reasons. First, it is
widely used in the empirical literature as a measure of institutional constraints placed on
political actors and has already been linked to macroeconomic volatility (e.g. Acemoglu
et al., 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Second, it is conceptually rooted in the
economic theory of institutions, more so than any of the broader measures capturing
wider aspects of the political regime (e.g. democracy or autocracy). Controlling for initial
GDP matters, as executive constraints are correlated with the level of development (the
correlation coefficient is 0.43), and both potentially determine the duration of declines.
For fractionalization, we use a measure from Desmet et al. (2012), who recently
developed a very detailed set of estimates of linguistic diversity. They compute the
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in a country belong to different
ethno-linguistic groups at 15 levels of ‘the language tree’. These new measures of
fractionalization capture the historical nature of ethnic and linguistic differentiation into
increasingly narrower groups over time. We use two variables at both extremes of the
spectrum. ELF1 is the most aggregate level, measuring only crude distinctions such as
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Indo-European versus non-Indo-European languages. ELF15 is the most disaggregate
level, differentiating among the language groups known today. Desmet et al. (2012) show
that aggregate fractionalization matters more for civil conflict and redistribution while
the disaggregate level strongly predicts growth differentials. Hence, we use the latter as
our primary measure.
The variable selection results reported in Section 5 show that the basic correlations
are mostly as expected. One notable exception is the lack of correlation between conflict
and the duration of declines. Stronger institutions are associated with shorter declines,
regardless of the measure. Higher initial GDP predicts shorter declines but the effect is
not significant. Conversely, higher fractionalization and a higher US interest rate predict
longer declines. Yet these findings could be driven by omitted variables.
Table 2 – Additive effects of institutions and fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.181*** -0.149 -0.007 -0.172*** -0.111* -0.178***
(0.066) (0.102) (0.075) (0.063) (0.064) (0.058)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.282** 1.014*** 0.293** 0.559*** 0.459*** 0.197*
(0.125) (0.290) (0.132) (0.171) (0.164) (0.106)
Real US Interest Rate 0.063 0.065 0.098* 0.081* 0.074* 0.087*
(0.044) (0.073) (0.054) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048)
Trade Openness (de jure) -0.772**
(0.312)
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.010**
(0.005)
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.007
(0.010)
Export Diversification -0.003
(0.012)
Export Sophistication -1.559**
(0.777)
Financial Depth -0.007
(0.013)
Private Credit -0.011
(0.008)
Infant Mortality 0.003
(0.009)
Life Expectancy -0.020
(0.038)
Education (All) -0.026
(0.074)
Constant -1.411 6.637 -1.346 -2.426 -3.346** -0.553
(0.989) (4.802) (1.035) (2.633) (1.401) (0.868)
Region FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Exits 42 18 25 45 47 47
Spells 51 22 32 55 57 57
Years of Decline 314 166 193 325 346 346
Log-L -59.259 -22.668 -36.422 -65.321 -63.827 -72.090
Pseudo-R2 0.248 0.277 0.218 0.211 0.263 0.168
Note(s): The standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 2 addresses the issue of omitted variables by adding groups of variables
measuring similar though different aspects of a certain theme, such as trade or finance.
All variables, except de facto trade openness, enter with the expected sign. The broad
patterns are very interesting. Above all, the effect of fractionalization is extremely robust
in all specifications and varies only within a narrow band. A one percentage point increase
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in fractionalization is estimated to prolong the decline phase by about 1-2%. Further, the
coefficient of executive constraints has a negative sign throughout and is often significant.
Most specifications imply that a one point improvement in executive constraints leads
to 11-18% reduction in the duration of the decline phase. The coefficient becomes small
when we control for financial variables, but this is the result of losing roughly half the
sample. The standard error blows up when controlling for export characteristics, though
the coefficient remains similar. We find that sustaining either a sophisticated export
mix or a complex financial system requires well-developed institutions (the correlations
are 0.56 and 0.62, respectively). These complex features of modern economies can be
characterized as outcomes of institutional development (Acemoglu et al., 2003), so we do
not interpret them as a lack of robustness.
Column (1) shows that de jure trade openness is negatively associated with the
expected duration, while de facto openness has a significant positive effect. The opposing
signs may seem puzzling at first, but de facto openness could be capturing international
contagion or excessive import (export) reliance, especially once “institutionalized”
openness is controlled for. The coefficients and standard errors for institutions and
fractionalization are unaffected. Column (2) illustrates that the effects of executive
constraints and fractionalization are robust to the inclusion of export sophistication,
the share of manufactured exports, and export diversification. The standard error for
executive constraints increases due to the diminished sample size but the coefficient
remains in the usual range. Turning to the financial variables, column (3) reveals
that including private credit and financial depth reduces the coefficient of executive
constraints but also the sample size substantially. The partial effects of these variables
are statistically very weak. Column (4) illustrates that neither life expectancy, nor
infant mortality, nor schooling have clear effects on the expected duration. We take
a different approach to addressing the issue of omitted variables in column (5) by
including region dummies to account for regional heterogeneity that is otherwise not
captured by the observed covariates. Both the coefficients and their standard errors on
institutions and fractionalization are within the usual range, providing further support
for the assertion that the effect of institutions is reasonably robust. Column (6) is our
preferred specification. This model captures most of the effects we are interested in and
uses nearly all available spells. Taken together, the regressions in Table 2 show that
the effect of fractionalization is very robust and the effect of institutions is only strongly
affected by financial depth and private credit – two measures that we consider to be
observed institutional outcomes, and that come at the cost of much data loss.
Intriguingly, the coefficient of initial GDP per capita has a positive sign, implying
the counterintuitive result that higher initial GDP prolongs declines. Yet, as the single-
variable specifications in Table E-1 of the Appendix show, the simple correlation between
initial GDP and the duration of declines is negative, though insignificantly so (p-value
= 0.39). The coefficient of initial GDP and its standard error are very unstable. Across
all specifications, the implied elasticities of the duration with respect to initial GDP range
from near zero to about one, depending on the sample size and the controls. While we keep
initial GDP in the models so as to not spuriously assign its effect to institutions, we only
treat it as a control variable and do not attempt to give its effect a causal interpretation.
The robustness section also shows that the statistical significance of initial GDP strongly
depends on the choice of baseline hazard.
Table E-3 in the Appendix assesses the effects of adding each control separately to our
preferred specification and reveals some additional findings. Complementing the results
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of Desmet et al. (2012), we find that when controlling for both the disaggregate and
aggregate measures of fractionalization, the aggregate measure (ELF1) has no effect on
the duration of declines. Several of the variables that passed the selection step have effects
that are not robust in a multivariate setting. The coefficients of the share of manufactured
exports, export diversification, and inequality point in the expected direction but are
insignificant by a large margin. Life expectancy, infant mortality and years of schooling
are insignificant and do not affect the partial effects of institutions or fractionalization.
Otherwise, the same pattern as in Table 2 emerges. The coefficient of institutions only
becomes insignificant when the sample size is diminished substantially.
The estimated effects of political institutions are economically meaningful. In the log-
normal model, mean and median duration are both estimated by the exponentiated linear
prediction allowing straightforward predictions of the expected duration. Conditionally
on having entered a slump, a country with the lowest score on the executive constraints
measure is expected to decline for about 9.1 years, while a country with the highest score
is expected to decline only for about 3.1 years. The mean of executive constraints in the
estimation sample is about 2.4, implying a duration of 7.1 years.
Next we examine if there is an interaction effect between institutions and
fractionalization. The rationale for this hypothesis is simple. Given a political economy in
which ethnic tension challenges the ability of political actors to take coordinated action,
more cohesive institutions may help to overcome this vulnerability. Countries with a
high degree of ethnic fractionalization may require strong institutions just to compensate.
Conversely, countries with a greater degree of ethnic homogeneity may make do with less
developed institutions to achieve a similar degree of social coordination. This hypothesis
is a less restrictive variant of the idea that there is a multiplicative effect between social
conflict and institutions in response to external shocks (Rodrik, 1999).
Table 3 reports the corresponding results. In order to ease the interpretation, we
subtract the sample average of the institutions and fractionalization variables from their
observed values before estimating each model. We denote the demeaned variables by
I˜NS0 and E˜LF15. This has the following effect. If either one of the two variables is
at its mean, then the interaction term is zero and the only relevant coefficient is the
non-interacted variant. As a result, the coefficient of the executive constraints variable
directly measures the effect of institutions at the average level of fractionalization, and
vice versa. For values other than the mean, the coefficient on the interaction term needs
to be taken into account.
There is considerable evidence of an interaction effect. In the same specifications
where we find a robust effect of institutions, we also find a significant interaction effect
between executive constraints and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. The partial effect of
one variable at the mean of the other is at least as significant as in the corresponding
specification without an interaction effect. The interaction term is negative and significant
at the 5%-level in all perturbations but columns (2) and (3). In column (2) there is simply
not enough data to estimate this effect, whereas in column (3) the sign and size of the
interaction coefficient is actually very similar to other estimations. Since our earlier
preferred specification is nested in column (6), testing the null that the interaction term
is zero is equivalent to a test that this model fits the data better. A likelihood ratio test
also prefers the interaction model and the pseudo-R2 improves from 0.168 to 0.197.
Figure 4 illustrates that the effects estimated in the interaction model are both
economically and statistically significant. It plots the predicted semi-elasticities of the
expected duration with respect to one variable of the interaction term over representative
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Table 3 – Interaction effects of institutions and fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (I˜NS0) -0.366*** -0.137 -0.091 -0.280*** -0.217** -0.288***
(0.098) (0.126) (0.101) (0.090) (0.087) (0.080)
Fractionalization (E˜LF15) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
I˜NS0 × E˜LF15 -0.005*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.004** -0.003** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.275** 1.007*** 0.238* 0.533*** 0.439*** 0.198*
(0.123) (0.293) (0.135) (0.175) (0.163) (0.106)
Real US Interest Rate 0.068 0.064 0.100* 0.084* 0.076* 0.098**
(0.042) (0.072) (0.054) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047)
Trade Openness (de jure) -0.690**
(0.298)
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.015***
(0.005)
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.008
(0.012)
Export Diversification -0.004
(0.011)
Export Sophistication -1.503*
(0.784)
Private Credit -0.008
(0.009)
Financial Depth -0.008
(0.011)
Infant Mortality 0.001
(0.007)
Life Expectancy -0.020
(0.030)
Education (All) -0.045
(0.070)
Constant -1.122 6.940 0.213 -1.425 -2.552* 0.025
(0.910) (4.896) (1.247) (2.066) (1.362) (0.872)
Region FE NO NO NO NO YES NO
Exits 42 18 25 45 47 47
Spells 51 22 32 55 57 57
Years of Decline 314 166 193 325 346 346
Log-L -54.001 -22.648 -35.514 -62.746 -61.681 -69.540
Pseudo-R2 0.315 0.278 0.238 0.243 0.288 0.197
Note(s): The standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
values of the other, including a 95% confidence interval. Three points stand out: 1) the
effect of executive constraints clearly depends on fractionalization (and vice versa), 2)
both partial effects are significant over most of the distribution, and 3) both partial
effects consistently have the expected sign. In the background, Figure 4 also shows
histograms of the sample data. Executive constraints scores cover the entire range from
1 to 7, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization ranges from near-zero (0.07%) to near-total
heterogeneity (96%). The predictions cover a wide range of the durations. At the
average score of executive constraints, a country with the highest (lowest) degree of ethnic
heterogeneity is expected to decline for about 12.6 years (2.1 years). Hence, it would be
difficult to understand the effects of institutions without considering fractionalization.
Stronger institutions also have the potential to overcome the adverse effects of high levels
of ethnic fractionalization. At the 75th percentile of ethnic heterogeneity (ELF15 = 89.7),
a country with the highest (lowest) score of executive constraints is expected to decline
for about 1.8 years (18.3 years).
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Figure 4 – Partial Effects in Interaction Model
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Note(s): The partial effects are based on column (6) in Table 3 and are computed over the entire
range of the variable on the horizontal axis while keeping all other regressors at their means. The
dashed lines are upper and lower 95% confidence limits.
One way to interpret the effects of fractionalization and institutions is through the lens
of the delayed stabilizations literature (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). When (ethnic) groups
engage in a ‘war of attrition’ over the burden of reform and are uncertain about how the
reform benefits all other groups (hence their willingness to bear the costs), then policy
reform is delayed until the weakest group concedes. The expected time until stabilization
occurs is expected to increase with the number of groups involved in the decision-making
process and the veto points they possess, so that the adjustment speed depends on the
political system (Spolaore, 2004). However, this interpretation does not explain the strong
interaction effect between executive constraints and ethnic heterogeneity very well.
We propose a theoretical mechanism whereby groups facing a crisis have to decide on
a policy response under uncertainty about post-crisis outcomes. When the executive is
unconstrained, then some groups may have an incentive to delay cooperation by fear of
boosting the strength of the independent executive and its power to expropriate them in
the aftermath of the crisis. If groups can fortify their position through blocking agreement
on policy, then such a mechanism could generate the observed interaction.11
Robustness
We briefly illustrate that our main conclusions are unaffected by the choice of the baseline
hazard, extending the sample and adding unobserved heterogeneity, the exclusion of
influential regions, and different ways of accounting for recurrent spells. In addition, we
also analyze the depth of the decline and the average rate of contraction.
Table 4 tackles the issues of functional form and model selection. We report
our preferred specification in the first column and then show estimates based on five
alternative forms of the hazard function. Column (2) uses a log-logistic hazard instead
of the log-normal shape. The estimated shape parameter (ln γ) is negative, implying
that the hazard is first increasing then decreasing as in the log-normal model. This
11In Chapter 4 we formalize this mechanism and provide a theory of delayed responses to crises.
64 Chapter 3. Do weak institutions prolong crises?
Table 4 – Robustness: functional form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log-normal Log-logistic Exponential Weibull Gompertz Cox PH
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Coefficients Hazard Ratios (H0 : HR = 1)
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.178*** -0.185*** 1.229*** 1.263*** 1.222*** 1.221***
(0.058) (0.067) (0.074) (0.089) (0.071) (0.082)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.978*** 0.974*** 0.979*** 0.979***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.197* 0.235** 0.787 0.765 0.786* 0.768
(0.106) (0.112) (0.119) (0.146) (0.113) (0.137)
Real US Interest Rate 0.087* 0.084* 0.947 0.928 0.949 0.951
(0.048) (0.051) (0.058) (0.061) (0.057) (0.064)
lnσ (Log-normal) -0.065
(0.093)
ln γ (Log-logistic) -0.580***
(0.105)
ln p (Weibull) 1.219**
(0.107)
γ (Gompertz) 0.985
(0.030)
Constant -0.553 -0.856 1.830 1.723 1.928
(0.868) (0.901) (2.432) (2.884) (2.448)
Exits 47 47 47 47 47 47
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 57
Years of Decline 346 346 346 346 346 346
Log-L -72.090 -73.286 -75.295 -73.940 -75.192 -143.142
AIC 156.180 158.571 160.590 159.879 162.384 294.285
Pseudo-R2 0.168 0.164 0.208 0.210 0.160 0.088
Note(s): The standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
lends itself to the following interpretation. In the first few years of a decline, some
countries are able to recover quickly. However, the longer the decline lasts, the more
economic fundamentals deteriorate making it increasingly difficult to enter a recovery.
Columns (3) to (6) have a different interpretation. We no longer report coefficients
but instead hazard ratios, since these models are proportional hazards (PH) models by
nature. They are interpreted as follows. A hazard ratio greater than one implies a higher
instantaneous probability of exiting the decline. A hazard ratio smaller than one implies
a lower instantaneous probability of exiting the decline. Column (3) is the exponential or
constant hazard model. The results remain very similar (given the altered interpretation),
but the log-likelihood decreases somewhat. Column (4) uses a Weibull parameterization
which allows for monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard rates. This model also
has a shape parameter (p) which allows testing for whether the rate increases, decreases
or is constant. The estimate suggests that the baseline hazard is increasing over time. In
contrast, the Gompertz model in column (5) also suggests a shape that is monotonically
decreasing (γ < 0). Among these parametric models, the AIC is lowest for the log-normal
distribution; that is, our preferred model fits the data best. In column (6), we specify a
semi-parametric Cox model which does not restrict the shape of the baseline hazard. The
Cox model also suggests that the probability of exiting a spell first increases very briefly
and then decreases monotonically. However, the imposed proportional hazard restriction
comes at a great cost in terms of fit.
The previous section has already shown that the findings are robust to the inclusion
of regional fixed effects. Column (1) in Table 5 goes two steps further: it extends the
The duration of declines 65
Table 5 – Robustness: sample, heterogeneity, dropping regions, and multiple failures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extended No SSA No MNA No LAC No multiple PWP multiple
Variables ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜ ln t˜
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.178*** -0.159*** -0.199*** -0.189** -0.199*** 1.263***
(0.049) (0.055) (0.071) (0.074) (0.064) (0.096)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.011*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.981***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Initial ln GDP per capita 0.301*** 0.358*** 0.263* 0.179 0.196* 0.759
(0.105) (0.101) (0.139) (0.115) (0.111) (0.137)
Real US Interest Rate 0.091** 0.103** 0.066 0.090 0.086 0.940
(0.036) (0.042) (0.048) (0.065) (0.060) (0.067)
Constant -1.415 -1.843** -1.055 -0.393 -0.405
(0.904) (0.936) (1.063) (0.870) (0.900)
VCE – cluster cluster cluster cluster cluster
Frailties shared – – – – –
Strata – – – – – spell #
Exits 70 40 43 34 40 47
Spells 82 44 50 43 50 57
Years of Decline 466 178 294 271 312 346
Log-L -109.168 -50.584 -64.255 -54.643 -63.715 -123.435
Pseudo-R2 0.094 0.151 0.163 0.172 0.162 0.095
Note(s): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
sample by running the break search algorithm with a significance level of 20% to detect
more episodes, and it includes country-level effects. We now identify 82 spells in total,
out of which 70 are completed. Each country now also has a so-called gamma distributed
frailty; the duration analysis equivalent of random effects in linear models. As usual,
they are assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the covariates (which is unlikely to hold
in practice). Our results are robust to these two modifications; the coefficients of interest
hardly change. Interestingly, there is only some evidence in favor of unobserved effects
altogether. A Likelihood Ratio test for the presence of shared frailties fails to reject the
null at 5% significance (p = 0.054).
To examine if results are driven by specific regions, we re-estimate our preferred
model several times, each time removing one of the three regions with the longest spells.
Column (2) drops all episodes in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and reveals an interesting
additional finding. While the coefficient of fractionalization (ELF15) is very robust in
the previous models, its size and significance is clearly driven by African observations.
Without those, the coefficient keeps the same sign but shrinks substantially and becomes
insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient of institutions remains large and
significant. Since Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest ethno-linguistic heterogeneity of
all regions, this result comes as no surprise and does imply we are only estimating an
“Africa effect”.12 Nevertheless, the interaction model proposed earlier may be particularly
relevant to understanding the effects of institutions and fractionalization in Africa. The
parameter estimates are not sensitive to excluding either the entire Middle East and
North Africa (MNA) or all of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Until now, we assumed that multiple spells of the same type are interchangeable.
The last two columns of Table 5 investigate if this relatively strong form of conditional
independence is a reasonable assumption. Column (5) shows that our findings are robust
to excluding all spells other than the first, which rules out any dependency across
12Also see Chapter 4, where we explore this issue further. This is a common issue in the literature,
e.g. see Sturm and de Haan (2015) who link various fractionalizaton measures to income inequality.
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recurrent spells. The coefficient of executive constraints becomes even larger and the
effect of fractionalization is virtually unchanged. Column (6) takes a different approach
and specifies a conditional risk set model or stratified Cox model due to Prentice et al.
(1981, PWP). The model accounts for ordering of the events but assumes that a subject
cannot experience another event until the previous event has occurred. This is a natural
assumption, as – by definition – a country cannot exit a second decline phase before
having left the first. The results (hazard ratios) are qualitatively similar.
Table 6 – Robustness: Average rate of decline and total depth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables g¯i g¯i t˜D × g¯i t˜D × g¯i t˜D × g¯i t˜D × g¯i
Executive Constraints (INS0) 0.003 0.001 0.034*** 0.005 0.027** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Fractionalization (ELF15) -0.000 -0.000* -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interaction (INS0 × ELF15) 0.000* 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.022 -0.022 -0.052 -0.045
(0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.035)
Real US Interest Rate -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 0.001 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant -0.030 -0.022 0.007 0.098 0.308 0.352
(0.049) (0.049) (0.197) (0.186) (0.310) (0.310)
Region FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 57
Log-L 106.795 107.408 12.267 14.939 15.987 18.209
R2 0.009 0.011 0.289 0.340 0.295 0.333
Note(s): Standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Last but not least, we construct a simple test to examine whether the effects of
institutions and ethnic cleavages on the depth of a slump run solely through the duration
process or if they also affect the rate of contraction. Since the depth of the decline is
the product of the estimated duration and the average rate of contraction, we can define
g¯i ≡
(
yi,tˆmin − yi0
)
/(tˆmin − t0) ≡
(
yi,tˆmin − yi0
)
/t˜D as the average rate of decline and
t˜D × g¯i ≡ yi,tˆmin − yi0 as the overall depth of the decline. Here yit is still the log of GDP
per capita in country i at time t, and g¯i is by construction negative. We have already
analyzed the duration of declines. Now we run OLS regressions explaining the rate of
contraction (g¯i) and depth (t˜D × g¯i) to isolate the channel through which the previously
estimated effects run.
Column (1) in Table 6 shows that we find no evidence in favor of an effect of either
executive constraints or fractionalization on the average rate of decline. Column (2)
confirms the absence of robust effects for the specification with an interaction term.
In fact, in both columns most coefficients are insignificant and estimated to be virtually
zero. The variables are not mean-centered in this case. The remaining columns of Table 6
examine the depth of the slump. Columns (3) and (4) illustrate that we now recover the
previously estimated effects (even with similar significance levels and, naturally, with
reversed signs since g¯i is negative). These results are robust to the inclusion of region
fixed effects as shown in columns (5) and (6). The interaction models explain about
33–34% of the variation in depth, highlighting the relevance of the estimated effects.
Together with the duration analysis and the analysis of the average rate of decline, this
leads us to conclude that a) political institutions and ethnic heterogeneity have robust
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effects on the overall depth of slumps, and b) these effects run primarily through the
duration of the decline phase and not the rate of contraction.
5 Concluding remarks
This chapter makes several contributions to a burgeoning literature on growth episodes
and structural breaks in growth performances. We show that a restricted structural
change approach, as in Papell and Prodan (2012), works well as an inferential method
for identifying slumps, big recessions or growth collapses in a large sample of countries.
We find a substantial number of slumps in developing and developed countries alike,
suggesting that severe downward volatility is an ubiquitous phenomenon in the post-
war period. There is systematic evidence of weak political institutions before slumps
hit and positive institutional change during and in the immediate aftermath of slumps.
Our interpretation of this stylized fact is that, while institutions may cause growth,
volatility can also contribute to endogenous institutional change. Severe economic crises
bring about what we may call creative political destruction and raise the pressure
for institutional reform in a very broad sense. Our key finding is that the duration
of declines depends on institutions and also particularly strongly on ethno-linguistic
fractionalization. An important extension is that the effect of executive constraints is
non-linear and depends on the level of fractionalization, an interaction which is not
fully captured by current theories of policy reform and delay. We also show that effects
of political institutions and ethnic cleavages on the depth of declines run through the
duration.
As a whole, our results lend broad support to political economy theories emphasizing
the respective roles of institutions and ethnic cleavages. Effective coordination and
responses to slumps are hampered by a high degree of social tension as captured by
ethno-linguistic fractionalization. However, particularly strong political institutions can
put in place coordination mechanisms that are able to contain or resolve these conflicts
within the institutional framework. At the same time, our findings imply that in less
ethnically fragmented societies political institutions are less important as a determinant
of the length of declines.
These results do not suggest that sound macroeconomic policies as such do not matter,
though they provide some indication that these policies may be secondary to more
fundamental factors. We need more research on which specific institutional features allow
better policies to emerge. While the previous literature has stressed the role of positive
growth spurts, we show that slumps matter a lot and that the decline phase can last
very long in some cases. We think a comparison of the relative effects of slumps versus
accelerations on long-run GDP levels would be an interesting extension of our findings.
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70 Appendix
Appendix A: Estimation of structural breaks
Sequential procedure for testing and dating breaks
The procedure described here is a modification of Bai’s (1997) sequential likelihood ratio
tests for structural change – see also the extensions in Bai and Perron (1998) and in Bai
(1999). We make an important simplifying assumption, namely, that all output series
are regime-wise trend-stationary. Verifying this assumption is beyond the scope of this
chapter, as testing for unit roots in the presence of structural breaks (with sufficient
power and size) is still contested territory and our output series have only a moderate
time dimension (T < 60 years). We implement the sequential procedure in six steps.
1. Determine the optimal AR(p) trend model using the Bayesian information criterion
to adjust for serial correlation up to a maximum lag count (pmax). We set pmax = 4.
2. Specify the partial structural change model:
yt = α+βt+γ01(t > tb1)+γ1(t−tb1)1(t > tb1)+γ2(t−tb2)1(t > tb2)+
p∑
i=1
δiyt−i+t
where yt is the log of GDP per capita in year t, tbi are the possible break dates,
1(·) is an indicator function, and p is the lag order as determined by the optimal
AR(p) model. We require that tb2 ≥ tb1 + h for h = 4. In other words, the period
between two successive breaks making up the same episode is at minimum 4 years.
3. Define trimming parameter τ , where typically τ ∈ [0.05, 0.25]. The breaks are in
the ranges tb1 ∈ [τT, (1− τ)T − h] and tb2 ∈ [τT + h, (1− τ)T ]. We set τ = 0.05.
Let Λτ denote the set of all possible episodes [tb1, tb2] ⊂ [τT, (1− τ)T ].13
4. Compute the sup-W test statistic of the null of no break versus at least one break
(H0 : γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = 0). The supremum is taken over all episodes in Λτ with a
positive estimate of β and a non-positive estimate of γ0:
sup
[tb1,tb2]∈Λτ
W (tb1, tb2) = sup
[tb1,tb2]∈Λτ
(
T −K
3
)
SSRr − SSRu
SSRu
where K is the number of parameters, SSRr denotes the sum of squared residuals
from a regression imposing H0, and SSRu the sum of squared residuals from a
regression imposing only β > 0 and γ0 ≤ 0.
5. The critical value and empirical p-value of sup-W statistic is bootstrapped.14
6. If the sup-W statistic is significant at the desired level, the remaining sample is split
into two new sub-samples from the beginning to the first break and from the second
break to the end, then the procedure restarts at (4) using the estimated AR-order
from before. If the bootstrapped sup-W ∗ test fails to reject in each sub-sample, or
the sub-samples are too small (T ≤ 20), then the procedure stops.
13For simplicity of exposition, we suppress an additional index running over the sub-samples (defined
in Step 6). T refers to the number of observations of the currently active sample. The notation neglects
the discontinuity of actual observation times.
14In finite samples comparable asymptotic tests often have poor size and power (see Prodan, 2008).
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Bootstrapping the sup-Wald statistic
There have been several suggestions on how to best bootstrap structural change tests
in particular or other popular time series tests in general. For example, Hansen
(2000) suggests employing a fixed-design bootstrap allowing for non-stationarity, lagged
dependent variables and conditional heteroskedasticity. MacKinnon (2009), on the
contrary, shows that the recursive bootstrap of Diebold and Chen (1996) gives results
superior to most other bootstrap types (fixed-parameter, sieve, pairs, block, double
block) as well as the asymptotic test in a simple application of an AR(1) model with an
endogenous break. Papell and Prodan (2012) also favor a recursive bootstrap though they
do not compare it to other methods. We use a recursive bootstrap similar to Diebold and
Chen (1996). Comparing methods systematically is beyond the scope of this chapter.15
In line with usual notation, we denote all bootstrap quantities with the superscript ‘∗’.
The bootstrap procedure is as follows.
1. Specify the optimal break model under theH0 of no structural breaks in the specified
sample using the BIC as before and obtain the residuals:
eˆt = yt − αˆ− βˆt−
p∑
i=1
δˆiyt−i.
2. Draw new residuals: eˆ∗t = ut, with ut ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σˆ2eˆ).
3. Construct a bootstrap sample of equal size as the original sample:
y∗t = αˆ + βˆt+
p∑
i=1
δˆiy
∗
t−i + eˆ
∗
t , ∀t = 1 + p, . . . , T
where y∗t−i is the observed yt−i only in the case of a fixed-design bootstrap, otherwise
y∗t must be constructed recursively (conditional on p observed initial values).
4. Rerun the break search algorithm on the bootstrap series {y∗t }, including
determination of the optimal AR(p) model, and compute bootstrapped test
statistics sup[tb∗1,tb∗2]∈Λτ W
∗
j , where j indexes the current bootstrap iteration.
5. Repeat from Step (2) until j = B, where B is the total number of bootstrap
replications. We set B = 1000.
6. The bootstrap p-value (pˆ∗) is obtained by counting the proportion of the estimated
bootstrap test statistics that are greater than the originally calculated test statistic:
pˆ∗ =
1
B
B∑
j=1
1
(
sup
[tb∗1,tb∗2]∈Λτ
W ∗j > sup
[tb1,tb2]∈Λτ
W (tb1, tb2)
)
.
The critical value is the (1−αs)Bth largest bootstrapped sup-W ∗ statistic, where αs
is the desired significance level (10% throughout the text, unless otherwise noted).
15We use a parametric recursive bootstrap, but informally compared the results to other techniques.
Hansen’s fixed-design bootstrap generates (too) many questionable slumps and the Wild bootstrap rejects
(too) often. Residual and parametric bootstraps give similar results.
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Appendix B: List of episodes
Table B-1 – Global Parameters
Data: PWT Max AR (pmax): 4
Sample start: 1950 Bootstrap replications: 1000
Sample end: 2008 Bootstrap errors: parametric
Trimming (τ): 0.05 Bootstrap type: recursive
Min. tbi distance (h): 4 Bootstrap significance (α
s): 0.1
Table B-2 – Estimated and Filtered Breaks with Troughs: 58 Episodes*
Code T0 t̂b1 t̂min t̂b2 T Sup-W Critical W p-value Drop (%) Duration c
ALB 1970 1990 1991 2002 2008 18.5 13.6 0.007 -15.32 1 0
ARE 1986 1990 1999 2002 2008 29.1 14.5 0.003 -10.90 9 0
AUS 1950 1954 1957 1966 2008 8.3 8.7 0.064 -0.72 3 0
AUS 1967 1989 1991 1998 2008 10.1 10.7 0.059 -2.29 2 0
BDI 1960 1971 1972 1988 2008 9.9 11.3 0.089 -3.23 1 0
BEL 1950 1957 1958 1973 2008 12.8 12.1 0.029 -2.24 1 0
BGR 1970 1988 1997 1997 2008 16.3 12.8 0.010 -23.79 9 0
BHR 1970 1980 1987 1986 2008 14.4 11.0 0.010 -44.12 7 1
BRA 1950 1980 1983 2003 2008 12.5 12.3 0.043 -14.60 3 0
CAF 1960 1978 2005 2005 2008 8.3 8.7 0.060 -46.38 27 1
CHE 1950 1974 1975 1978 2008 10.7 10.6 0.047 -7.87 1 0
CHL 1951 1953 1954 1972 1973 12.0 8.5 0.017 -9.06 1 0
CHL 1951 1974 1975 1979 1980 13.3 10.8 0.021 -16.50 1 0
CHL 1951 1981 1983 1995 2008 12.6 11.4 0.025 -21.22 2 0
CHN 1952 1960 1962 1977 2008 13.9 12.9 0.029 -23.71 2 0
CMR 1960 1986 1995 1990 2008 12.0 12.3 0.055 -40.46 9 1
COG 1960 1974 1977 1982 2008 11.9 12.5 0.069 -21.35 3 0
CRI 1950 1955 1956 1963 1979 11.4 11.3 0.048 -4.39 1 0
CRI 1950 1980 1982 2002 2008 17.2 10.6 0.002 -17.47 2 0
CUB 1970 1988 1993 1995 2008 11.4 12.5 0.072 -34.70 5 0
CYP 1950 1973 1975 1977 2008 15.5 9.7 0.001 -31.40 2 0
CYP 1978 1990 1991 1995 2008 11.6 14.6 0.098 -10.19 1 0
DNK 1950 1954 1955 1965 2008 12.9 11.7 0.022 -1.56 1 0
DZA 1960 1984 1994 1996 2008 10.9 8.2 0.013 -14.09 10 0
ETH 1950 1972 1992 1993 2008 11.5 10.2 0.020 -30.68 20 0
FIN 1950 1989 1993 2006 2008 10.6 10.8 0.057 -16.34 4 0
GAB 1960 1976 1987 1997 2008 10.6 11.2 0.062 -50.56 11 1
GMB 1960 1982 1998 2002 2008 16.4 11.2 0.006 -25.33 16 0
GRC 1951 1973 1974 1994 2008 17.9 11.6 0.003 -6.92 1 0
GTM 1950 1980 1988 1984 2008 15.1 12.3 0.015 -19.14 8 0
HUN 1970 1990 1992 2004 2008 15.6 13.5 0.018 -10.56 2 0
IDN 1960 1997 1999 2001 2008 13.5 10.6 0.013 -17.49 2 0
IRN 1955 1976 1981 1980 2008 15.9 11.6 0.004 -56.78 5 1
IRQ 1970 1990 2003 1994 2008 9.1 8.9 0.046 -66.43 13 1
JPN 1950 1973 1974 1990 2008 13.5 13.4 0.050 -2.85 1 0
MEX 1950 1981 1988 1995 2008 11.9 11.0 0.038 -17.03 7 0
MNG 1970 1990 1993 2003 2008 46.5 11.7 0.000 -41.81 3 0
MOZ 1960 1981 1986 1995 2008 12.6 12.0 0.037 -24.99 5 0
MYS 1955 1984 1986 1993 2008 9.1 10.5 0.093 -7.47 2 0
NPL 1960 1979 1980 2000 2008 10.6 8.9 0.025 -5.33 1 0
NZL 1950 1974 1978 1992 2008 9.9 10.5 0.070 -9.03 4 0
Continued on next page
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Table B-2 – Continued from previous page
Code T0 t̂b1 t̂min t̂b2 T Sup-W Critical W p-value Drop (%) Duration c
OMN 1970 1979 1980 1985 2008 12.4 9.0 0.007 -21.61 1 0
PER 1950 1958 1959 1966 1976 11.9 9.3 0.022 -6.91 1 0
PER 1950 1977 1992 1992 2008 11.0 10.3 0.037 -29.30 15 0
PHL 1950 1983 1985 2003 2008 12.8 10.2 0.007 -16.78 2 0
POL 1970 1979 1982 1993 2008 13.8 12.1 0.027 -22.55 3 0
PRY 1980 1989 2002 2002 2008 8.8 8.8 0.049 -14.24 13 1
RWA 1960 1993 1994 1997 2008 18.0 7.9 0.001 -45.38 1 0
SAU 1986 1992 1999 2002 2008 14.6 13.3 0.039 -18.75 7 0
SLE 1961 1995 1999 2006 2008 14.2 11.1 0.011 -41.65 4 1
SLV 1950 1978 1983 1987 2008 18.2 10.2 0.002 -25.82 5 0
TGO 1960 1979 2008 1989 2008 9.6 10.1 0.065 -53.60 29 1
THA 1950 1996 1998 2003 2008 10.7 7.8 0.003 -14.17 2 0
TTO 1950 1961 1963 1969 1981 16.8 14.9 0.020 -0.78 2 0
TTO 1950 1982 1993 2006 2008 12.4 12.6 0.054 -28.96 11 0
UGA 1950 1977 1986 1987 2008 11.6 10.5 0.029 -30.27 9 0
USA 1950 1957 1958 1966 2008 8.7 9.3 0.075 -2.51 1 0
ZMB 1955 1968 2001 2000 2008 15.0 10.9 0.007 -68.99 33 1
* Out of a total of 70 episodes identified by the sequential algorithm, 12 are invalid slumps. The invalid episodes are [country
code (spell number)]: AUT (1), AUT (2), CHN (1), FIN (1), HKG (1), IRN (1), MRT (1), PRY (1), TZA (1).
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Appendix C: Data sources and summary statistics
Table C-1 – Summary Statistics: break date to trough
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N × T Source
Institutions, Politics & Conflict
Polity Score -1.90 6.99 346 Polity IV
Democracy 2.73 3.61 330 Polity IV
Autocracy 4.69 3.74 330 Polity IV
Executive Recruitment 4.92 2.27 330 Polity IV
Executive Constraints 3.18 2.28 330 Polity IV
Political Competition 4.11 3.38 330 Polity IV
Regime Duration 18.14 22.70 347 Polity IV
Negative Regime Change 0.01 0.12 347 Polity IV
Positive Regime Change 0.10 0.29 347 Polity IV
Corruption (ICRG) 2.63 1.10 193 ICRG
Fractionalization (ELF1) 18.36 18.69 348 Desmet et al. (2012)
Fractionalization (ELF15) 63.68 30.71 348 Desmet et al. (2012)
Inequality (Gini) 45.83 11.65 192 Solt (2009)
Leader Exit 0.39 0.49 344 Goemans et al. (2009)
War/Conflict (major) 0.12 0.33 348 Gleditsch et al. (2002)
War/Conflict (any) 0.24 0.43 348 Gleditsch et al. (2002)
Macro I: Prices, Trade & Exports
Inflation (ln(1 + δ)) 22.89 43.97 292 WDI/IFS
RER Undervalue 0.07 0.54 348 PWT 7.0
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -3.98 6.70 254 WDI
∆ Terms of Trade -4.11 17.72 224 WDI/IFS
Manufactures (% of Exports) 22.65 24.27 264 WITS/ COMTRADE
Trade Openness (de facto) 67.85 37.43 348 PWT 7.0
Trade Openness (de jure) 0.23 0.42 306 Wacziarg and Welch (2008)
Export Sophisticaton 8.43 0.42 234 Hausmann et al. (2007)
∆ Export Sophistication 1.48 7.44 233 Hausmann et al. (2007)
Export Diversification 65.91 24.58 264 WITS/ COMTRADE
Macro II: Finance
Capital Account Openness -0.49 1.28 304 Chinn and Ito (2006)
Financial Integration 115.30 88.18 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Financial Depth 32.35 18.68 245 Beck et al. (2010)
Financial Development 68.40 22.18 271 Beck et al. (2010)
Private Credit (% of GDP) 26.25 23.53 248 Beck et al. (2010)
FDI Liabilities (% of GDP) 15.11 15.66 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
External Debt Liabilities (% of GDP) 65.22 59.18 309 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
External Leveragea 165.29 327.09 307 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Other Determinants
Initial ln GDP per capitab 8.20 1.21 348 PWT 7.0
Real US Interest Ratec 1.90 2.44 348 FRED
Infant Mortalityd 73.37 40.23 348 World Population Prospects
Life Expectancyd 58.63 10.55 348 World Population Prospects
Telephones (per 100 people) 5.24 9.78 312 WDI
Education (primary) 3.14 1.71 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
Education (secondary) 1.12 0.83 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
Education (all) 4.44 2.47 327 Barro and Lee (2010)
a Following Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), external leverage is li = (τ + Ai/Yi)(τ + NAi/Yi + Eij/Yi)
−1,
where τ is the market value of assets to output (set to 3) and j is the rest of the world, Ai/Yi is assets
over GDP, NAi/Yi is net foreign assets over GDP and Eij/Yi equity over GDP. The ratio is always > 0 if
NAi > −300, this condition is not satisfied in very few cases; we set these missing.
b Initial refers to ln GDP per capita at t0, that is, the last year before the slump.
c Deflated three months treasury bill rate.
d Converted into annual data by interpolation. If the average is for the years 1950-55, we assume it is reached
in the 1952 and linearly interpolate to the middle of the next group (1957), and so on. The data is from the
2010 edition of the Word Population Prospects (medium-fertility variant).
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Appendix D: Duration Method
Log-normal Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) models
Given the model ln(t˜) = β0 + x
′β + , log-normality implies the following relationships.
Setting all covariates zero, the expected survival time is E[ln t˜|x = 0] = β0. Hence, the
baseline survival and hazard functions are
S0(t˜) = 1− Φ
(
(ln t˜− β0)σ−1
)
and λ0(t˜) =
φ
(
(ln t˜− β0)σ−1
)(
1− Φ ((ln t˜− β0)σ−1))σt˜
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the standard normal pdf and cdf, respectively.
Including (time-invariant) covariates is equivalent to scaling the baseline survival
functions. The conditional survival curve is defined as S(t˜|x) = S0(t˜)
(
exp(−x′β)t˜). This
implies S(t˜|x) = 1 − Φ ((ln t˜− (β0 + x′β))σ−1); that is, the intercept can be absorbed
into β. The density and cumulative probability functions are defined implicitly.16
Time-varying covariates introduce two complications. First, the hazard rate at each
unit of analysis time t˜ is not independent from previous realizations of the time-varying
covariates. Second, the covariates must be strictly exogenous, as otherwise feedback may
occur from the duration to future realizations of the covariates. Following Lancaster
(1990) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) these issues can be formalized as follows. For
time-varying covariates x(t˜), let xH(t˜) denote the covariate path up until time t˜, so that
xH(t˜) ≡ {x(u), 0 ≤ u ≤ t˜} for all t˜ ≥ 0, then the conditional hazard function is:
λ(t˜|xH) = lim
dt˜→0
Pr(t˜ ≤ T˜ < t˜+ dt˜ | T˜ ≥ t˜,xH(t˜+ dt˜))
dt˜
.
Lancaster (1990, pp. 26–30) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002, p. 196) define strict
exogeneity as Pr(xH(t˜) | xH(u), T˜ ≥ u) = Pr(xH(t˜) | xH(u), T˜ = u) for all 0 < u ≤ t˜.
The condition states that the future path of the time-varying covariate is not affected by
the event occurring at present.
We can now derive the partial likelihood.17 Suppose we know the event occurs at t˜i,
the likelihood contribution of an observation i at time j = t˜i then is Li = S(j)λ(j). The
likelihood contribution of an observation that has not failed at time j, so that j < t˜i, is
just the probability of survival until j: Li = S(j). Hence, right-censoring is essentially
nothing else than an observation at analysis time j that is still in the sample but has not
yet failed and thus extends easily to (exogenous) time-varying covariates.
Using the notation for grouped data from Wooldridge (2010, p. 1016), the log-
likelihood of the log-normal model with time-varying covariates can be expressed as:
lnL(β, σ) =
N∑
i=1
t˜i−1∑
j=1
lnαj(x
′
ijβ, σ) + (1− ci) ln
(
1− αt˜i(x′it˜iβ, σ)
)
where αj(·) = exp[−
∫ αj
αj−1 λ(s, ·)ds] measures survival over the given interval and ci
indicates if observation i is censored. The inner sum (first term) is the probability of
survival until t˜i − 1 and the second term is the conditional probability of failure at t˜i.
16It follows that an expression for the hazard function conditional on the covariates is λ(t˜|x) =
λ0
(
t˜ exp(−x′β)) exp(−x′β); these hazards are not proportional.
17This does not apply to frailty models where the likelihoods are more involved.
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Appendix E: Variable selection and robustness
Table E-1 – Base Models
Coefficient SE p-value Exits Spells Years logL
Constant Only 1.346 0.180 0.00 48 58 348 -87.86
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.124 0.144 0.39 48 58 348 -87.44
Real US Interest Rate 0.096 0.047 0.04 48 58 348 -86.55
Note(s): All models include a constant. The standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level.
Table E-2 – Variable Selection
Coefficient SE p-value Exits Spells Years logL
Inflation (ln(1 + δ)) -0.002 0.004 0.68 38 45 234 -64.62
RER Underval -0.144 0.333 0.67 48 58 348 -86.13
Trade Openness (de jure) -1.019 0.304 0.00 43 52 316 -74.89
Trade Openness (de facto) 0.014 0.005 0.00 48 58 348 -80.82
Current Account Balance -0.000 0.027 1.00 27 34 222 -47.79
Manufactures (% Exports) -0.015 0.007 0.04 24 31 236 -42.26
∆ Terms of Trade -0.007 0.017 0.68 24 27 164 -36.63
Export Diversification -0.015 0.008 0.07 24 31 236 -42.29
Export Sophistication -2.131 0.574 0.00 28 34 241 -45.86
Capital Account Openness -0.016 0.125 0.90 32 41 275 -59.63
Financial Integration 0.000 0.003 0.88 35 43 271 -61.67
Financial Depth -0.015 0.005 0.00 26 33 195 -44.81
Financial Development 0.006 0.009 0.55 31 39 266 -57.87
External Debt Liabilities 0.000 0.007 0.98 35 43 271 -61.69
External Leverage 0.003 0.014 0.82 35 43 271 -61.64
FDI Liabilities -0.004 0.018 0.83 35 43 271 -61.67
Private Credit -0.013 0.004 0.00 28 35 198 -47.09
Polity IV Score -0.064 0.018 0.00 47 57 346 -80.27
Democracy Score -0.118 0.032 0.00 47 57 346 -80.43
Autocracy Score 0.127 0.038 0.00 47 57 346 -80.57
Executive Recruitment -0.163 0.057 0.00 47 57 346 -81.90
Executive Constraints (INS0) -0.218 0.065 0.00 47 57 346 -79.70
Political Competition -0.122 0.038 0.00 47 57 346 -80.89
Regime Durability -0.002 0.005 0.72 47 57 346 -84.96
Corruption (ICRG) -0.486 0.141 0.00 14 18 98 -19.29
Fractionalization (ELF1) 0.018 0.007 0.01 48 58 348 -83.82
Fractionalization (ELF15) 0.018 0.004 0.00 48 58 348 -78.07
Inequality (Gini) 0.045 0.023 0.05 22 27 137 -34.73
Leader Exit 0.424 0.360 0.24 47 57 346 -84.18
War/Conflict (major) 0.179 0.875 0.84 48 58 348 -86.19
War/Conflict (any) 0.469 0.553 0.40 48 58 348 -85.73
Infant Mortality 0.014 0.006 0.02 48 58 348 -83.18
Life Expectancy -0.060 0.030 0.05 48 58 348 -83.03
Education (Primary) -0.356 0.096 0.00 46 56 327 -76.39
Education (Secondary) -0.448 0.165 0.01 46 56 327 -79.76
Education (All) -0.254 0.063 0.00 46 56 327 -76.17
Telephones per capita -0.021 0.014 0.13 30 38 257 -52.57
Note(s): All models also include initial GDP per capita, the real US interest rate, and a constant.
The standard errors are cluster-robust at the country level.
Appendix 77
T
a
b
le
E
-3
–
P
re
fe
rr
ed
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
:
V
a
ri
ab
le
-b
y
-V
ar
ia
b
le
M
o
d
el
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
V
a
r
ia
b
l
e
s
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
ln
t˜
E
x
ec
u
ti
v
e
C
o
n
st
ra
in
ts
(I
N
S
0
)
-0
.1
7
6
*
*
-0
.1
7
0
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
7
-0
.1
7
8
*
*
-0
.0
5
8
-0
.0
2
4
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.1
3
4
-0
.1
7
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
5
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
0
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
7
8
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(0
.1
1
4
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
6
0
)
(0
.0
6
0
)
(0
.0
6
4
)
F
ra
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(E
L
F
1
5
)
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
0
*
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
0
.0
1
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
In
it
ia
l
ln
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
0
.4
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
6
1
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
2
0
0
.8
8
7
*
*
*
0
.2
8
6
*
*
0
.2
8
2
*
*
0
.5
2
0
*
*
0
.1
8
8
0
.3
7
4
*
*
0
.3
9
9
*
*
0
.4
0
1
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
8
)
(0
.1
2
1
)
(0
.1
5
6
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
(0
.2
3
4
)
(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.1
3
2
)
(0
.2
4
4
)
(0
.1
1
4
)
(0
.1
7
0
)
(0
.1
8
4
)
(0
.1
2
4
)
R
ea
l
U
S
In
te
re
st
R
a
te
0
.0
6
6
0
.0
8
5
*
0
.1
2
2
0
.1
3
0
0
.0
9
0
*
0
.0
8
6
0
.1
0
6
*
*
-0
.0
1
9
0
.0
8
8
*
0
.0
9
9
*
*
0
.0
9
7
*
*
0
.0
7
0
(0
.0
4
6
)
(0
.0
4
7
)
(0
.0
8
3
)
(0
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
7
7
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
(0
.0
4
6
)
(0
.0
4
5
)
T
ra
d
e
O
p
en
n
es
s
(d
e
ju
re
)
-0
.8
0
7
*
*
(0
.3
2
9
)
T
ra
d
e
O
p
en
n
es
s
(d
e
fa
ct
o
)
0
.0
0
9
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
s
(%
E
x
p
o
rt
s)
-0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
0
9
)
E
x
p
o
rt
D
iv
er
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
-0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
1
0
)
E
x
p
o
rt
S
o
p
h
is
ti
ca
ti
o
n
-2
.1
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.4
7
9
)
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
D
ep
th
-0
.0
1
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
7
)
P
ri
v
a
te
C
re
d
it
-0
.0
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
In
eq
u
a
li
ty
(G
in
i)
0
.0
2
2
(0
.0
2
2
)
F
ra
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(E
L
F
1
)
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
9
)
In
fa
n
t
M
o
rt
a
li
ty
0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
0
5
)
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
-0
.0
2
9
(0
.0
2
3
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
(A
ll
)
-0
.0
8
8
(0
.0
6
9
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
-2
.0
8
0
*
*
0
.2
3
2
0
.4
4
0
0
.9
0
2
1
1
.8
0
5
*
*
*
-1
.1
7
6
-1
.3
2
4
-4
.1
6
4
*
*
-0
.4
7
9
-2
.5
3
8
-0
.5
4
2
-1
.7
8
6
*
*
(0
.9
6
6
)
(0
.9
4
4
)
(1
.4
4
4
)
(1
.5
9
5
)
(2
.9
4
8
)
(1
.0
3
0
)
(1
.0
3
9
)
(2
.0
0
4
)
(0
.9
3
0
)
(1
.7
2
4
)
(0
.9
3
6
)
(0
.8
8
4
)
E
x
it
s
4
2
4
7
2
4
2
4
2
8
2
5
2
7
2
2
4
7
4
7
4
7
4
5
S
p
el
ls
5
1
5
7
3
1
3
1
3
4
3
2
3
4
2
7
5
7
5
7
5
7
5
5
Y
ea
rs
o
f
D
ec
li
n
e
3
1
4
3
4
6
2
3
6
2
3
6
2
4
1
1
9
3
1
9
6
1
3
7
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
4
6
3
2
5
L
o
g
-L
-6
1
.3
1
8
-7
0
.2
0
0
-3
9
.2
3
6
-3
9
.6
5
5
-3
9
.0
8
3
-3
6
.8
5
7
-3
8
.2
6
7
-3
1
.3
1
6
-7
2
.0
5
1
-7
1
.2
5
2
-7
1
.1
9
2
-6
6
.1
4
2
P
se
u
d
o
-R
2
0
.2
2
2
0
.1
8
9
0
.1
2
0
0
.1
1
1
0
.2
4
5
0
.2
0
9
0
.2
3
0
0
.1
5
8
0
.1
6
8
0
.1
7
7
0
.1
7
8
0
.2
0
2
N
o
te
(s
):
T
h
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
-r
o
b
u
st
at
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
le
ve
l.
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.

Chapter 4
Ethnic divisions, political
institutions and the duration of
declines
A political economy theory of delayed recovery∗
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the duration of large economic declines and
provides a theory of delayed recovery. First, we develop a formal
political economy model that illustrates a simple mechanism of how weak
constraints on the political executive can lead to longer declines in ethnically
heterogeneous countries. The model shows how uncertain post-recovery
incomes and a ‘winner-take-all’ threshold effect create a commitment problem
rendering a cooperative equilibrium inaccessible. Holding out can benefit
groups by reducing the threshold effects in subsequent periods, thus limiting
the remaining uncertainty. Placing strong constraints on the executive solves
this commitment problem by reducing the uncertainty from the threshold
effects, which brings about cooperation earlier on. Second, we then test
several empirical predictions from the model using standard data on linguistic
heterogeneity and more detailed data on ethnic power configurations. We
find that the partial correlations are consistent with the proposed theory.
The effect of executive constraints on the length of declines is very large in
heterogeneous countries, but practically disappears in ethnically homogeneous
societies. The adverse effect of heterogeneity is driven by the number of
groups; increasing political concentration works in the opposite direction.
Keywords: economic crises, delayed recovery, political economy
JEL Classification: E6, O43, J15
∗This chapter is based on Bluhm, R. and K. Thomsson. 2015. Ethnic cleavages, institutions and
the duration of economic slumps, MERIT Working Papers 003, United Nations University - Maastricht
Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
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1 Introduction
Why do economic declines in Sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the globe last so
much longer than in others, say, Western Europe and North America? We propose a
novel answer to this question which links ethnic heterogeneity and the powers of the
political executive to the failure to agree on a policy response to the shock, even when
the policy is economically effective and socially desirable.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a theory of how ethnic diversity
and political institutions interact during economic declines and to test the implications
of this theory. We focus on the process of policy formulation during the decline phase
of a slump and illustrate a simple mechanism of how weak constraints on the political
executive can lead to longer declines in ethnically heterogeneous countries. The key issue
we highlight is a commitment problem among winners and losers of the recovery process.
Uncertainty about post-recovery incomes and a ‘winner-take-all’ threshold effect caused
by imperfect political institutions can lead to delayed cooperation. Next, we assess the
model empirically. We examine the central predictions of the model using both standard
data on linguistic heterogeneity and a more detailed data set on the level of access to
executive power enjoyed by the prevailing ethno-political groups.
The main theoretical results are threefold. First, delayed cooperation can occur in
equilibrium. Weak constraints on the executive act as a political friction in ethnically
diverse countries that can lead to large social inefficiencies. Second, stronger political
institutions can entirely resolve this issue and bring about cooperation early on. Third,
the commitment problem is getting worse when the number of groups increases. We
also derive an additional result which takes the relative size (strength) of the groups
into account. We then show empirically that the partial correlations are consistent with
the theory. The effect of executive constraints on the length of declines is very large in
heterogeneous countries, but muted in ethnically homogeneous societies. This finding
is robust to the different data sets, as well as region and decade dummies. We also
show that greater political concentration shortens declines and, vice versa, that a more
even distribution of political power across groups increases delay. An important policy
implication is that political institutions can contain the adversarial element of ethnic
diversity and thus play a critical role in heterogeneous countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the empirical
motivation: an interaction effect of ethnic diversity and political institutions on the
duration of economic declines. In Section 3, we argue that the rich literatures on
ethnicity and political institutions in economics and political science have not yet offered a
thorough explanation for this interaction. In Section 4, we outline our model of how ethnic
fractionalization and weak constraints on the executive can lead to delayed cooperation.
In Section 5, we discuss the data, the empirical strategy and the main empirical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical motivation
This chapter is motivated by a growing empirical literature which has established that
economic growth is often not steady but instead characterized by different growth regimes.
It is long known that the correlation of growth rates across decades is low (Easterly et al.,
1993). A key finding of the newer growth episodes literature is that growth accelerations
are triggered by a variety of factors but are difficult to sustain (Hausmann et al., 2005;
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Berg et al., 2012). Several years of positive growth can easily be followed by long and
deep slumps. Such negative shocks can wipe out previous welfare gains and are often
characterized by persistent output loss (Cerra and Saxena, 2008). In light of these
findings, it becomes important to understand why some declines last so much longer
than others and what factors are associated with longer (or shorter) durations.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the econometric identification of the decline phase of
economic slumps and then analyze its duration. We empirically examine if the duration
of the decline phase of large economic slumps is, among other factors, shaped by political
institutions and ethnic cleavages. In a departure from the previous literature, we
specifically focus on the duration of declines for three reasons. First, the onset of a slump
may be brought about by many factors which are not necessarily related to a country’s
political institutions or level of social cohesion, but the duration of declines depends
on socioeconomic groups agreeing on coordinated responses. Second, the dynamics of
recoveries differ a lot from the dynamics of declines (both empirically and theoretically).
Third, most of the variation in the overall depth of slumps is due to the duration of the
decline phase and not due the rate of contraction.
Figure 1 – Unconditional correlations with the duration of declines
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Note(s): The durations are based on the 58 slumps estimated in Chapter 3 for the panel (b), and
57 slumps for panel (a) as we lack scores on the index of executive constraints for Trinidad and
Tobago in 1961. No adjustment has been made for censored observations (unfinished declines).
We first show that the duration (in years) until a recovery starts increases with
greater degrees of ethnic cleavages, and that it decreases with stronger constraints on
the executive. A slump is defined by a trend break or shift in the growth regime with
a restricted pattern. The duration of the decline phase is simply the time from the
downbreak until the trough. Institutional strength is measured by the constraints placed
on the political executive using an index scaled 1 to 7 (least to most constrained). Ethnic
heterogeneity is proxied for by an index of linguistic fractionalization (scaled 0 to 100).
Figure 1 illustrates the unconditional correlation of the (log) duration of declines with
executive constraints (−0.38) and ethno-linguistic fractionalization (0.47).
We also provide evidence of a more subtle pattern: the adverse effect of high ethnic
heterogeneity is conditional on the quality of political institutions. A log-normal survival
regression of the duration of the decline phase on executive constraints, ethno-linguistic
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fractionalization and an interaction term yields the following (the standard errors are in
parentheses below the coefficients):1
l̂n t˜ =
1.808
(0.201)
− 0.254
(0.080)
XCONST0 +
0.018
(0.004)
ELF − 0.004
(0.002)
XCONST0 × ELF
The estimated effects are statistically significant and qualitatively meaningful. Even
though this is a very na¨ıve reduced form model of the duration process, the basic findings
are robust to more demanding specifications. We centered the two explanatory variables
on their sample mean, so that the interaction term only needs to be considered when
both regressors change. Ceteris paribus, a unit increase in executive constraints away
from the average leads to a 22.4% shortening of the duration until the trough and thus
predicts a substantially faster exit from the decline phase. Conversely, a one percentage
point increase in ethnic heterogeneity prolongs the duration by about 1.8%. Political
institutions seem to moderate the effects of ethnic heterogeneity. At perfect executive
constraints the negative effect of diversity is virtually zero, whereas it is very large when
the political executive has unlimited powers. We also show that the effect of these two
variables on the overall depth of slumps runs through the duration and not the average
rate of declines.
In Chapter 3 we are primarily concerned with the econometrics of identifying declines
and establishing this stylized fact. The main objective of this chapter is twofold: first,
to propose a theory that can generate such an interaction effect, and, second, to then
empirically examine additional theoretical predictions using much more detailed data on
ethnic groups and their political power.
3 Related literature
Ethnic heterogeneity is a fundamental determinant of prosperity. It is typically associated
with low growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997), the undersupply of public goods (Alesina
et al., 1999), and civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban
et al., 2012). Ethnicity plays a rampant role in Sub-Saharan Africa where political
organization is mostly ethnic (Francois et al., 2012), but diversity has also been linked
to inadequate public good provision in US states (Alesina et al., 1999), school quality
in Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), or excessive deforestation in Indonesia (Alesina
et al., 2014). Furthermore, high economic inequality among ethnic groups is associated
with regional underdevelopment and political inequality (Alesina et al., 2012).
Heterogeneity is not necessarily a problem and viewed favorably in many literatures.
In lower income economies, organizing along ethnic lines may resolve a contracting
problem and help to enforce social sanctions within family or kin groups (Bates, 2000).
In highly developed economies, the negative effects of heterogeneity are muted, as
skill complementarities matter more, or political institutions tame the conflict element
inherent in diversity (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005). Ethnic diversity and political
institutions also have an impact on one another. On the one hand, the adverse effects
of ethnic heterogeneity may only be relevant in weakly institutionalized societies where
political leaders often use (or abuse) ethnic and other divisions in their favor (Eifert
1The estimation is based on 57 episodes using the data from Chapter 3. A subscripted zero means
that the variable is fixed at the last year before the slump to avoid endogenous feedback. The standard
errors are clustered on the country level to account for repeated spells.
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et al., 2010). On the other hand, diversity affects the (endogenous) choice of institutions
governing the executive power of such leaders (Aghion et al., 2004).
There is some empirical evidence consistent with the view that ethnicity and political
institutions interact. Collier (2000), for example, argues that ethnicity plays no role
in democracies but is growth reducing in autocracies and provides evidence along these
lines. Easterly (2001) empirically investigates an interaction effect between institutions
and ethnicity in determining growth and conflict. However, the precise mechanisms
behind how these two jointly determine the length of crises have not been investigated
and may explain substantial parts of the robust negative correlation between ethnicity
and growth. While there is plenty of anecdotal evidence, we are only aware of a paper by
Rodrik (1999) which explicitly considers ethnicity and negative growth empirically (and
more formally in the working paper version).
The theoretical literature on delayed reform and policy non-adoption offers important
insights. Ethnic groups may be engaged in “wars of attrition” over the burden of reform,
so that groups are trying to shift the costs of, say, a debt consolidation onto competing
groups (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). In these models, agreement on a particular policy is
required for stabilization and veto power lies either with groups represented within the
executive or an effective parliamentary or non-parliamentary opposition. Stabilization
occurs only once one of the groups concedes. Drazen and Grilli (1993) use this set-up to
show that crises can be welfare improving by reducing delay and Spolaore (2004) examines
the impact of different government systems on the expected time until a stabilization
occurs. Alternatively, a socially optimal reform may not be undertaken at all because it
is ex ante not known to which (ethnic or other political) groups the benefits will accrue
(Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Laba´n and Sturzenegger (1994a,b) show that such a model
can also generate delay and an endogenous economic deterioration. Both approaches have
two key elements in common: 1) uncertainty about the expected outcomes, and 2) an
ex ante commitment problem between (ex post) beneficiaries and losers of the reform.
However, while instructive, this literature does not explicitly focus on ethnic diversity
and constraints on the executive. As a result, it does not capture an interaction between
these two factors in determining the length of declines.
This chapter also relates to the veto player literature in political science. These
contributions generally find that policy stability is greater, the more numerous the
players in the political system that are required to agree (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). Veto
player arguments have been used to explain why governments may not reform during an
economic shock (Cox and McCubbins, 1997; Haggard, 2000), but recently Gehlbach and
Malesky (2010) turn the argument on its head by demonstrating that (more) veto players
weaken the power of special interest groups which encourages wholesale reform. Using a
different setup based on the selectorate framework by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005),
Hicken et al. (2005) stress an alternative mechanism which suggests that accountability
of the executive matters in response to exchange-rate devaluations. They conclude that
greater checks on the executive do not aid the recovery which stands in sharp contrast to
the results developed in this chapter.
The degree of ethnic diversity is endogenous in the (very) long run. Heterogeneity
is related to migratory distance from Africa (Ashraf and Galor, 2013), the duration
of settlements and the history of the state (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012), and variation
in terrain and land endowments (Michalopoulos, 2012). At the micro-level, people
may choose their group affiliation and switch groups depending on how discernible the
individual features are which identify group membership (Caselli and Coleman, 2013).
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Ethnic markers are usually more salient than other group identifiers which may explain
why interest groups organize among ethnic lines to limit “infiltration” by outsiders.
We do not expect ethnic compositions to change fundamentally in the short run
(especially in the post-colonial period). However, ethnicity is not always the most
prominent political fault line in a society and the degree of access to political power of
a particular group varies over time (Posner, 2004). Early empirical studies of the effects
of ethnic heterogeneity (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997) use data Soviet ethnographers
published in 1964, incorporate possibly irrelevant cleavages and do not account for
differences in political power. Several later studies use up-to-date data on linguistic
fragmentation (e.g. Fearon, 2003; Desmet et al., 2012), but still remain confined to the
cross-section and disregard political power. Wimmer et al. (2009), as well as Cederman
et al. (2010), present a new data set which explicitly aims to remedy this situation.
The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data codes the degree of access to executive power
by different groups, focuses on politically relevant groups, and employs a more flexible
notion of political division capturing the main fault line in a particular country (such as
ethnicity, language, race or religion).2 In our empirical part, we use the latest EPR data
and contrast the results to more traditional measures of linguistic diversity.
4 Theory
We model group interactions during a slump as a cooperation game where groups decide
on whether to formulate a policy response to a crisis that will initiate a recovery. We first
focus on the symmetric two group case and then extend the model to allow for unequal
sizes and multiple groups.
4.1 Basic setup
We consider a population normalized to unity and split into J equal-sized (ethnic) groups.
These J groups constitute the players of the game. Time is discrete and there is an infinite
number of periods, indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. The per-period discount rate is δ. With
slight abuse of notation, groups are indexed by j = 1, 2, . . . , J , where J = 2 for the
baseline model considered in this subsection. Each group acts as a single agent and we
do not analyze internal coordination issues among individual members within the same
group.
Preferences. Group j receives a net income of yj in period zero. Total initial income
in the economy is normalized to unity (
∑
j yj = 1). Utility in each period is g(yj), where
g(·) is increasing in yj, concave and identical for all groups.
Slumps: decline and recovery. When a slump occurs, output declines by a fixed
amount (∆) in the first period, which affects both groups proportionally, and then remains
at that level until both groups cooperate. Total income is now (1 − ∆) as long as the
slumps lasts. Once a decision to cooperate has been reached, we assume that the economy
recovers within one period. Groups decide to cooperate or not based on their expected
future returns to cooperation.
2Rainer and Trebbi (2012) and Francois et al. (2012) extend this approach further and code an ethnic
group’s access to power at the ministerial level for 15 African countries.
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Slumps: uncertainty. We assume that groups are uncertain about their post-recovery
incomes, and their relative positions may change after the slump is over. In the baseline
model where y1 = y2 = 1/2, both groups experience a uniformly distributed shock to their
incomes in the first recovery period. For the first group, the shock is ν ∼ U [−y1, 1−y1], so
y1 is now a counterfactual, and w1 denotes actual income after the shock; and similarly
for y2, w2. The other group’s income undergoes a shock opposite to that of the first
group. This implies that a slump hits groups unequally after the recovery, even though
neither group assumes they will be hit harder ex ante.
Political institutions. We interpret executive constraints as limits on how much one
can group gain or lose relative to the other through expropriation, as is common practice
in the literature (Besley and Persson, 2011a,b). The intuition is as follows. If a particular
group has been sufficiently weakened by the slump, the now stronger group may be
in a position to expropriate part or all of the weaker group’s income and exclude it
from the political process. If the executive is unconstrained, there are no checks on this
type of predatory behavior. A complete constraint on how much one group can extract
means that no expropriation can occur. A partial constraint implies that expropriation
occurs only when one group becomes too weak. The dominant ethnic group controls the
executive and shares the spoils from expropriating the weaker group with its members.
To be more precise, we model political institutions in a simple way by including
thresholds in the random shock. Boundary outcomes (expropriation) are realized only
beyond these thresholds. Let the parameter c ∈ [0, 1/2] represent the weakness of
executive constraints, and let the set A = [c, 1 − c] be the political safe zone in which
there is no expropriation. Once a group falls below c, its income is expropriated (pushed
to zero) and the other group gains the remainder. Thus, 1 − 2c can be interpreted as
the ability of one group to commit to not expropriating the other group; alternatively,
c = 1/2 can be thought of as the total lack of constraint.
Figure 2 – Threshold effects as constraints on the executive
w
fW (w)
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1−2c
1−2dx
1− c0 1dx
1
1−2dx
1− dx
A
pt pt
To fix ideas, we interpret the ‘winner-take-all’ event as political extinction of the
weaker group, though it can be understood in a variety of ways. In non-democratic
politics, the threshold mechanism symbolizes the potential of some ethnic groups to
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exclude other groups from the political process and capture the rents of those that
have been excessively weakened by the slump. Alternatively, it may even represent
physical extinction due to ethnic conflict. In democratic politics, assuming that ethnic or
other identity groups are represented by parties reflecting their interests, it captures the
existence of thresholds that allow minorities to block political change (e.g. the filibuster
rule used in the U.S. Senate as well as several state legislatures, or the 5% minority
threshold used in the German Bundestag).
Delay. We assume that groups are able to fortify their position through non-
cooperation. This implies that a group can (in part) counterbalance the uncertainty
introduced by weak institutions through not cooperating, and thus potentially avoid
falling below the threshold. Both groups would cooperate and the recovery would be
immediate if there were no gains from delay.
In terms of the model, delay limits how likely it is that a particular group will be
expropriated. We assume that delay shrinks the support of the distribution of wj, such
that after a particular number of periods of delay, say d, the support is wj ∈ [dx, 1− dx].
The associated parameter x is a measure of how much a group can reduce the risk of
expropriation by holding out in each period. This describes a linear process for the
probability of landing on either side outside the safe zone (pt = c − (t − 1)x), at each t
when the groups can chose to cooperate or delay.3
Figure 2 shows the distribution of wj and illustrates the relevant regions.
Timing. The following timing summarizes the structure of the game. At t = 0, the
economy is in its initial state. Output
∑
j yj = 1 is produced and shared equally.
1. At t = 1, the slump occurs, and incomes decline to (1 − ∆)yj. Both groups
simultaneously choose to cooperate C or delay D.
2. For all t > 1, incomes remain at (1−∆)yj if both groups did not cooperate in the
previous period. They once again simultaneously choose whether to cooperate C or
delay D. If, instead, there was cooperation in the previous period, incomes recover
within one period, but are subject to a random shock and groups can land outside
the political safe zone with twice the probability pt. After a recovery, each group
receives the same payoff as in the first post-recovery period forever.
The present discounted value of the lifetime utility for each group is
vj =
∞∑
τ=1
δτ−1Eg(·) (1)
where g(·) is g((1−∆)yj) if the recovery has not yet occurred and (1− 2c)E[g(wj)|wj ∈
A] + c(g(0) + g(1)) otherwise. The discounted utility has two components: 1) if the
economy has not recovered, groups are on a delay path, and 2) once the slump is over,
they remain on a post-recovery path.
Figure 3 sketches how the economy evolves over time given different choices and
presents a stylized view of the process we envision. Note that the action pair (D, d) has
the same implication as (C, d) and (D, c); that is, cooperation of both groups is required
for a recovery to occur.
3Our key results hold for a larger class of pt-processes.
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Figure 3 – A sketch of decisions and timing
D, d D, d D, d
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y
t
The game has a symmetric structure. At each choice node (solid nodes), the
comparison between any two adjacent periods always looks alike. The utility from
cooperating in a particular period t when the other group cooperates in period t is
vtj(C, c) =
1
1− δ
{
(1− 2pt)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + pt(g(0) + g(1))
}
(2)
and the utility from cooperating in the next period when the other group cooperates in
period t is
vtj(D, c) =g((1−∆)yj) +
δ
1− δ
{
(1− 2pt+1)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + pt+1(g(0) + g(1))
}
. (3)
It is useful to establish the social optimum before we characterize the non-cooperative
equilibrium. Our first comment summarizes two key aspects of the planner’s solution.
Comment 0. i) The utilitarian welfare-maximizing outcome involves no delay.
To see this, note that due to the concavity of the utility function the sum of the group’s
utilities is maximized when their share is equal. At equal shares, the total welfare from
any non-delay path dominates any delay path.
ii) Any outcome with delay is Pareto dominated by some outcome without delay.
To see why this is the case, take any path with delay, give the groups the same shares
in every period, but let the recovery happen immediately. In this case, all groups receive
more in the period before the recovery than they did with delay, and the same in every
period after the recovery.
The intuition behind this comment is straightforward. Given that there are two
groups in the economy, a social planner would give both the same shares and avoid delay;
only then is their combined utility maximized. Even if these two groups have unequal
shares, an immediate recovery is beneficial to both. The social planner is unconstrained,
in the sense that the solution involves no uncertainty towards the post-recovery utilities
or political boundary effects. This benchmark is particularly interesting when contrasted
to the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game, where groups face a trade-off between
immediately recovering and falling below the threshold c, or recovering later and reducing
future uncertainty.
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By comparing the utilities from cooperating in the first period and in the second
period it is relatively straightforward to show that delay can occur in equilibrium. Our
first result establishes this.
Proposition 1. There exist parameter values, such that all equilibria involve delay.
Proof. See Appendix. 
The proof to the proposition shows that all components that make the immediate
cooperation scenario less attractive are conducive to delay. The key issue rendering the
cooperative equilibrium inaccessible is the ex ante commitment problem among potential
winners and losers. Hence, worse institutions, or less ability to commit to not expropriate
the loser (larger c), larger gains from holding out (larger x) and a larger value placed on
the future (higher δ) make immediate cooperation less likely. Conversely, a larger shock
(∆) makes cooperation more attractive since a (potentially sizable) one period loss is
avoided. The concavity of g(·) matters in the sense that it implicitly captures how averse
groups are to negative events (falling below c) or how much they value expropriating
other groups (landing above c).
Note that the proposition is formally true only in a weak sense; it does not rule out
that equilibria with immediate recovery could exist for some parameter values.4 Rather,
the result should be viewed in light of Comment 0. What Proposition 1 establishes is
that for some parameter values all equilibria are inefficient and welfare-suboptimal.
While still in the two-group case, we can already highlight an interesting comparison
to the homogeneous (one group) case.
Comment 1. Without heterogeneity, there always exists an equilibrium with immediate
recovery.
Note that if the groups were to pool their resources as one, then all the elements
inducing delay – except pure miscoordination – are absent. In other words, we need
antagonistic political (ethnic) groups for the proposed mechanism to work, i.e. for the
model developed here to provide a theory of why there is delay. A more careful analysis
of group asymmetries and multiple groups follows in the model extensions.
To better understand when we are likely to see delay, we now characterize the subgame
perfect equilibrium with (the earliest possible) recovery, if such an equilibrium exists.
Given the symmetric structure of the game an interior solution exits and the optimal
time to recovery can be derived using equations eq. (2) and eq. (3). Our second result
summarizes a central insight of the model.
Proposition 2. Stronger constraints on the executive shorten the time to recovery.
Proof. See Appendix. 
4There are many “coordination failure” equilibria where neither group cooperates simply because
they believe the other group will not. Such equilibria always exist, including an equilibrium with infinite
delay. Our analysis, however, is focused on the more interesting scenarios (equilibria) where delay does
not happen only as a result of this type coordination failure.
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The proof shows that the optimal time to recovery is
t∗ =
g((1−∆)yj)− E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]
x{2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− (g(0) + g(1))} +
c
x
+
1
1− δ (4)
where the key comparative static result is ∂t∗/∂c > 0.
This proposition says that if institutions are imperfect (c > 0), delay is going to be
longer than if the groups are able to perfectly commit to not expropriating the losers.5
In fact, the weaker the constraints on the executive (larger c), the longer is the expected
time to cooperation. Intuitively, either group will find it optimal to delay until a point is
reached when the benefit of holding out for an additional period is equal to the benefit of
cooperating in this period, where the former may be the period in which all uncertainty
regarding the political threshold is resolved. At this point, or the next discrete period, it
is optimal to cooperate. Where exactly this point in time occurs depends on the trade off
between recovering and potentially falling outside the political safe zone, or recovering
later and reducing the remaining uncertainty.
For the remainder, we do not explicitly derive this equilibrium solution. Instead,
we focus on the case where all uncertainty is resolved in the next period and compare
different scenarios (e.g. perfect and imperfect institutions). We outline such an argument
in the next comment.
Comment 2. The existence of imperfect (weak) institutions makes delay more likely.6
If institutions are perfect (c = 0), we have
E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] ≥ g((1−∆)yj) (5)
and if institutions are imperfect (and pt = c for all t), we have
(1− 2c)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + c(g(0) + g(1)) ≥ g((1−∆)yj). (6)
Inequality (6) is harder to satisfy than inequality (5) under the concavity assumptions
imposed on the utility function. Note that this is entirely due to the presence of weak
institutions (c > 0).
Discussion of the model. The baseline model focuses on several key aspects of the
political economy of declines. First, we have modeled group interactions during crises
under uncertain post-recovery incomes in a way that highlights that groups are not able to
commit to compensating the losers. There are no enforceable contracts where the winners
return the (additional) post-recovery gains, which is precisely the role played by strong
constraints on the executive. Second, outcomes with delay can occur in equilibrium, and
they do not coincide with the social optimum or with efficiency. Weak institutions act as
a political friction creating potentially large economic inefficiencies. Third, heterogeneity
5Again, this is only holds if we rule out equilibria involving immediate cooperation or infinite delay.
6Strictly speaking, a probabilistic statement (delay becomes “more likely”) should not be used in
this comment, as, for any given set of parameters, there either exists an equilibrium with immediate
recovery or not. However, we follow Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and say that a change in the setup
of the model makes a particular outcome “more likely” if it becomes an equilibrium outcome for a larger
parameter set.
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matters and political groups are assumed to be willing to cooperate once it is optimal to
do so. Entrenched distrust would only increase delay.
We abstract from several other features, such as modeling slumps in a more realistic
manner (both in terms of the decline and the recovery phase) or the precise nature of the
policy response. Clearly, some policies can prolong the decline phase and make recovery
more difficult. We also do not differentiate between democratic and autocratic regimes, or
examine the impact of particular political constitutions (presidential or parliamentary).
The exact form of the boundary events is also left open and could, for example, also
represent the exclusion from public goods. Nor do we differentiate between political and
economic power. Such specificities are not essential to the main argument, but clearly our
contribution is particularly relevant for understanding declines in Africa where political
divisions are often ethnic and executive power is shared (Francois et al., 2012).
The mechanism we propose is different than those suggested in the policy reform
literature, which has previously focused on shifting the burden of reform (Alesina and
Drazen, 1991) and status-quo bias (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). While both literatures
highlight the importance of ex ante uncertainty (either about the costs or benefits of
reform), their core focus is not on the role of political institutions in general or executive
constraints in particular. The empirical content also differs substantially. For example,
Drazen and Grilli (1993) stress that crises help stabilizations and Spolaore (2004) shows
that political systems with a strong government (less constrained executive) reform more
quickly, whereas we propose that crises coinciding with an unconstrained executive are
at the heart of the problem.
4.2 Extensions: asymmetric and multigroup settings
We now briefly sketch two extensions. To extend the model to the asymmetric and J-
group cases, we make the following simplifying assumptions. First, we restrict attention
to the uncertainty associated with falling below the political threshold. Specifically, we
assume that if a group falls within the political safe zone its share of total economic
activity will be equal to its pre-recovery share. Second, we use a piecewise linear utility
function, in particular:
g(yj) =
{
yj for yj > 0
z otherwise
(7)
where z < 0. Furthermore, for the case when there are more than two groups, we assume
that at most one group can fall outside the political safe zone. We now work with a
probability function pt(yj), where we only assume
dpt(yj)
dyj
< 0. Finally, our comparative
statics will be done for the case where all uncertainty is resolved after one period of delay.
How do changes in political concentration affect the political equilibrium? Intuition
may suggest that smaller groups are more afraid of falling out of the political safe
zone, implying that greater asymmetry between groups increases the likelihood of
delay. However, our theoretical result suggests that the effect of changes in political
concentration can go either way. Several things change in the two-group case if the share
of an initially weaker group moves closer to an equal allocation, so that the size of the
previously more powerful group decreases in return. On the one hand, the emboldened
group finds itself further away from the political threshold (c) and hence faces a lower
probability of being expropriated (pt(yj)). In addition, the group also has to forgo more
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utility in the delay scenario. Both work in favor of cooperation. On the other hand, the
group now has more to lose if it gets expropriated and is thus less likely to cooperate.
Without imposing further restrictions, the overall direction of the effect is undetermined
and depends on the parameter values. We consider this an empirical issue and return
to it in the next section. The following result gives the condition that has to hold for
greater symmetry to lead to more delay.
Proposition 3. A decrease in (political) concentration makes delay more likely, if the
following condition holds
∆ +
1
1− δ
{
dp1(yj)
dyj
(z − yj)− p1(yj)
}
< 0. (8)
Proof. See Appendix. 
Using this condition, we can summarize the circumstances that determine the direction
of this effect.
Comment 3. A decrease in concentration is more likely to work in favor of delay, if
the shock is smaller, the future is less heavily discounted, the negative consequence of
falling outside the political safe zone is greater and the probability of that event is not
very responsive to the weaker group’s share.
Up until this point, we assumed that there are only two groups deciding on whether to
cooperate or not. The final proposition relaxes this constraint and highlights another key
insight of the model with respect to group heterogeneity (assuming symmetric groups).
Proposition 4. An increase in the number of groups makes delay more likely.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Contrary to the more equivocal result in Proposition 3, a larger number of groups
decreases the likelihood of cooperation. The proof shows that the condition for immediate
cooperation (when all uncertainty is resolved in the next period) boils down to an
inequality that decreases in J . The intuition behind this proposition is simple. As the
number of groups increases, every group becomes poorer and thus more vulnerable during
a slump. Simplifying the model helped to show that this is driven by the uncertainty
arising from the lack of executive constraints (which we now no longer denote c but
implicitly define through pt(yj), since a uniform shock with a threshold does not capture
the J-group case).
So far we did not explicitly consider political power or political relevance. Instead,
we assumed that all groups start from inside the political safe zone, matter equally for
the decision to cooperate, and may only fall into political irrelevance as a consequence of
the slump. Keeping the decision mechanism fixed, we now reflect on what this implies
for different power (group) configurations. We do so with an eye to the concepts that we
can empirically capture in the next section. With this in mind, we summarize the role of
political relevance in the last comment as follows.
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Comment 4. More politically relevant groups make delay more likely, while politically
irrelevant groups do not matter. Conversely, this implies that if a group dominates or
monopolizes the decision making process, delay becomes less likely.
Here, political relevance refers to being a party to the negotiations and thus being included
in this model. Note that this separates the issue of political relevance (and the number
of groups) from the strength of constraints on the executive. For example, there may
be a dominant group which is unconstrained and thus poses a threat for smaller groups,
or there may be a dominant group whose hands are tied so that it cannot expropriate
smaller groups. Since these cases are distinct, we should still observe an independent
effect of both the number of groups represented in the executive (or different qualitative
assessment of their access to executive power), and constraints on the executive per se.
5 Empirics and Discussion
Decline spells. Our dependent variable is the duration of the decline segment during
deep economic slumps. The identification of the duration of these negative growth spells
is not trivial and beyond the scope of this chapter. We only briefly summarize the method
here. The details are discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
The procedure involves several steps. First, we fit a restricted partial structural change
model with two breakpoints to each GDP per capita series in the Penn World Table 7.0.
We impose sign restrictions on the model parameters, so that we only find major economic
slumps. Second, we estimate candidates for the endogenous breakpoints and conduct a
bootstrap Monte Carlo test of their significance. Third, we keep only breaks that are
significant at the 10%-level and run the procedure again on the remaining data (before
the first and after the second break) until all breaks have been found or the sample gets
too small. Fourth, for each slump, we identify the empirical trough (the lowest point in
the GDP series after the beginning of the slump) and then compute the duration of the
decline segment (denoted t˜).
This algorithm yields 58 slumps from 1950 to 2008. The basic correlations are
as expected. Poorer countries have longer and deeper declines than richer countries;
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have the longest spells, followed by the Middle East and
North Africa, and then Latin America. OECD countries experience only few, shallow
and short spells.
Measuring institutions. Our core measure of political institutions is the variable
Executive Constraints from the Polity IV data set. The variable directly measures the
degree of institutionalized constraints placed on the political executive. It is coded unity
when there is “unlimited executive authority” and seven when there is “executive parity
or subordination”; intermediate values represent some constraints. We believe that this
variable corresponds well with the parameter c in our model. The Polity IV project has
information on executive constraints annually from 1800 (or the year of independence)
until 2010. We do not use this wealth of time variation, since political institutions may
endogenously respond to the slump. We only rely on the degree of executive constraints
in the last year before the slump and denote this variable XCONST0.
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Measuring heterogeneity. We rely on two data sources to capture very different
aspects of ethnic heterogeneity. The first source is a set of measures computed by
Desmet et al. (2012) on the basis of the Ethnologue data. This data does not measure
ethnicity directly but captures linguistic diversity. Fearon (2003) shows that linguistic
(cultural) diversity coincides well with ethnic heterogeneity in some regions, notably Sub-
Saharan Africa, but not so well in others. Together with the Atlas Narodov Mira data
gathered by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s, it is a standard source for data on ethnic
heterogeneity and considerably more up-to-date than the former. Desmet et al. (2012)
compute linguistic diversity at different levels of the language tree to capture the historical
depth of ethnic divisions. We only make use of the most disaggregate level, since they
also show that current divisions are correlated with economic growth more strongly than
historical cleavages. The second data source is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data
presented in Wimmer et al. (2009), as well as Cederman et al. (2010). The EPR data has
several advantages over other measures of linguistic or ethnic diversity, particularly for
our application. It provides time series information on the degree of access to executive
power of ethno-political groups from 1946 to 2010. Contrary to the Ethnologue data, it
is not restricted to linguistic cleavages existing today. Instead, expert coders identified
the most relevant division which may be ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious depending
on the country and time period. The data contains information on the power status of
each group, so that it allows us to focus on politically relevant groups; that is, groups
with some form of representation in the presidency, cabinet, or other senior posts in the
administration or army.
Our primary measure of heterogeneity is the commonly used index of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997). It is defined as
ELFi = 1−
J∑
j=1
(
nij
Ni
)2
(9)
where nij/Ni is the population share of group j in country i (j = 1, 2, . . . , J , nij is the
number of people in group j, and Ni the size of the population in country i). We employ
two versions of this index: one computed by Desmet et al. (2012) and one computed
using the EPR data (denoted ELF0). We scale all heterogeneity indices by 100 to give
changes on the right hand side a percentage point interpretation.
Another important dimension of diversity is the degree of polarization of a society
into two (opposing) groups. The literature on ethnic conflict often stresses that
fractionalization and polarization have very different effects (e.g. see Esteban and Ray,
2011). We capture polarization with an index developed by Esteban and Ray (1994):
POLi = k
J∑
j=1
(
nij
Ni
)1+α(
1− nij
Ni
)
(10)
where α = 1 (as they show in an auxiliary theorem) and k = 4 to scale the index between
zero and one. Again, we use a version computed by Desmet et al. (2012) and one we
compute for the EPR data (denoted POL0).
While the polarization index captures the extent of bimodality of a distribution7, it is
not a measure of asymmetries (such as the existence of one large and many small groups).
7It attains its maximum at a symmetric bimodal distribution.
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Table 1 – Definitions of Variables
Symbol Description Source and Notes
Dependent Variable
t˜ Duration of decline segment From Chapter 3 computed using
structural break model with a significance
level of 10%. Underlying GDP per capita
data is from the Penn World Table 7.0.
Independent Variables
XCONST0 Constraints on the executive From Polity IV data. Measures de facto
independence of the executive. Scaled
from 1 (no constraints) to 7 (fully
constrained). Fixed at last year before
slump.
ELF Ethno-linguistic
fractionalization
From Desmet et al. (2012), the original
source is the Ethnologue data (15th
edition). Cross-section.
ELF0 Fractionalization of ethno-
political groups
From Ethnic Power Relations data
version 3.01 (Wimmer et al., 2009). Fixed
at last year before slump.
POL Ethno-linguistic polarization From Desmet et al. (2012) using the
Esteban and Ray (1994) measure with
α = 1 and k = 4. The original source
is the Ethnologue data (15th edition).
Cross-section.
POL0 Ethno-political polarization Computed using Ethnic Power Relations
data version 3.01 (Wimmer et al., 2009)
and Esteban and Ray (1994) measure
with α = 1 and k = 4. Fixed at last
year before slump.
ELA0 Asymmetries between ethno-
political groups (relative to
fractionalization at equal sizes).
Computed using Ethnic Power Relations
data version 3.01 (Wimmer et al., 2009).
Fixed at last year before slump.
GROUPS0 Number of groups ———
EGIPGRPS0 Number of included groups ———
EXCLGRPS0 Number of excluded groups ———
DOMPOP0 Dominant population (in %) ———
MONPOP0 Monopoly population (in %) ———
Control Variables
GDP per capita Log of initial real GDP per
capita
From the Penn World Table 7.0. Fixed at
last year before slump.
Regional
dummies
Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe,
Oceania
UN classification. Oceania is base.
Decade
dummies
1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s,
1990s, and 2000s.
Coded at beginning of slump. 2000s is
base.
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To capture these, we propose another simple measure of ethno-linguistic asymmetries:
ELAi =
∑J
j=1
(
nij
Ni
)2
− 1
Ni
1− 1
Ni
=
Ni
Ni − 1
[
J∑
j=1
(
nij
Ni
)2
− 1
Ni
]
, ∀Ni > 1 (11)
and ELAi = 1 if Ni = 1. The ELA index is simply the (normalized) difference between
fractionalization with equal shares and observed fractionalization; it’s a normalized
Herfindahl index. We only compute this index for the EPR data (denoted ELA0). Desmet
et al. (2012) do not use this measure. Recall that for any particular number of groups,
the ELF measure attains its maximum at an equal allocation. The global maximum is
reached when, in the limit, each person constitutes an ethnic group. Contrary to the
polarization or fractionalization measure, the ELA index is zero when the groups are of
equal sizes and approaches unity as a single group becomes dominant. For the empirical
analysis that follows, using the index of group asymmetries together with the number of
groups allows us to analyze the effect of these two components of ethnic heterogeneity
separately and investigate the more subtle aspects of the theoretical model.
Table 2 – Summary Statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
XCONST0 57 3.42 2.47 1.00 7.00
ELF 58 45.39 33.71 0.07 95.98
ELF0 57 36.00 25.71 0.00 80.39
POL 58 40.04 24.98 0.14 85.99
POL0 57 19.35 16.42 0.00 56.95
ELA0 57 48.75 33.40 0.10 100.00
GROUPS0 57 4.19 6.43 0.00 47.00
EGIPGRPS0 57 1.37 1.33 0.00 7.00
EXCLGRPS0 57 2.33 6.17 0.00 46.00
MONPOP0 57 0.21 0.36 0.00 0.97
DOMPOP0 57 0.21 0.34 0.00 0.98
(Log) GDP per capita 58 8.53 1.21 5.87 10.63
We also obtain several additional variables from the EPR data. GROUPS0 is the
number of relevant (active) ethno-political groups. EGIPGRPS0 is the number of
included ethno-political groups at the last year before the slump; that is, groups with
have some level access to executive power. EXCLGRPS0 is the number of ethno-political
groups without access to the political executive. Finally, DOMPOP0 and MONPOP0
are the population shares of the dominant or monopoly groups (the two highest levels
of political power). All of these variables are fixed at the last year before the slump to
rule out any feedback from the duration to the group composition. Table 1 describes all
variables and lists the underlying data sources. Table 2 presents the associated summary
statistics.
Empirical approach. Our approach is to examine partial correlations and test whether
these are consistent with the proposed theory. While we cannot rule out all forms of
endogeneity, we do take care to ensure temporal precedence. We employ standard event
history techniques to study the duration of the decline phase.
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To estimate the partial correlations, we run log-normal accelerated failure time (AFT)
regressions of the form:
ln t˜ ≡ ln(t− t0) =β0 + β1XCONST0 + β2H + β3(XCONST0 ×H) + x′0ξ + t (12)
where t˜ is analysis time, t0 is the last year before the slump, XCONST0 is executive
constraints, H is a measure of group (ethnic) heterogeneity, x0 is a vector of controls,
and t ∼ N (0, σ). Variables which could endogenously react to a prolonged duration of
declines are kept fixed at t0 to rule out any such feedback; we drop the subscript if they
have no time dimension. All parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood and
the standard errors are clustered on the country level to account for repeated spells.
Our main parameters of interest are β1, β2, and β3. In several regressions, we impose
β3 = 0 to estimate first-order effects before examining a possible interaction effect. The
vector x0 may include additional heterogeneity measures, the (log of) initial GDP per
capita before the slump, region effects and decade dummies.
Accelerated failure time models are so named due to their interpretation. A coefficient
greater than zero implies that time passes more slowly, so that the exit of the decline
phase is prolonged. A coefficient less than zero implies that time passes more quickly
and hence that the recovery starts sooner. Alternatively, we may simply read the effects
as elasticities (or semi-elasticities) of the expected duration with respect to the variables
on the right hand side. While duration models have the main benefit of accounting for
unfinished spells (ongoing declines), their interpretation is otherwise identical to log-linear
OLS when they are cast in the AFT form.
Results. Table 3 presents the first set of results relating mainly to the empirical
predictions derived from the baseline model. We compute two sets of estimates. One
using the Ethnologue data which focuses on linguistic diversity and one based on the EPR
data which incorporates only politically-relevant groups divided along the predominant
social cleavage (ethnic, linguistic, racial, etc.).
Columns (1) to (3) use the Ethnologue data. Column (1) establishes that stronger
constraints on the political executive shorten the expected duration of the decline phase
and that greater linguistic heterogeneity has an adverse effect on the expected duration.
The effects are statistically significant at the 1%-level and economically meaningful. A one
point improvement in executive constraints (before the slump) leads to an approximate
18.7% reduction in the duration until the trough. Conversely, a one percentage point
change towards greater linguistic heterogeneity prolongs the decline phase by about 1.7%.
Column (2) allows for a conditional effect and strongly suggests that the effect of political
institutions depends on the level of linguistic diversity (and vice versa). Whenever we
introduce an interaction term, we first center the two constituent variables on their
average. This shifts the coefficients of the two base levels into a meaningful range,
but leaves the magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction term unaffected.
Holding the other variable constant, the coefficient on either base variable now measures
the effect of a one unit change away from the average. As a result, the interaction effect
can be ignored; it has to be taken into account only when both variables change. The
interaction between executive constraints and linguistic fractionalization is significant
at the 5%-level and comparatively large. The specification predicts that at perfect
homogeneity the median decline lasts about 2 years, while at perfect heterogeneity it
lasts about 15 years. These estimates cover nearly all of the observed differences between
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Table 3 – Baseline – Executive Constraints, Heterogeneity and Interactions
Dependent Variable: ln t˜
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ethnologue Ethnic Power Relations
XCONST0 -0.187*** -0.291*** -0.171*** -0.187*** -0.262*** -0.170**
(0.063) (0.092) (0.064) (0.067) (0.085) (0.067)
ELF 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
ELF0 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
XCONST0×ELF15 -0.004**
(0.002)
POL -0.011
(0.007)
XCONST0 × ELF0 -0.004*
(0.002)
POL0 0.012
(0.009)
Control sets
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary stats
Exits 47 47 47 47 47 47
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 57
Years of Decline 346 346 346 346 346 346
Log-L -73.677 -71.621 -72.679 -76.294 -74.952 -75.597
Pseudo-R2 0.149 0.173 0.161 0.119 0.134 0.127
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level to account for repeated spells. All
specifications include a constant (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
declines in Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. The results in columns (1) and
(2) are consistent with our theoretical predictions; greater constraints on the executive
shorten the expected duration unless the society is nearly homogeneous. The partial
effect of executive constraints is not statistically different from zero for low ELF values.
Column (3) adds the linguistic polarization measure to the specification in column (1).
The literature on civil conflict stresses that polarization matters; e.g. Esteban and Ray
(2011) show theoretically that conflict over public goods is driven by polarization and
conflict over private goods by fractionalization. Contrary to this literature but in line
with our model, we find no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that polarization is an issue
for (the lack of) cooperation during declines, while the coefficient on fractionalization is
robust to this perturbation. In other words, existence of two equally powerful groups
does not predict longer declines than, say, three equally-sized linguistic groups.
Measures of linguistic diversity tend to describe Sub-Saharan Africa as more diverse in
comparison to other regions than alternative diversity measures. This begs the question
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if we are just estimating an “Africa effect”. Columns (4) to (6) use the EPR data which
addresses this issue by alternating the relevant cleavage by country (from racial over
linguistic to religious). This changes the relative location of Sub-Saharan Africa, which
is only the second most diverse region on this measure, after South Asia, contrary to
being the most linguistically diverse region based on the Ethnologue data. The EPR
data also only codes politically relevant groups, so that the level of heterogeneity –
no matter the measure – is generally lower. Note that we compute the heterogeneity
measures for all politically relevant groups, not just the included groups. Strikingly,
the results are virtually unchanged. Column (4) shows that the first order effects of
executive constraints are the same, and the effect of fractionalization is well within one
standard error of the previous estimate. Moreover, the sign and size of the interaction
effect in column (5) is nearly identical to the one in column (2). Only the statistical
significance of the interaction effect is a bit lower (cluster robust t-stat = -1.71). Column
(5) shows that we also find no evidence in favor of ethno-political polarization affecting
the duration of declines, just as with linguistic polarization. Contrasting these results
to the Ethnologue data, it seems safe to conclude that we are not only explaining that
declines in Sub-Saharan Africa last longer than elsewhere because the subcontinent is the
most linguistically diverse, but that this holds try when we account for political relevance
and the prevalence of different divisions in different parts of the world.
Overall, Table 3 provides significant evidence that there is a robust partial correlation
of the duration of the decline phase with executive constraints on the one hand and with
ethnic diversity on the other hand. In addition, the effect of weak constraints on the
executive seems to be conditional on the degree of (ethno-political) fractionalization.
In Table 4 we “unpack” these statements further and examine what type of group
configurations give rise to the cooperation problem we are analyzing. These results relate
mainly to the empirical content of the model extensions. We now only use the EPR
data, as it provides the necessary detail on the number of groups, their power status
and more. Column (1) presents a result that may appear puzzling at first sight. If we
measure heterogeneity simply by the number of ethno-political groups, then we find no
evidence of an effect on the duration of declines. However, this coefficient amalgamates
two effects. The EPR data distinguishes between included groups, which have access to
executive power, and excluded groups, which lack power at the state level or are (at worst)
discriminated against. In the model presented earlier, only the former are relevant players
and thus we also expect that only the former category is empirically relevant. Column (2)
confirms this expectation. The effect of included groups is statistically significant at the
1%-level and economically very large: an additional group increases the duration of the
decline phase by about 53%. On the contrary, the effect of excluded groups is estimated
to be near zero and has a comparatively tight 99% confidence interval centered near zero.
In line with the theory, these results suggest that only ethnic groups with some degree of
access to political power matter for the duration of declines.
We have not yet isolated whether this adverse effect of heterogeneity is due to several
equally powerful groups co-existing in society or due to particular asymmetries in political
power. Columns (3) to (6) represent different attempts towards empirically answering
this question. In Comment 4, we translated the theoretical results regarding political
concentration from Proposition 3 and the number of groups from Proposition 4 into
the concepts of monopoly groups and dominant groups. Column (3) is the empirical
counterpart. Here we relate the share of population represented by a group that either
monopolizes or dominates the political executive to the duration of the decline phase.
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Table 4 – Extensions – Number of Groups, Political Relevance, and Asymmetries
Dependent Variable: ln t˜
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XCONST0 -0.225*** -0.241*** -0.215*** -0.179*** -0.210*** -0.200***
(0.070) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066) (0.070) (0.073)
GROUPS0 -0.008 -0.031**
(0.018) (0.014)
EGIPGRPS0 0.426*** 0.290** 0.300***
(0.095) (0.124) (0.111)
EXCLGRPS0 -0.012 -0.021* -0.014
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
DOMPOP0 -0.702*
(0.361)
MONPOP0 -1.140**
(0.484)
ELF0 0.022*** 0.013
(0.007) (0.009)
ELA0 -0.013**
(0.006)
Control sets
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Summary stats
Exits 47 47 47 47 47 43
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 53
Years of Decline 346 346 346 346 346 334
Log-L -81.069 -75.062 -77.647 -75.457 -73.253 -66.669
Pseudo-R2 0.064 0.133 0.103 0.129 0.154 0.166
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level to account for repeated spells. All
specifications include a constant (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The results are unambiguous. Both variables are associated with substantially shorter
declines. Columns (4) and (5) try to explicitly tackle the issue of the number of groups
versus group asymmetries. In column (4), we include the number of ethno-politically
relevant group together with the index of ethno-political fractionalization. This leads
to an interesting ceteris paribus condition. Increasing the degree of fractionalization by
one percentage point while holding constant the number of groups necessarily implies
that political concentration is decreasing; that is, the groups are becoming more alike.
Once again, recall that for any given number of groups, fractionalization is maximized
at equal shares. The estimates thus suggest that less political concentration leads to
longer declines. Column (5) again distinguishes between included and excluded groups
to illustrate that only the former are relevant. The coefficient on the ELF0 measure
loses significance, suggesting that the number of included groups may drive the effect
of ethnic heterogeneity and that group imbalances hardly matter. However, column
(6) addresses this issue more directly by using our index of ethnic asymmetries and
100 Chapter 4. Ethnic divisions, political institutions and the duration of declines
provides the same answer as column (4). Now the effect is easy to interpret, negative and
significant at the 5% level. A one percentage point move towards greater asymmetries
(political concentration) shortens the duration by about 1.3%. Note that the effect of
executive constraints remains robust throughout, fluctuating around a 20% reduction in
the duration of declines for a one point improvement.
To summarize, Table 4 adds several valuable insights about the effect of ethnic
diversity on the duration of declines. Fractionalization of linguistic or ethno-political
groups masks two effects: 1) the expected duration is increasing in the number of
politically relevant groups, and 2) the expected duration is decreasing in greater group
asymmetries (political concentration). Both theory and evidence suggest that this is not
an issue of polarization, but rather an issue of adding a smaller, potentially irrelevant,
group to any multi-modal distribution of power as opposed to adding another powerful
group (an additional mode).
Table 5 – Robustness – Region and time effects
Dependent Variable: ln t˜
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
XCONST0 -0.245*** -0.216*** -0.211*** -0.171** -0.181*** -0.145**
(0.079) (0.065) (0.077) (0.068) (0.066) (0.064)
ELF 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003)
ELF0 0.017** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.006)
XCONST0 × ELF -0.003** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
XCONST0 × ELF0 -0.003 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
EGIPGRPS0 0.298*** 0.212*
(0.097) (0.119)
EXCLGRPS0 0.024* 0.009
(0.013) (0.026)
Control sets
GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Decade dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Summary stats
Exits 47 47 47 47 47 47
Spells 57 57 57 57 57 57
Years of Decline 346 346 346 346 346 346
Log-L -62.777 -55.812 -67.966 -64.108 -68.705 -66.701
Pseudo-R2 0.275 0.355 0.215 0.260 0.207 0.230
Note(s): The standard errors are clustered on the country level to account for repeated spells. All
specifications include a constant (not shown). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5 selects three key specifications, one for each data source, and then subjects
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them to two robustness checks. First, we return to the issue of whether we are estimating
an “Africa effect” by including region dummies in each specification. Second, we control
for temporal heterogeneity by including a dummy for the decade in which the slump
began in every other specification, since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s exhibit significantly
higher volatility than the other decades.
The Africa dummy is significant in all specifications, capturing that declines take
substantially longer on the African continent. Nevertheless, we still find comparable
effects. Column (1) uses the Ethnologue data and shows that our two variables of
interest are robustly correlated with within region differences in the duration of declines.
Column (2) adds that this is still the case when we also control for temporal heterogeneity.
Using the EPR data, columns (4) and (5) verify that the same holds for ethno-political
fragmentation. The standard error of the interaction term becomes somewhat wider,
leading to a loss of significance, but the estimated coefficient is extremely stable. The last
two columns show that this also hold for the effect of the number of included groups. In
general, there is significant evidence of regional heterogeneity (a χ2-test always rejects the
null of no heterogeneity at the 5%-level), but there is somewhat less evidence of temporal
heterogeneity (on top of duration dependence).8 Throughout Table 5 the coefficient of
political institutions and the coefficients of the various measures of ethnic heterogeneity
remain statistically significant at conventional levels and well within their usual range.
This last set of empirical findings reveals the following: first, ethnic heterogeneity
and constraints on the political executive are robust determinants of the length of the
decline phase during major economic slumps. Second, this result is not due to regional
differences in ethnic heterogeneity but holds when we only use within region variation.
Taken as a whole, we believe that these results operationalize the key parameters of the
model and demonstrate that there is robust evidence consistent with the theory outlined
here.
6 Concluding remarks
This chapter presents a political economy theory of declines, highlighting a commitment
problem between winners and losers of the recovery process after a crisis, and then
analyzes empirical implications of this theory. We show that ethno-political heterogeneity
coupled with weak constraints on the political executive can bring about delayed
cooperation during the decline phase of a slump and hence explain why we observe such
long declines in some countries and relatively short declines in others.
Both the theory and the empirical analysis suggest that ethnic heterogeneity is indeed
harmful for getting groups to agree on a response to a crisis when political institutions are
weak. More subtle predictions show that this is mostly an issue of having many powerful
groups in the society and does not apply to the same degree when there is a politically
dominant group. The overarching policy implication here is not that ethnic diversity
is necessarily a problem, but that political institutions can be designed to contain the
adversarial element of ethnic heterogeneity in particular and political heterogeneity in
general. While not restricted to understanding declines in Sub-Saharan Africa, we would
like to once again emphasize that we believe these insights are particularly important
for understanding the political economy of declines on the subcontinent. Sub-Saharan
8A χ2-test rejects the null of no temporal heterogeneity at the 1%-level in column (1), at the 5%-level
but not the 1%-level in column (4), and fails to reject the null at conventional levels in column (6).
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Africa is home to the longest and deepest declines, politics shaped by ethnicity, and weak
institutions governing executive power. While we still need to better understand why
ethnic diversity tends to coincide with weak political institutions and how one shapes the
other, we find that there is ample room for managing this heterogeneity better so that
welfare gains are not lost in the next crisis.
This line of research is far from complete. Fruitful avenues for future research would be
to extend these models further by integrating a richer description of the executive decision-
making process, altering the decision rules, treating the quality of political institutions as
endogenous to the decline, or modeling details of the policy response. On the empirical
side, richer data on cabinet allocations, ethnicity and executive power would help to trace
out the proposed mechanism more carefully.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The utility from cooperation in the first period when the
other group cooperates is
v1j (C, c) =
1
1− δ {(1− 2c)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + c(g(0) + g(1))} (A-1)
and the utility from choosing to delay cooperation one period when the other group
cooperates is
v1j (D, c) =g((1−∆)yj) +
δ
1− δ
{
(1− 2p2)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + p2(g(0) + g(1))
}
(A-2)
where p2 = c − x; that is, half the probability of landing outside the safe zone in the
second period.
The proof is by contradiction. We conjecture an equilibrium with immediate recovery,
such that v1j (C, c) ≥ v1j (D, c). Using p2 = c− x and rearranging terms, we get
g((1−∆)yj) ≤
E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]−
[
c+
δ
1− δx
]
{2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− g(0)− g(1)} .
(A-3)
Note that concavity implies that {2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− g(0)− g(1)} > 0. Inequality (A-3)
is contradicted whenever c, x or δ are large enough in relation to ∆, depending on the
shape of the utility function g(yj) and its range, which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First of all, it is useful to demonstrate that the difference
in utility between recovery at any time period (t) and recovery at the subsequent period
(t+ 1) decreases over time. For all s > t, we need to check whether
vt+1j (C, c)− vtj(C, c) > vs+1j (C, c)− vsj (C, c). (A-4)
Note that vt+1j (C, c) = v
t
j(D, c).
Substituting the utilities and rearranging the inequality, we get
g((1−∆)yj)− (1− 2pt)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− pt(g(0) + g(1))+
δ
1− δ
{
2(pt − pt+1)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (pt+1 − pt)(g(0) + g(1))
}
>
g((1−∆)yj)− (1− 2ps)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− ps(g(0) + g(1))+
δ
1− δ
{
2(ps − ps+1)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (ps+1 − ps)(g(0) + g(1))
}
.
(A-5)
Recall that pt = c− (t− 1)x implies pt+1− pt = −x, so the second and third terms cancel
and the inequality reduces to
(1− 2pt)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + pt(g(0) + g(1)) <
(1− 2ps)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + ps(g(0) + g(1)).
(A-6)
Substituting pt = c− (t− 1)x again, it is straightforward to show that this inequality is
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always satisfied when s > t.
Having established this, setting the utility of choosing to cooperate in period t equal
to the utility of recovering in period t + 1 results in an equation that will deliver a
potentially non-integer t, such that the smallest higher integer (dte) is the equilibrium
time to recovery:
1
1− δ
{
(1− 2pt)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + pt(g(0) + g(1))
}
= g((1−∆)yj)+
δ
1− δ
{
(1− 2pt+1)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + pt+1(g(0) + g(1))
}
.
(A-7)
Inserting the linear process on pt = c− (t− 1)x yields
1
1− δ {(1− 2(c− (t− 1)x))E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (c− (t− 1)x)(g(0) + g(1))} =
g((1−∆)yj) + δ
1− δ {(1− 2(c− tx))E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (c− tx)(g(0) + g(1))} .
(A-8)
Isolating the first term of the geometric series gives
{(1− 2(c− (t− 1)x))E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (c− (t− 1)x)(g(0) + g(1))}+
δ
1− δ {(1− 2(c− (t− 1)x))E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (c− (t− 1)x)(g(0) + g(1))} =
g((1−∆)yj) + δ
1− δ {(1− 2(c− tx))E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + (c− tx)(g(0) + g(1))}
(A-9)
and after canceling the common terms, we have
(1− 2c)E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A] + c(g(0) + g(1))+
tx{2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− (g(0) + g(1))}
= g((1−∆)yj) + 1
1− δx {2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− (g(0) + g(1))} .
(A-10)
Solving for t∗ and simplifying gives
t∗ =
g((1−∆)yj)− E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]
x{2E[g(wj)|wj ∈ A]− (g(0) + g(1))} +
c
x
+
1
1− δ . (A-11)
The proposition follows directly from comparative statics w.r.t. to c
∂t∗
∂c
=
1
x
> 0 (A-12)
that is, stronger executive constraints (smaller c) shorten the time to cooperation. This
completes the proof for the interior case. Note that it can also be the case that recovery
happens at the point when all uncertainty is resolved, i.e. the point where the probability
of being outside the safe zone is zero and no longer changes. If this is the case it is
straightforward to see that the time to recovery is shorter with stronger constraints on the
executive. This follows directly from the fact, that the time it takes until all uncertainty
is resolved is shorter with smaller c. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that for the asymmetric case only one group risks
falling outside the political safe zone. Hence, for there to exist an equilibrium with
recovery in the first period, the following condition needs to be true
1
1− δ {(1− p1(yj))yj + p1(yj)z} ≥ (1−∆)yj +
δ
1− δ yj (A-13)
which simplifies to
∆yj +
1
1− δ {p1(yj)(z − yj)} ≥ 0. (A-14)
An decrease in concentration (asymmetry) makes delay more likely if the left hand side
of the inequality is a decreasing function of yj. This is true when the derivative of the
left hand side is negative:
∆ +
1
1− δ
{
dp1(yj)
dyj
(z − yj)− p1(yj)
}
< 0 (A-15)
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Remember that there always exists an equilibrium with
recovery in period two in the sub-game that starts in period two after delay in period
one. If all of the other groups decide to cooperate in period 1, it is optimal for the
remaining group to cooperate if the following condition holds
1
1− δ
{
(1− Jp1(yj)) 1
J
+ (J − 1)p1(yj)
(
1
J
+
1
(J − 1)J
)
+ p1(yj)z
}
≥
(1−∆) 1
J
+
δ
1− δ
1
J
.
(A-16)
The second term inside the curly braces simplifies to pt(yj), so that inequality (A-16)
becomes
1
1− δ
{
(1− Jp1(yj)) 1
J
+ p1(yj) + p1(yj)z
}
≥ (1−∆) 1
J
+
δ
1− δ
1
J
(A-17)
or
1
1− δ
{
1
J
+ p1(yj)z
}
≥ (1−∆) 1
J
+
δ
1− δ
1
J
(A-18)
and, after some algebraic manipulation, this simplifies to
∆
J
+
1
1− δp1(yj)z ≥ 0. (A-19)
Note that p1(yj) is increasing in J , as symmetry implies yj = 1/J , and z < 0 by definition.
As a result, the inequality becomes harder to satisfy if the number of groups increases,
which completes the proof. 

Part II
Growth, distribution and poverty

Chapter 5
The pace of poverty reduction
A fractional response approach∗
Abstract
The pace of poverty reduction through growth v. redistribution is at
the heart of current debates on equitable development. In this chapter, we
argue that empirical poverty decompositions should build in the inherent
boundedness of the poverty headcount ratio directly. As a solution, we
propose a fractional response approach to estimating poverty decompositions,
and present extensions dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, measurement
error and unbalancedness. Using a large new data set, we estimate income
and inequality (semi-)elasticities of poverty for the $2 a day and $1.25 a day
poverty lines. The models fit the data remarkably well over the entire data
range. We highlight the relevance of focusing on semi-elasticities for policy
purposes and, building on the improved accuracy of the fractional response
results, we present poverty projections from 2010 through 2030. Finally,
we discuss some implications of these results for the post-2015 development
agenda.
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1 Introduction
The pace of poverty reduction through economic growth is at the heart of ongoing debates
on inclusive growth and equitable development. Given the salience of this issue to both
policy makers and academics, an increasingly large literature analyzes the impact of
changes in incomes and inequality on poverty, as well as their respective contributions
towards poverty reduction in the past decades (Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Besley and
Burgess, 2003; Bourguignon, 2003; Kraay, 2006; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Bresson,
2009; Chambers and Dhongde, 2011). Collectively, these studies established not only that
income growth is crucial to achieving sustained decreases in poverty but also that the
benefits of income growth strongly depend on the initial levels of income and inequality.
In fact, poverty is linked to income and distribution through a decomposition identity
that should guide empirical studies of poverty (Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993;
Bourguignon, 2003). In this chapter, we revisit and extend this literature in several ways.
First, and most fundamentally, we argue that the previous literature based on linear
models of poverty changes ignores the bounded nature of the poverty headcount ratio
and either disregards or awkwardly reintroduces the information provided by income
and inequality levels. This leads to poorly fitting approximations of the underlying
decomposition identity and estimates of the relevant elasticities that can take on
implausible values. Instead, we propose that empirical models of poverty should capture
the boundedness of the poverty headcount ratio directly, and thus build in the inherent
non-linearity of the relationship and the non-constancy of the elasticities. To this end, we
derive fractional response models of the poverty headcount ratio. We present extensions of
these models that deal with unobserved heterogeneity, measurement error and unbalanced
panel data (see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010a). A key result is
the greatly improved accuracy of the poverty decomposition. Our specifications fit the
data remarkably well and predict the observed poverty headcount ratio with less than 2.5
percentage points error on average. For comparison, we also reproduce the traditional
approach and highlight some of its empirical shortcomings.
Second, using a new data set of 809 nationally representative surveys covering 124
countries from 1981 to 2010, we estimate income and inequality elasticities of the poverty
headcount ratio for different regions and time periods. Our findings generally confirm
the result of previous studies that the average income elasticity of poverty is around
two. However, in order to understand the speed of poverty reduction across different
regions and time periods, we are particularly interested in reliable estimates of values
other than the overall cross-country mean. Our method provides considerably more
precise regional and temporal estimates of the income and inequality elasticities of poverty
that often contradict earlier studies. For example, we find universally higher income
elasticities in Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia but lower income
elasticities in both South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa than reported earlier (Kalwij
and Verschoor, 2007). Furthermore, since income or inequality elasticities of poverty are
concepts of relative change, they may give the misleading impression that richer countries
are becoming ever better at reducing poverty even though the underlying absolute changes
are small. Hence, we also stress the importance of semi-elasticities which capture the
absolute change in poverty for a given rate of income growth or proportional change in
the income distribution (Klasen and Misselhorn, 2008).
Last but not least, based on the much improved accuracy of our new estimates, we
present projections of the poverty headcount ratio for the $2 a day and $1.25 a day poverty
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lines until 2030. We find that absolute poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and, as a not too
distant second, South Asia remains the primary development challenge of the twenty-first
century. In all other regions, poverty is projected to nearly disappear or fall to much less
than 10% of the population by 2030. These results are based on the assumption that
per capita incomes and expenditures in each country continue to grow at the average
pace of the last 15 years. While it is clearly far from guaranteed that this will hold true,
other assumptions are easily evaluated using our proposed estimation framework. The
projected poverty trends have direct bearing on the post-2015 development agenda and
can be used to assess the viability of proposed development goals.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews how the
existing literature models poverty, derives our approach, and discusses the econometrics
of fractional response models. Section 3 briefly outlines the data used in this chapter.
Section 4 presents the estimation results, regional elasticities, and poverty projections
until 2030. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling poverty and elasticities
2.1 Traditional approaches: linear models of poverty changes
Using micro-data, changes in poverty can be decomposed into changes in income and the
income distribution up to some error (Datt and Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993). A key
problem for cross-country studies of poverty is that we generally do not have access to
micro data sets of incomes and/or consumption expenditures for all countries but usually
estimate poverty based on grouped data.1 To overcome this limitation, Bourguignon
(2003) suggests approximating the entire income distribution of each country using a
two-parameter log normal distribution – an approach that is theoretically grounded2,
simple and popular but not without its critics (e.g. Bresson, 2009).
Bourguignon assumes that income, yt, is a log normal random variable, such that
ln yt ∼ N (µt, σ2t ), and mean income can be written as y¯t = E[yt] = exp(µt + σ2t /2). Then
the poverty headcount ratio (henceforth, poverty headcount) at time t may be defined as
Ht = H(y¯t/z, σt) = Φ
(− ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
≡ Pr[yt ≤ z] (1)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cdf, inequality is measured as the standard
deviation (σt) of log income, and y¯t/z is the (relative) distance of mean income (y¯t) to
the (fixed) poverty line (z) – which we interpret as a ‘shortfall’ when y¯t < z and ‘aﬄuence’
when y¯t > z.
1There have been some attempts to either collect all the available primary data or to estimate gaps
in survey coverage with the help of national accounts. Milanovic (2002) compiles a global data set
of household level data to study the evolution of inequality, Sala-i-Martin (2006) estimates a “world
income distribution” via kernel density approximations based on grouped data, and Kraay (2006) fits
three-parameter Lorenz curves to grouped data in order to estimate the entire income distribution for
the country-poverty spells in his sample.
2Gibrat’s law, for example, illustrates how the log normal distribution can arise from a sequence of
stochastic income shocks ln yt = ln yt−1 + et, so that et is a random transitory shock in log income and
as t grows the distribution of et defines the distribution of ln yt. Battistin, Blundell, and Lewbel (2009)
recently argued that this process is better thought of in terms of permanent income and suggest that
consumption is closer to a log normal distribution.
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Eq. (1) can be interpreted as the probability that, at a particular time t, an individual
randomly drawn from the population is poor. This formulation gave rise to a large
literature deriving the income and inequality elasticities of poverty analytically and
estimating econometric models inspired by their analytic counterparts (e.g. Bourguignon,
2003; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Klasen and Misselhorn, 2008). To summarize the
essence of this approach note that, based on eq. (1), we can derive the income elasticity
(εHy¯t =
∂Ht
∂y¯t
y¯t
Ht
) and inequality elasticity (εHσt =
∂Ht
∂σt
σt
Ht
) of the poverty headcount as
εHy¯t = −
1
σt
λ
(− ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
(2)
and
εHσt =
(
ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
λ
(− ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
(3)
where we define the inverse Mills ratio (λ(x) ≡ φ(x)/Φ(x)) as the ratio of the standard
normal pdf to the standard normal cdf, and we require Ht > 0.
The decomposition of the poverty headcount is often written as
dHt
Ht
≈ εHy¯t
dy¯t
y¯t
+ εHσt
dσt
σt
(4)
where dHt/Ht is a small relative change in the poverty headcount, dy¯t/y¯t is a small
relative change in mean incomes, and dσt/σt is a small relative change in the standard
deviation of log incomes. The approximation follows from a linear Taylor expansion of
Ht. Appendix A derives this result.
3
Given log normality, the standard deviation is a monotone transformation of the Gini
inequality coefficient, denoted Gt, and can be obtained via σt =
√
2Φ−1(Gt/2+1/2).4 So,
eqs. (2) and (3) can be used to predict the elasticities directly using observed values of
income and inequality. With some additional algebra, we can also derive an expression
for the Gini elasticity and rewrite eq. (4) accordingly – see eq. (A-6) in Appendix A.
However, the assumption of log normality is only an approximation and unlikely
to hold exactly. The key observation motivating the econometric models is that both
elasticities depend only on the initial levels of mean income and inequality (when the
poverty line is fixed). In order to allow for misspecification of the functional form, the
authors rely on a linear approximation of these intrinsically non-linear functions. They
capture the dependence on initial levels by interacting both mean income and inequality
with the ratio of initial mean income to the poverty line and with initial inequality. This
model is sometimes called the “improved standard model” (Bourguignon, 2003) and it is
usually formulated in (annualized) differences:
∆ lnHit = α + β1∆ ln y¯it + β2∆ ln y¯it × ln(y¯i,t−1/z) + β3∆ ln y¯it × lnGi,t−1
+ γ1∆ lnGit + γ2∆ lnGit × ln(y¯i,t−1/z) + γ3∆ lnGit × lnGi,t−1 + it
(5)
where ∆ is the difference operator, α is a linear time trend and it is an error term. We
also added country subscripts.
3Also see Datt and Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (1993) and Bourguignon (2003).
4This formulation is the inverse of Gt = 2Φ(σt/
√
2)− 1 due to Aitchison and Brown (1957).
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Suppose eq. (5) is estimated via OLS or GMM, then it is straightforward to see that
the implied elasticities approximate eqs. (2) and (3). The estimated income elasticity is
εˆHy¯it = βˆ1+βˆ2 ln(y¯i,t−1/z)+βˆ3 lnGi,t−1 and the estimated inequality elasticity is εˆ
HG
it = γˆ1+
γˆ2 ln(y¯i,t−1/z) + γˆ3 lnGi,t−1. Clearly, the elasticities depend on the initial levels of income
and inequality. These two elasticities are sometimes referred to as the ‘distribution-
neutral’ income elasticity and the ‘growth-neutral’ inequality elasticity. They identify
the partial effect of changing either income or inequality, contrary to the simple observed
elasticity that confounds both effects.5 Yet, this approximation is extremely coarse and
does not place any meaningful restrictions on the parameter space. Moreover, it is unclear
which level equation this specification derives from.
In general, poverty elasticities can paint a distorted picture of poverty dynamics. The
income elasticity, for example, gives the impression that richer countries become ever
better at poverty reduction because a drop in the poverty headcount from 2% to 1% is
treated just the same as a drop from 50% to 25%. Recognizing this shortcoming, Klasen
and Misselhorn (2008) suggest to focus on absolute poverty changes instead. Removing
the log from the headcount in eq. (5) turns it into a model of semi-elasticities and alters
the interpretation.6 The coefficients now measure the percentage point change in the
population that is below the poverty line for a given rate of change in income or inequality.
Likewise, eqs. (2) and (3) can be written as semi-elasticities by replacing the inverse Mills
ratio with the standard normal pdf. Contrary to elasticities, the semi-elasticities approach
zero as mean income becomes large. Klasen and Misselhorn (2008) also report that their
models fit the data better and suggest that the specification in absolute changes captures
more of the inherent non-linearity. Nevertheless, given the underlying identity, the fit
typically found in the literature (.55 ≤ R2 ≤ .73) is not particularly high.
There are advantages to relying on a linear framework other than mere simplicity,
such as the well-known robustness properties of popular estimators. Nevertheless, a
specification like eq. (5) suffers from several problems. First, it completely disregards the
information provided by poverty levels, most likely introduces negative serial correlation,
and compounds pre-existing measurement error.7 Second, after differencing removes the
time-constant unobserved effects, the added interaction terms reintroduce the unobserved
effects present in the lagged levels. Hence, the coefficients are likely to be biased no
matter if the model is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Instrumental
Variables (IV) or Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) if time invariant measurement
differences exist.8 Third and most fundamentally, the intrinsic non-linearity of the (semi-)
elasticities is due to the bounded nature of the dependent variable which is not taken into
account by linear specifications. The poverty headcount is a proportion and thus only
takes on values in the unit interval (Hit ∈ [0, 1]). As a result, the linear estimates are
5For recent estimates of the simple empirical elasticity (d lnHit/d ln rgdpcit, where rgdpcit is real
GDP per capita), see Ram (2013).
6The term semi-elasticity refers here to the quantity ∂y∂ ln x =
∂y
∂xx rather than the more usual
∂ ln y
∂x =
∂y
∂x
1
y .
7If the errors in the original process (say, yit = α + β(xit + νit) + it, where νit is a mean zero
process uncorrelated with xit ) are not autocorrelated, then differencing introduces correlation: ∆it has
a term in common with ∆i,t−1, so E[∆it∆i,t−1] = E[−2i,t−1] = −σ2 . Furthermore, any attenuation
bias is magnified by the first-difference transformation: plim(βˆFD) = βσ
2
∆x/(σ
2
∆x +σ
2
∆ν) where typically
σ2∆ν = 2σ
2
ν but σ
2
∆x < 2σ
2
x. Autocorrelation in the mismeasured variables further reduces the signal to
noise ratio and increases the attenuation bias.
8Cf. Kalwij and Verschoor (2007), who first show a simpler linear model in differences to remove the
unobserved effects and then estimate interaction models with unobserved effects reintroduced.
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unlikely to work well for values distant from the mean and can easily take on implausible
values (e.g. εˆHy¯it > 0) for some combinations of income and inequality. Any version of the
linear model will only poorly approximate the non-linear shape. Yet for these estimates
to be relevant for any particular country or region, we are precisely interested in temporal
and/or regional elasticities and not just the overall cross-country mean elasticities.
2.2 Alternative approaches: non-linear models of poverty
We propose modeling the conditional expectation of the poverty headcount using non-
linear parametric fractional response models. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to use such an approach for estimating poverty elasticities.
Some weaknesses of the linear specifications have been highlighted before. Chambers
and Dhongde (2011) argue that the functional form is the source of the non-linearity.
They estimate non-parametric models of the conditional mean of the headcount (Hit =
m(y¯it, Git)+it) and then obtain average elasticities. However, non-parametric techniques
are often inefficient, cannot handle many covariates (due to the curse of dimensionality),
and cannot easily deal with measurement error. It is generally difficult to test more
involved hypotheses in a non-parametric framework. Nevertheless, we fully agree with
Chambers and Dhongde (2011) that non-linear estimation of the conditional mean
matters.
We follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996), who first suggested modeling proportions
using fractional logit or fractional probit to estimate models of the form E[yi|xi] = F (x′iβ),
where yi ∈ [0, 1] and F (·) is the logistic or normal cdf. Applying this approach to our
problem, we may approximate eq. (1) with
E[Hit|y¯it, Git] = Φ(α + β ln y¯it + γ lnGit) for i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T (6)
where ln z is absorbed into the constant and we also take the logarithm of the Gini
coefficient (mostly for convenience). Naturally, we expect β < 0 and γ > 0. In motivating
this model, we temporarily assume away all econometric complications such as unobserved
heterogeneity, endogeneity and unbalancedness. These assumptions are relaxed in the
next subsection.
Since F (·) is invertible, it can be used as a ‘link function’ in the spirit of the GLM
literature (e.g. MacCullagh and Nelder, 1989). Thus, we may also write eq. (6) as
Φ−1 (E[Hit|y¯it, Git]) = α + β ln y¯it + γ lnGit. In other words, the inverse normal cdf
linearizes the conditional mean. Figures B-1 and B-2 in Appendix B use this property
to plot Φ−1(Hit) against ln y¯it and lnGit for each region, including a regression line. The
result is striking. This simple transformation is extremely successful in removing the
intrinsic non-linearity of the poverty headcount.
It is now straightforward to define the estimated income elasticity as
εˆHy¯it =
∂Eˆ[Hit|y¯it, Git]
∂y¯it
y¯it
Eˆ[Hit|y¯it, Git]
= βˆ × λ
(
αˆ + βˆ ln y¯it + γˆ lnGit
)
(7)
and the estimated Gini elasticity as
εˆHGit =
∂Eˆ[Hit|y¯it, Git]
∂Git
Git
Eˆ[Hit|y¯it, Git]
= γˆ × λ
(
αˆ + βˆ ln y¯it + γˆ lnGit
)
. (8)
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Contrary to the linear model, the elasticities in eqs. 7 and 8 closely mimic the
properties and structure of the analytical elasticities in eqs. 2 and 3. The non-linearity
arises simply from the bounded functional form and is not artificially captured by
interaction terms. However, it is important to note that we do not require log normality
but implicitly assume that an unspecified two-parameter distribution sufficiently describes
the poverty headcount up to statistical error. We simply derived a more natural model
of the poverty headcount as a function of income and inequality which happens to look
a lot like its theoretical counterpart.
This approach has several advantages. We directly take the information provided by
poverty levels into account, the model predictions of the poverty headcount ratio will
strictly lie in the unit interval, and the same model is able to estimate both elasticities
and semi-elasticities. As a result of respecting the bounded nature of the headcount, the
elasticities will also approach zero when the inverse Mills ratio becomes vanishingly small
and are likely to closely approximate values further away from the mean of the covariates.
Hence, they share important properties of their theoretical counterparts based on the log
normal assumption. Furthermore, we can directly predict the poverty headcount for
interesting combinations of income and inequality rather than going the roundabout way
of estimating the elasticities in one model and then projecting poverty separately.
2.3 Econometrics of fractional response models
Since there is no free lunch in econometrics, the apparent gains over the linear approach
must come at a price. In non-linear models it is generally harder to deal with unobserved
heterogeneity, measurement error and unbalancedness. While until a few years ago
there was relatively little research on this issue, we can now draw on an increasingly
well developed framework. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) extend fractional response
models to balanced panels with unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous covariates,
Wooldridge (2010a) develops the theory for unbalanced panels, and Wooldridge (2012)
derives a general set-up for one-step estimators in non-linear models. Other contributions
to the field are Loudermilk (2007), Cook, Kieschnick, and McCullough (2008), Ramalho,
Ramalho, and Murteira (2011), and Tiwari and Palm (2011).
To simplify the exposition, we stack the coefficients β = (β1, β2, . . . , βk)
′ and covariates
xit = (xit,1, xit,2, . . . , xit,k)
′. The ideal model we would like to estimate is
E[Hit|xi, µi] = E[Hit|xit, µi] = Φ(x′itβ + µi) for i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T (9)
where xi = (xi1,xi2, . . . ,xiT ) are the covariates in all periods. We assume that the
covariates are strictly exogenous conditionally on the unobserved effects (µi), and that
the panel is balanced. We introduced unobserved country-level effects to capture time-
persistent differences in measurement or deviations from a two-parameter distribution,
which may be arbitrarily correlated with the elements in xit.
The key problem with such an approach is that the unobserved effects are not identified
when T is fixed and N −→ ∞, leading to biased estimates of the parameter vector.
This is the incidental parameters problem of Neyman and Scott (1948).9 In addition,
the partial effects needed for calculating the elasticities are not identified either. Papke
9This bias tends to become small as T gets large, but there are no benchmark simulations for the
fractional probit case that we know of and in our case T¯ is small. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) explain
why replacing the standard normal cdf by the logistic cdf is not a good solution for this problem.
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and Wooldridge (2008) suggest to solve this problem by imposing some structure on the
correlation between the unobserved effects and the covariates using a device developed by
Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984). This approach is generally known as correlated
random effects (CRE). Concretely, we let
µi|(xi1, . . . ,xiT ) ∼ N (ϕ+ x¯′iθ, σ2u) (10)
where x¯i = T
−1∑T
t=1 xit is the time average of all the included time-varying regressors,
xit no longer contains a constant, and ui = µi−ϕ− x¯′iθ with ui|(xi1, . . . ,xiT ) ∼ N (0, σ2u).
The covariates are still strictly exogenous conditionally on the unobserved effects. In
linear models, this specification is equivalent to the traditional ‘fixed effects’ model and
thus, in terms of accounting for unobserved effects, achieves the same aim as specifying
a difference equation.
Plugging eq. (10) into eq. (9), we can rewrite our model of interest as
E[Hit|xi, ui] = Φ(ϕ+ x′itβ + x¯′iθ + ui) (11)
E[Hit|xi] = E[Φ(ϕ+ x′itβ + x¯′iθ + ui)|xi] = Φ (ϕu + x′itβu + x¯′iθu) (12)
where the subscript u denotes scaling of the coefficients by the factor (1 +σ2u)
−1/2. Going
from eq. (11) to eq. (12) applies iterated expectations and the last equality follows from
mixing (compounding) independent mean-zero normals.
If these assumptions hold, then the scaled coefficients and average partial effects
(APEs) of all time-varying covariates are identified. However, survey-specific (non-
classical) measurement error in income is likely to lead to overestimating the income
elasticity in absolute value (Ravallion and Chen, 1997). In addition, classical
measurement error may attenuate the income coefficient and thus work in the opposite
direction. Suppose we do not observe true income but ln y¯it = ln y¯
∗
it + υit, where
ln y¯∗it is the true value of log mean income/ expenditure and υit is a composite error
process with a classical and a non-classical component. We can view this as an omitted
variable problem. Going back to the simplest model, we have E[Hit|x1it, y¯∗it, µi] 6=
E[Hit|x1it, y¯it, µi] = Φ(x′1itβ +ψ(ln y¯∗it + υit) + µi) = Φ(x′1itβ +ψ ln y¯it−ψυit + µi), where
x1it is xit without the mismeasured ln y¯it, and υit is also potentially correlated with the
time-constant unobserved effects (cov(υit, µi) 6= 0). Inference using observed income will
lead to underestimating or overestimating the effect depending on which type of error is
stronger.
Building on Rivers and Vuong (1988) and the general result from Blundell and Powell
(2004), Papke and Wooldridge (2008) suggest a simple two-step control function estimator
for such endogeneity problems. Provided we have an m × 1 vector of time-varying
instruments (zit) that are relevant but not correlated with υit, we can estimate a log-
linear model ln y¯it = ϕ1 + x
′
1itβ1 + z
′
itγ1 + x¯
′
iθ1 + νit in the first step and then obtain the
residuals νˆit. It is important to note here that we redefine x¯i = (x¯1i, z¯i); that is, x¯i now
contains the time averages of all strictly exogenous variables including the instruments.
In the second step, we specify the residual-augmented model of E[Hit|x1it, zit, y¯it, νit] =
Φ (ϕk + x
′
1itβk + x¯
′
iθk + ψk ln y¯it + ρkνˆit). Here, too, the Chamberlain-Mundlak device
concerns both the strictly exogenous variables and the excluded instruments. The
subscript k denotes a new scale factor (1 + σ2k)
−1/2. The solution is to simply condition
on an estimate of the omitted variable (νˆit). A test of ρˆk = 0 corresponds to a test of
exogeneity and does not depend on the first step under the null (see Hausman, 1978).
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The asymptotic standard errors must be adjusted for the uncertainty of the first step and
can be derived via the delta method or approximated with the panel bootstrap.
Accounting for unbalancedness adds another layer of complication. Contrary to linear
models with CRE, where most estimators need little or no practical adjustments to
work with unbalanced panels, estimates from non-linear CRE models are inconsistent
if applied to unbalanced panel data. The main problem is that both the estimates and
the variances of the correlated random effects can differ depending on the sample size.
Wooldridge (2010a) proposes to also directly model this dependence. Assuming that
selection is conditionally independent, we can extend our model by letting the unobserved
effects vary depending on the panel size: E[µi|wi] =
∑T
r=1 δTi,rϕkr +
∑T
r=1 δTi,rx¯
′
iθkr,
where wi is a vector of functions of the conditioning variables sufficient to represent
the distribution D[µi|(sit, sitx1it, sitzit, sit ln y¯it)] = D[µi|wi]; further, sit is a selection
indicator and δTi,r is the Kronecker delta which is equal to unity if Ti = r and
zero otherwise. The coefficients are still scaled by (1 + σ2k)
−1/2. Without further
assumptions, this implies that we cannot use the observations where Ti = 1 as these
have no separately identifiable panel dimension. Hence, they drop out of the estimating
equation. Additionally, we also let the conditional variance depend on the panel size such
that var(µi|wi) = σ2µ exp(
∑T−1
r=2 δTi,rωr), where the omegas represent unknown variance
parameters and σ2µ is the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity when Ti = T .
10,11 The
result is a variable scale factor: (1 + σ2µ exp(
∑T−1
r=2 δTi,rωr))
−1/2.
A convenient reparameterization arises when we treat the overall variance as
heteroskedastic and assume that D[µi|wi] is normal (see Wooldridge, 2010a). Dividing
the conditional expectation by exp(
∑T−1
r=2 δTi,rω˜r), where ω˜r denotes a new set of unknown
parameters for the overall variance, we again obtain a constant scale factor. Then, the
reparametricized two-step unbalanced CRE model is
E[Hit|xi, νit,wi] = Φ
x′1itβh + ψh ln y¯it + ρhνˆit +∑Tr=2 δTi,rϕhr +∑Tr=2 δTi,rx¯′iθhr
exp
(∑T−1
r=2 δTi,rω˜r
)1/2

(13)
where the explanatory variables at t are (1,x′1it, ln y¯it, νˆit, δTi,2x¯
′
i, . . . , δTi,T x¯
′
i) and the
variance depends on a set of dummy variables shifting from Ti = 2 to Ti = T−1 with Ti =
T as the base. The subscript h denotes the new scale factor. The specification nests the
balanced case. If the panel is balanced, the numerator has only one set of time averages
and a constant in addition to the time-varying covariates, while the denominator is unity.
The first estimation step is also augmented to accommodate the varying panel sizes. We
obtain the residuals via νˆit = ln y¯it − z′itγˆ1 − x′1itβˆ1 −
∑T
r=2 δTi,rϕˆ1r −
∑T
r=2 δTi,rx¯
′
iθˆ1r,
where x′1it includes time dummies and x¯
′
i their time averages. The heterogeneity related
to the instruments (the z¯i time averages in x¯i) is interacted with the panel size dummies
and thus enters the first step flexibly. This, too, simplifies back to the earlier result in
10As Wooldridge (2010a) points out, it is possible to model the conditional expectation and variance
even more flexibly by allowing for additional intercepts, trends, and variances/covariances to approximate
the non-parametric relationship from Altonji and Matzkin (2005).
11We could also let the conditional variance depend on inequality (which can be motivated by assuming
log normality of income). This relaxes an implicit assumption, namely that the marginal proportional
rate of substitution (MPRSt = −εˆHy¯t /εˆHGt ) is constant. The models fit marginally better but the
substantive implications change very little. Additional results are available on request.
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the balanced case if we remove the redundant variables (i.e. averages of the time effects).
Obviously this is a complicated model to fit but it can be estimated by any
software that has a heteroskedastic probit implementation without any restrictions on
the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2010a).12 Since this is a quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator (QMLE), the standard errors based on the inverse information matrix will be
too conservative and need to be adjusted for clustering at the country level (for details
see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; 2008; Wooldridge, 2010b). Apart from the assumptions
made to restrict the unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, fractional probit only
requires correct specification of the conditional mean irrespective of the true distribution
of the dependent variable (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984). Hence, it is as
robust as non-linear least squares but potentially more efficient.
We still need to define the average partial effects (APEs) and elasticities. Both can be
derived from the average structural function (ASF) computed over the selected sample
(see Blundell and Powell, 2004; Wooldridge, 2010a) which makes clear that only the
APEs of time-varying covariates are in fact identified. Let the linear predictors inside
the cumulative normal be m′it1ξˆ1 for the main equation and m
′
it2ξˆ2 for the variance
equation. Then, ÂSF(xt) = N
−1∑N
i=1 Φ
(
m′it1ξˆ1/exp(m
′
it2ξˆ2)
1/2
)
, where xt refers to all
time-varying covariates including mismeasured income, and the coefficients are the scaled
QMLE estimates. We always need to average over the cross-section dimension in order
to get rid of the unobserved effects, varying panel sizes, and endogeneity/ measurement
error. The APE at time t of a particular continuous variable is simply the derivative of
the ASF with respect to that variable. We usually plug in interesting values for xt and
obtain the APEs assuming the entire sample shares these characteristics.
Analogously, the elasticity with respect to any xk ∈ xt (provided that xk is in logs
and does not show up in the variance equation) is
εˆHxkt = βˆk ×N−1
N∑
i=1
exp
(
−m′it2ξˆ2/2
)
λ
(
m′it1ξˆ1/exp(m
′
it2ξˆ2)
1/2
)
(14)
and the semi-elasticity (ηˆHxkt ) is the derivative of the ASF with respect to xk; that is, the
average partial effect (APE). We also average over time in order to obtain a scale factor.
The basic structure is exactly the same as in the simpler versions derived in the
previous section with the addition of a variance equation adjusting for the degree of
unbalancedness. If the panel is balanced, the non-redundant sums inside the linear
predictors simplify and we again obtain the CRE analogues of eqs. (7) and (8).
3 Data
Based on the World Bank’s PovcalNet database13, we compile a new and comprehensive
data set consisting of 809 nationally-representative surveys spanning 124 countries from
1981 to 2010.14 Smaller panels of this data have been used in previous studies (e.g.
Chambers and Dhongde, 2011; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007; Adams, 2004) and the World
12However, most implementations (e.g. Stata’s hetprob) only allow binary dependent variables. We
implement the estimator in a new module called fhetprob (see Bluhm, 2014, forthcoming).
13The data is publicly available at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet (last accessed May
20 2013, last updated April 18 2013).
14Supporting materials and the panel data set are available at www.richard-bluhm.com/data/.
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Bank’s methodology is described in more detail in Chen and Ravallion (2010). Here we
only briefly summarize the main features.
All data originate from household surveys. Our primary measure of poverty is the
headcount index (Hit) given a poverty line (z) of $2 a day or $60.83 a month. The
poverty headcount at the $1.25 a day or $38 a month poverty line is used as a secondary
measure. The data also contains measures of mean monthly per capita household income
or consumption expenditures (y¯it)
15, the Gini coefficient of inequality (Git) for income
or consumption expenditures, the surveyed population (popit),
16 and a set of indicators
distinguishing if the survey uses income or consumption as a welfare measure and whether
unit-level or grouped-level (deciles or finer quantiles) data are used. About 63% of the
data come from expenditure surveys and about 74% are estimated from grouped data.
All monetary quantities are in constant international dollars at 2005 PPP-adjusted prices.
Some countries17 do not conduct nationally representative surveys but instead report
urban and rural data separately. We simply weigh the poverty and income data using
the relative urban/rural population shares to construct national series. Since the Gini
is not subgroup decomposable, we employ a mixing of two log normal distributions
approximation to estimate a national Gini coefficient (Young, 2011).18 If only one urban
or rural survey is available in any given year, we usually drop the survey, except in
the case of Argentina where urbanization is near or above 90% for most of the sampled
period and we thus consider the urban series nationally representative. This results in an
unbalanced panel of 124 countries, with an average time series (T¯ ) of about 6.5 surveys
for a total of 809 observations, spanning 30 years. Table 1 provides summary statistics
for the entire panel. In Appendix B, Table B-1 presents summary statistics by region,
and List B-1 lists the countries and the corresponding numbers of surveys in the sample.
Table 1 – Summary statistics
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max N
Main variables
Hit – Headcount ($2) 0.303 0.286 .0002 .9845 809
Hit – Headcount ($1.25) 0.182 0.219 .0002 .9255 789
Git – Gini coefficient 0.424 0.102 .2096 .7433 809
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure in $ per month 194.59 125.90 14.93 766.78 809
PCEPit – Consumption (PWT) in $ per month 338.64 234.59 14.39 1231.21 795
Survey type dummies
Consumption (Grouped) 0.611 0.488 0 1 809
Consumption (Unit) 0.015 0.121 0 1 809
Income (Grouped) 0.132 0.339 0 1 809
Income (Unit) 0.242 0.429 0 1 809
For the linear models in log differences, we also construct a second data set of ‘poverty
spells’ at the country level (data in changes). Manually defining poverty spells serves two
15Computed as a simple per capita average without equivalence scaling.
16Several entries in the PovcalNet population data are clearly mistaken, zero or missing. We fix the
values/series using data from the World Development Indicators.
17China, India and Indonesia.
18PovcalNet omits weighting some recent data. To use a single consistent method, we apply Young’s
formula in all cases where separate urban and rural surveys are combined. The approximation is very
accurate. The formula is G =
∑K
i=1
∑K
j=1
sisj y¯i
Y¯
(
2K
[
ln y¯i−ln y¯j+ 12σ2i+ 12σ2j
(σ2i+σ
2
j )
1/2
]
− 1
)
where K is the total
number of subgroups, si is the population share of the i-th subgroup and Y¯ is the population-weighted
mean income across all subgroups.
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purposes. First, we only use data from runs of the same survey type to avoid introducing
artificial changes when there is a switch from income to expenditure surveys or vice versa
(same for unit and grouped-level data; we assume the grouping does not change). Second,
we annualize all differences to mitigate any biases arising from estimating elasticities over
very different time periods. This leads to a smaller data set of 648 observations in 104
countries, as differencing requires Ti ≥ 2. Most studies using poverty differences lose
additional observations when the poverty headcount is zero at the beginning or end of
a spell (e.g. Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007), implying a relative change in the poverty
headcount of negative or positive infinity. This problem does not occur in our data, but
more importantly, our approach does not require such ad hoc adjustments.
We add per capita consumption data from national accounts to the survey-based
panel, which we later use as instruments for mean survey income and require for the
poverty projections. Personal consumption expenditures are retrieved from both from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) and Penn World Table 7.1 (PWT), denoted
PCEWit and PCE
P
it respectively.
19 The PWT version is preferred in the estimations; for
the poverty projections a “merged” series (PCEit) is constructed using the WDI series
as a benchmark but replacing it with PWT data if coverage over 1981-2010 is better.
Both series are in constant 2005 prices, but the PWT adjust the original 2005 ICP data
and interpolate differently between benchmark years (Deaton and Heston, 2010). For the
projections, we also use estimates of the total population from 2010 to 2030 based on the
medium fertility variant from the World Population Prospects (the 2010 revision).
4 Results
4.1 Fractional response models
Table 2 presents our main results, with each specification progressively addressing
more estimation issues (unobserved effects, unbalancedness and measurement error). In
all specifications, we include time averages to proxy for time invariant measurement
differences across different countries (unobserved effects). We also include survey type
dummies (consumption or income, grouped or unit data) as reported poverty is typically
lower in income surveys than consumption surveys and the availability of grouped versus
unit-level data in PovcalNet may proxy for other systematic survey differences. In
addition, time dummies allow for unspecified common year effects.
Column (1) includes correlated random effects but entirely ignores unbalancedness.
As expected, the coefficient on average income is negative and the coefficient on inequality
is positive. Since the estimated coefficients are arbitrarily scaled, the adjacent column
reports the average partial effects (APEs) and we report the scale factor separately in
the bottom panel. The APEs in column (1) imply the following semi-elasticities. On
average, one percent income growth leads to a 0.284 percentage point reduction in the
population that is poor and a corresponding one percent increase in inequality leads to
a 0.232 percentage point increase in poverty. Turning to elasticity concepts, the average
income elasticity across the entire estimation sample is about −1.83 (SE = 0.084) and
the average Gini elasticity is about 1.5 (SE = 0.167). Hence, a one percent increase in
19Monthly PCEPit is computed as (kcit/100 × rgdplit/12), where kcit is the consumption share and
rgdplit is GDP per capita (Laspeyres) in 2005 constant prices. Similarly, PCE
W
it is household final
consumption expenditure in 2005 prices divided by the population and converted to monthly figures.
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income leads to about a 1.83 percent decrease in poverty. These two estimates are located
near the lower bound of the results typically found in the literature.20
Table 2 – Fractional probit models (QMLE) – Dependent variable: Hit, $2 a day
(1) (2) (3)
Regular Unbalanced Unbalanced + Two-Step
Hit APEs Hit APEs Hit APEs
ln y¯it -1.263 -0.284 -0.880 -0.281 -1.049 -0.339
(0.054) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011) (0.198) (0.035)
lnGit 1.032 0.232 0.786 0.251 0.775 0.251
(0.114) (0.026) (0.098) (0.026) (0.163) (0.032)
νˆit 0.133
(0.113)
CRE (Corr. Rand. Effects) Yes Yes Yes
Survey type dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Panel size dummies No Yes Yes
Panel size dummies × CRE No Yes Yes
Variance equation No Yes Yes
Scale factor 0.225 0.319 0.323
N × T¯ 789 789 775
N 104 104 103
pseudo R2 0.992 0.996 0.997
lnL -219.3 -315.6 -313.4√
MSE 0.0355 0.0238 0.0235
Notes: 20 observations with Ti = 1 not used in estimation. In models (1) and (2), the standard
errors of the coefficients are robust to clustering at the country level and the standard errors of the
APEs are computed via the delta method. We include the time averages of the survey type and
time dummies in (2) and (3), but constrain their coefficients to be equal across the panel sizes.
The standard errors of the coefficients and the APEs in model (3) account for the first stage
estimation step with a panel bootstrap using 999 bootstrap replications. The linear projection in
the first stage uses lnPCEPit as an instrument for ln y¯it. The first-stage cluster-robust F-statistic
in (3) is 28.05. Model (3) also excludes West Bank and Gaza entirely (2 observations) and 12
observations from ECA countries pre-1990 for lack of PCE data.
Our first specification could be biased due to the strong unbalancedness of the panel
and the presence of time-varying measurement error in income and inequality. Column
(2) addresses unbalancedness by including panel size dummies, interactions of the time
averages with the panel size dummies, and a separate variance equation. We consider
this our best specification without correcting for measurement error. The substantive
conclusions change very little. The APE of income is virtually unchanged and the APE
of inequality increases by about one standard error. Clearly, varying panel sizes introduce
little bias on average. Nonetheless, they may still have a non-negligible effect on the
(semi-)elasticites at particular points in time.
20The typical range for the income elasticity in earlier studies is from about 2 to 5, while the range
for the Gini elasticity is much wider. Newer studies suggest the income elasticity is closer to 2. This is
largely owed to parameter instability in linear approximations and changing data coverage. However, as
Chambers and Dhongde (2011) report, estimates of the income elasticity using the 2005 PPPs are also
universally lower (in absolute value) than estimates based on the earlier 1993 PPPs.
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Our preferred specification, column (3), is the empirical counterpart of the two-
step estimator presented in eq. (13). We account for measurement error in income
by instrumenting survey mean incomes or expenditures with per capita consumption
from the national accounts (PCEPit ). The main identifying assumption is that any
measurement error in per capita consumption from the national accounts is orthogonal
to survey-based measurement error in income or expenditures. As both expenditure
measures are estimated very differently in practice, this is a plausible and common
identification strategy (Ravallion, 2001). Figure B-3 in Appendix B highlights the
strength of the first stage relationship. It shows a partial regression plot of mean incomes
or expenditures from the surveys against per capita consumption from the National
Accounts, after taking out the variation in the Gini, the time averages of the Gini and
PCEPit , panel size dummies, survey dummies and time dummies.
Ignoring the first-stage variability of income, we find some evidence of measurement
error in income (cluster robust t-stat ≈ 1.69).21 After accounting for the two-step nature
the evidence for measurement error is considerably weaker (panel bootstrap t-stat≈ 1.18).
The APE of income, on the other hand, is larger in absolute value, hence we conclude that
the coefficient of income in models (1) and (2) is attenuated towards zero. These results
suggest that classical attenuation bias is more of a problem than systematic survey bias
due to under-reporting or over-reporting of incomes and expenditures. Since the biases
arising from these two types of measurement error are likely to run in opposing directions,
our estimates imply that they are not fully offsetting as in Ravallion and Chen (1997).
The unbiased average-income semi-elasticity of poverty estimated in column (3) is
considerably larger in absolute value than in the previous two specifications. A one
percent increase in incomes leads to a 0.339 percentage point reduction in the population
that is poor. Likewise, the average elasticity increased (¯ˆεHy¯ ≈ 2.21, SE = 0.156) and is
now closer to the conventional estimates of about two. The inequality elasticity remains
about the same (¯ˆεHG ≈ 1.64, SE = 0.188). In fact, there may also be non-negligible
measurement error in observed inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. However,
since inequality is most often estimated from household surveys and estimates based on
alternative sources such as tax records are not available on a cross-country basis, we are
lacking a corresponding instrument for the Gini coefficient.
Is there evidence of additional non-linearity missing in the non-linear functional form
of the poverty headcount? To examine this possibility, we add squares (m′it1ξˆ1)
2 and
cubes (m′it1ξˆ1)
3 of the linear predictors in columns (1) and (2) for a RESET-type test
as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). In the most basic column (1), this yields
a robust χ22-statistic of 4.65 for a p-value of 0.098, giving no reason for concern. For
the heteroskedastic model in column (2), the RESET test provides some evidence of
additional non-linearity (robust χ22 = 9.15, p > 0.01). However, there is no theoretical
reason to expect additional powers or interactions of income and inequality to enter the
model.
At first sight, all three models may suggest an only moderately larger effect of income
growth when holding inequality constant relative to changes in inequality, and vice versa.
This does not imply that both variables have the same scope for change or have to
change independently for that matter. We estimate the impact of each component and
not its contribution to overall poverty reduction (for estimates of the contributions see
Kraay, 2006). While there is substantial variation in inequality, it shows no systematic
21As mentioned earlier, the Hausman (1978) test does not depend on the first stage under the null.
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trend over the sample period from 1981 to 2010.22 In contrast, incomes and expenditures
have increased substantially in all regions over the same time span (see Table B-5 in
Appendix B). Moreover, the effect of income growth is not constant. In these models, it
depends strongly on the levels of inequality and income. Thus there is a ‘double dividend’
to improvements in distribution (Bourguignon, 2003) and substantial heterogeneity in the
estimated poverty (semi-)elasticities across time and space – an issue to which we return
shortly.
Perhaps the most striking fact about all three specifications is how well they fit. For
more intuitive comparisons, the last row shows the square root of the mean squared
residual for each column – a model metric suggested by Wooldridge (2010a). Already in
the first model, we predict the observed poverty headcount for each country-year with
about three and a half percentage points accuracy and with better than two and a half
percentage points accuracy in the preferred specification. This truly reflects an identity
relationship. A simple pseudo-R2 measure of the correlation between the observed and
fitted values for models (1) to (3) suggests near perfect fit (R2 > 0.99). Figure 1
illustrates this point and shows the shape of the estimated effects. Using our preferred
specification, we plot both the observed headcount and the predicted headcount over
the range of observed mean income or expenditures (left panel) and inequality (right
panel). The quality of the non-linear approach is readily apparent as the fit is very close
at either bound (near unity or near zero) and the model does not predict nonsensical
values. Further, the variation in the observed values is completely covered by the model
predictions. In linear models, neither of these two outcomes is guaranteed.
Figure 1 – Data versus fitted values, preferred specification, $2 a day
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For comparison, Table B-2 in Appendix B reproduces the linear approach of the previous
literature using the data in levels and the poverty spell data in differences. The differences
in the estimated average elasticities are not large, as is typical for comparisons between
linear and non-linear approaches. We do not discuss these results in detail since they
suffer from the expected problems (see Section 2). First, when switching from fixed
22In a simple regression of the Gini coefficient on time, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
time trend is zero (cluster robust t-stat ≈ 0.07 and p > 0.94).
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effects to annualized differences in the simple models with only income and inequality,
measurement error increases and attenuates the income coefficient. Second, the models
with interaction terms do not fit nearly as well as those reported earlier and many
coefficients are insignificant. Third, the two-step GMM results for the interaction models
are unstable and not able to convincingly solve the problem of measurement error. The
last model, which is in the spirit of the preferred specification of Kalwij and Verschoor
(2007), even implies a negative Gini elasticity and all coefficients are estimated with great
imprecision. In sum, these models do not perform well in comparison to their fractional
response counterparts and are thus unlikely to produce reliable estimates over a wide
range of circumstances.
Conversely, the strength of the fractional response approach lies in its ability to deliver
much more precise estimates of effects other than the overall mean. Table 3 and Table 4
illustrate this point by estimating the income elasticities and Gini elasticities over different
time periods for the six geographic regions in our sample. They are computed according
to eq. (14) by plugging in the different time period and region specific means of income
(ln y¯it) and inequality (lnGit), and then averaging over the entire sample population. The
standard errors of the elasticities are computed via a panel bootstrap and thus account for
the uncertainty of the first stage. We present regional and temporal elasticities here but
also provide estimates for the semi-elasticities in Table B-3 and Table B-4 in Appendix B
for comparison.
Table 3 – Predicted regional income elasticities, preferred specification, $2 a day
Time period
1981–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
East Asia and Pacific -0.991 -1.029 -1.237 -1.139 -1.578
(0.030) (0.033) (0.055) (0.043) (0.101)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -4.358 -2.892 -2.700 -2.846 -3.304
(0.555) (0.309) (0.277) (0.304) (0.384)
Latin America and Caribbean -2.284 -2.374 -2.425 -2.349 -2.985
(0.243) (0.257) (0.271) (0.258) (0.366)
Middle East and North Africa -2.176 -2.116 -2.024 -1.966 -2.501
(0.203) (0.188) (0.168) (0.161) (0.246)
South Asia -0.548 -0.629 -0.810 -1.024 -1.192
(0.053) (0.048) (0.030) (0.032) (0.046)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.831 -0.437 -0.436 -0.592 -0.632
(0.027) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.033)
Notes: Standard errors obtained via a panel bootstrap using 999 replications. The predicted
elasticities are based on estimated APEs at each region/time-period mean of ln y¯it and lnGit.
There is considerable regional and temporal heterogeneity in the estimated income
elasticities. However, its origins are very mechanical. As the theoretical derivations
in Section 2 show and our estimates make clear, the income elasticity is an increasing
function of income. In other words, regional heterogeneity of the income elasticity is
mainly due to income heterogeneity. More aﬄuent regions (Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa) have
higher income elasticities than poorer regions (East Asia and Pacific, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa). Income dynamics over time are also clearly visible. In Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, for example, income is comparatively high before the post-communist
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transition, sharply collapses throughout the 1990s and then recovers during the 2000s.
Compared to earlier results (e.g. Kalwij and Verschoor, 2007), we find markedly higher
average income elasticities in more aﬄuent regions and lower elasticities in poorer regions.
Throughout Table 3, the standard errors are small compared to the point estimates and
remain very accurate for regions with more extreme values (e.g. very low income and
above average inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s).
Table B-3 in Appendix B presents the region and time specific income semi-elasticities
of poverty. There the picture is reversed. Comparatively more aﬄuent regions have
fewer people near the poverty line, and thus the poverty reduction potential from a
one percent increase in incomes is much smaller in terms of the population lifted out
of poverty. This dynamic is again best visible in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
where absolute poverty at the $2 a day poverty line is almost non-existent just before
the post-communist transition and then rises sharply in the 1990s as incomes decline.
Correspondingly, the semi-elasticity is close to zero in the 1980s but then it increases as
more people fall into poverty. Likewise, the biggest poverty reduction potential in 2005-
2010 was in East Asia, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. This highlights an important
point. For development policy, we really care more about poverty reduction in terms of
the percent of the population lifted out of poverty rather than relative changes in the
poverty headcount. Hence, semi-elasticities are the pertinent concept (see also Klasen
and Misselhorn, 2008).
Table 4 – Predicted regional Gini elasticities, preferred specification, $2 a day
Time period
1981–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
East Asia and Pacific 0.732 0.760 0.914 0.841 1.165
(0.105) (0.101) (0.113) (0.108) (0.144)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 3.219 2.136 1.994 2.102 2.440
(0.510) (0.307) (0.283) (0.296) (0.353)
Latin America and Caribbean 1.687 1.753 1.791 1.735 2.205
(0.186) (0.198) (0.199) (0.189) (0.269)
Middle East and North Africa 1.607 1.563 1.495 1.452 1.847
(0.197) (0.198) (0.196) (0.185) (0.253)
South Asia 0.405 0.464 0.598 0.756 0.880
(0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.107) (0.127)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.614 0.322 0.322 0.437 0.467
(0.087) (0.055) (0.060) (0.066) (0.069)
Notes: Standard errors obtained via a panel bootstrap using 999 replications. The predicted
elasticities are based on estimated APEs at each region/time-period mean of ln y¯it and lnGit.
The region and time specific Gini elasticities in Table 4 show where the potential of
redistributive policies in terms of proportionate reductions in the poverty headcount was
largest over the last three decades. Unsurprisingly, these regions are Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa
– all of which have above average inequality. Sub-Saharan Africa starts out with high
inequality in the 1980s23 but incomes are very low relative to the poverty line, so that the
Gini elasticity is small. This is the flip side of the dependency on initial levels: countries
23The population-weighted mean Gini in the 1980s is 0.4608.
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can be so poor and unequal that the immediate effects of equalization and income growth
on relative changes in the poverty headcount are comparatively small. However, here too,
the semi-elasticities presented in Table B-4 in the Appendix help to clarify the picture.
There the relative position of poorer and richer countries is reversed. The potential for
reducing poverty through redistribution in terms of percent of the population that is poor
was larger in poorer regions throughout the entire period from 1981 to 2010.
The ‘double dividend’ of reductions in inequality is illustrated in Figure 2 by graphing
the estimated poverty elasticities or semi-elasticities over different combinations of income
and inequality. Again, we compute these estimates according to eq. (14) by plugging in the
different values for mean income or expenditures (ln y¯it) and inequality (lnGit), and then
averaging over the entire sample. As Figure 2a illustrates, on top of the direct poverty
alleviating effect of income redistribution towards the poor, a lower level of inequality
also raises the income elasticity in absolute value at every point. However, the magnitude
of both elasticities is steeply increasing in the level of income; that is, the return to either
income growth or equalization is bigger, the higher the income level. This may invite
the conclusion that growth matters more at lower levels of income, while redistribution
is only important for high income and high inequality countries. This, precisely, is the
misleading feature of relative changes.
Figure 2b shows the predicted income and Gini semi-elasticities of poverty. The
picture is very different and in many ways more intuitive. If the shortfall is too large –
the mass of the income distribution is too far to the left of the poverty line – then both
the income and the Gini semi-elasticities approach zero. However, if the country is very
aﬄuent – the mass of the income distribution is far to the right of the poverty line – then
both semi-elasticities also approach zero. In between those two extremes, improvements
in the income distribution can make a very large difference in terms of percent of the
population lifted out of poverty, both, directly through redistribution and indirectly
through growth. At y¯t/z = 1, for example, a Gini of 0.25 implies that one percent
income growth leads to a 0.584 percentage point reduction in the poverty headcount
and a Gini of 0.55 implies that one percent income growth leads to a 0.378 percentage
point reduction in the poverty headcount. Especially at very low average income levels
the initial income distribution is decisive. It practically determines whether there is any
substantial potential for poverty alleviation through income growth at all (in terms of
percent of the population that is poor). Moreover, as the Gini semi-elasticity also depends
on the level of inequality, further improvements in the income distribution will have a
larger effect on poverty reduction at lower levels of inequality. Contrary to Figure 2a,
this suggests that poverty reduction strategies should focus both on income growth
and equalization, especially in least developed countries and high inequality countries
where the total returns to redistribution are large. Again, for policy questions, these
relationships are much more pertinent than relative changes in the poverty headcount.
Could the decomposition be improved by allowing for other “more ultimate”
determinants of poverty? If the assumption of log normality is justified, mean income
and the Gini fully describe the distribution of incomes and expenditures, and there is
logically no scope for other variables to enter. Yet this assumption is restrictive and we
deliberately do not rely on log normality. In fact, we expect it to be violated at least
for some cases (see, e.g., the host of alternative distributions analyzed by Bresson, 2009).
More realistic distributions usually have more than one shape parameter in order to better
capture skewness, long tails or the existence of multiple modes. “Ultimate factors” could
thus be proxies for systematic deviations from equiproportional shifts in the distribution
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Figure 2 – Predicted income and Gini elasticities and semi-elasticities of poverty, $2 a day
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of incomes and expenditures. Weak institutions, for example, may explain the fact that
the rich receive more of the gains. Table B-6 in Appendix B extends the heteroskedastic
fractional probit models with data on institutions, human capital, access to credit and
trade openness. The APEs of income and inequality are not affected by the inclusion of
additional covariates and the APEs of other determinants are virtually zero. Thus we
conclude that with only two variables, several dummies and correlated random effects,
these specifications are essentially saturated. The fractional response approach leaves
little room for misspecification of the decomposition.
While the literature on poverty reduction has produced mixed results so far, it is
largely consistent with this view. Prominent examples are two studies by Dollar and
Kraay (2002, 2004), who find that trade, inflation and other factors influence the incomes
of the poorest quintile, while several other variables do not. However, they emphasize
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that these effects run predominantly through growth of GDP per capita. The interesting
link is between some factor X and income or inequality, not between X and a measure of
poverty. Usually such a “first stage” relationship has a dedicated literature that explicitly
attempts to resolve causality issues and provides an appropriate theoretical background.
Thus if we are interested in the effects of, say, institutions on poverty it is not only
sufficient but, in our opinion, much more relevant to investigate the effects of institutions
on income (e.g. see Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) and inequality
(e.g. see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Easterly, 2007). Separating these two estimation
steps is important, as the impacts of income and distributional changes themselves depend
on the initial levels of income and inequality.
4.2 Projecting poverty
Parts of the previous literature highlight that estimates of income and inequality
elasticities or semi-elasticities are particularly useful for poverty simulations (e.g. Klasen
and Misselhorn, 2008) and hence model fit is very important. Fractional response models
provide a new, powerful and simple method of predicting poverty.
To illustrate the appeal and accuracy of this approach, we compare the predictions
of our model for 2010 to the official World Bank data and then extrapolate poverty
well into the medium-term future until 2030. Clearly, this is a hypothetical exercise
and is not intended to replace any official estimates by the World Bank or national
authorities. Rather it allows us to make somewhat more sophisticated predictions than
back-of-the-envelope trend extrapolations and can provide a useful benchmark for setting
global poverty reduction goals. Using fractional response models for this purpose has the
added advantage that we can predict poverty responses to any combination of shifts in
mean income and inequality. Further, these models have the attractive feature that the
implied changes in the elasticities of poverty at different income and inequality levels are
automatically taken into account.
In fact, even the official World Bank regional poverty figures involve a considerable
amount of interpolation and extrapolation since most household surveys are not
undertaken annually (for details see Chen and Ravallion, 2004). The basic steps are as
follows. The World Bank first calculates poverty in the given survey year by fitting Lorenz
curves to either the unit-level or grouped-level data. Then, average real household income
is lined up to a reference year by interpolating between surveys or extrapolating with the
growth rate of personal consumption expenditures per capita (PCEit). Afterwards, the
poverty headcount is recalculated using the new income level and the same Lorenz curve
as before. If two surveys are available, one before and one after the reference year, the
poverty headcount is a weighted average of the two estimates for the reference year.
Our method is similar in spirit. We proceed in four steps. First, we extrapolate the
last available survey income to 2010 using actually observed country growth rates in PCE
from the WDI, or PWT if the former is missing. Inequality is kept constant at the latest
observed value. Second, we project mean income into the future using each country’s
average growth rate of PCE over the last 15 years. We assume that growth is distribution
neutral, which is in line with the absence of any significant correlation between changes
in inequality and income growth (see Figure B-4 in the Appendix). Third, we predict the
poverty headcount in 5-year intervals from 2010 to 2030 using our preferred specification
without adjusting for measurement error in income (Column 2 in Table 2).24 We typically
24Note that although our preferred specification is only estimated on the sub-sample where Ti ≥ 2,
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do not need estimates of the measurement errors in income or inequality for forecasting
purposes, but we implicitly assume that their contribution remains stable over time.
Finally, the world total and the regional aggregates are estimated as population-weighted
averages of our country level estimates using population data from the World Population
Prospects. We do not provide standard errors for the point estimates since these are
subject to fundamental uncertainty in the assumed PCE growth rates.
Table 5 shows the results and Table B-5 in Appendix B provides regional PCE
growth rates highlighting the assumptions behind these forecasts. The comparison of
the official World Bank poverty figures and our estimates in 2010 illustrates that our
approach produces meaningful results. For three regions, our estimates are within a
percentage point of the official figures, for another two regions, they are within less than
2.5 percentage points, and only for East Asia and Pacific, we estimate a much lower
poverty level in 2010. Our results closely match the World Bank’s results for the world
total. Using the World Bank population data, our estimates imply 2,383.43 million
people under the $2 line worldwide in 2010 versus 2,395.21 million as reported by the
World Bank.
Table 5 – Poverty projections (Hˆit × 100), preferred specification, $2 a day
2010 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Official Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
East Asia & Pacific 29.73 26.70 16.80 10.53 6.92 4.86
Europe & Central Asia 2.35 2.98 1.88 1.17 0.73 0.46
Latin America & the Caribbean 10.37 10.62 8.96 7.59 6.46 5.52
Middle East & North Africa 12.04 14.57 11.36 8.86 6.92 5.41
South Asia 66.71 68.36 57.50 46.09 35.29 26.06
Sub-Saharan Africa 69.87 69.02 64.74 60.73 57.20 54.02
World Total 40.67 40.47 33.64 28.01 23.55 20.09
Notes: Regional aggregates are based on the World Bank classification of low and middle income
countries in 1990. High income countries in 1990 are assumed to have no poor. The projections are
for 123 countries. West Bank and Gaza is excluded as we lack both PCE and population data.
The anticipated regional trends from 2010 to 2030 are highlighted in Figure 3. The left
panel shows the regional poverty rates and the right panel plots the regional distribution of
the poor population. Given past growth trajectories, poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia remains the fundamental development challenge of the twenty-first century.
Estimated poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is very high in 2010 (69.02%) and projected
to remain high through 2030 (54.02%) on the entire subcontinent in spite of sustained
income growth (about 2.3% p.a.). In South Asia, too, poverty is equally high in 2010
(68.36%) but projected to fall by more than half (to 26.06% in 2030). By 2030, about
half of the world’s poor will live in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed closely by South Asia.
Poverty in the East Asia and Pacific region, on the contrary, largely takes care of itself
if incomes and consumption expenditures keep growing at the impressive rates of the last
15 years. We project poverty in East Asia (4.86%) to be below poverty levels in Latin
America (5.52%) by 2030, and second only to Eastern Europe and Central Asia where
absolute poverty virtually disappears (down to 0.46%). Most of the progress in East Asia
we can use the model estimates to predict poverty for the entire sample (Ti ≥ 1). We only lack estimates
of the panel size effects for Ti = 1, so we assign these observations to the adjacent group (Ti = 2).
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is due to rapid income and expenditure growth in China. However, this prediction may
not hold if a middle-income slow-down occurs in China as some observers suggest (see,
e.g., Eichengreen, Park, and Shin, 2013).
Figure 3 – Predicted regional poverty, $2 a day, 2010 to 2030
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Notes: Regional aggregates are based on the World Bank classification of low and middle income
countries in 1990. High income countries in 1990 are assumed to have no poor. The projections are
for 123 countries. West Bank and Gaza is excluded as we lack both PCE and population data.
Population data is the medium fertility variant from the World Population Prospects.
Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa
is noticeably slower in spite of the assumption of robust yet moderate income growth
(about 2.2% and 2.9% p.a., respectively) and comparatively large income elasticities.
This suggests that the countries in these regions should reinforce their poverty alleviation
efforts. However, for the Middle East and North Africa these numbers could be too
optimistic given the recent social upheavals and volatile economic growth that ensued.
Part of this pattern follows directly from the process of “bunching up above $1.25 a
day and just below $2 a day” occurring in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, in South Asia
over the last two decades (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). These two regions have a relatively
large population near the poverty line and hence most of the advances are projected to
occur there. Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the Middle East and North
Africa, are richer and require stronger income growth to continuously reduce poverty.
Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, has a considerable proportion of the population
far below the $2 a day line in 2010 (with 48.47% poor at $1.25 a day). It is facing a lower
income elasticity and thus requires exceptionally strong income growth to make significant
strides against poverty. As highlighted in the previous section, this heterogeneity in the
income elasticity is mainly due to income differences.
We repeat the same exercise for the $1.25 a day poverty line. Table B-8 and Figure B-
5 in Appendix B show the results based on the estimates presented in Table B-7. The
performance of our method is similar and, when compared to the World Bank approach,
is just slightly less accurate for the 2010 baseline. The broad patterns are also similar but
start from much lower poverty levels. It is worth noting that the gap between Sub-Saharan
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Africa and South Asia is even wider for extreme poverty. All regions are predicted to
have a poverty headcount below 7% in 2030, except Sub-Saharan Africa where we project
poverty levels to remain at about 35%. In 2030, it is likely that the great majority of the
world’s extremely poor population will live on the Sub-Saharan subcontinent.
What do these results imply for the post-2015 development agenda? We suggest that
a new goal to at least halve the $2 a day poverty level within 20 years should be the
bare minimum if we want to ensure steady progress. It could be combined with a more
ambitious goal for extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) and significant resources targeted at
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Shifting the policy focus to a higher poverty line
makes a lot of sense. The $1.25 a day poverty line will become nearly irrelevant for most
parts of the developing world. In fact, as long as incomes continue to grow, any absolute
poverty measure will become less relevant over time when it is set too low and $2 a day
can hardly be described as generous. China, for example, recently updated its national
poverty line from less than $1 a day to about $1.80 a day. Raising the headline poverty
threshold ensures the goal remains relevant as time passes.
Even the lower bound of this poverty reduction goal will not be achieved automatically.
A lasting slump in the developed world coupled with the possibility of China entering a
middle-income trap could make it a challenge to preserve historical income growth rates
throughout the medium-term future. In addition, greater equality can coincide with
faster growth and anti-poverty policies will be more successful if they are accompanied
by an improving income distribution. In any case, we now have a baseline to calculate
goals against and to asses counterfactual assumptions. This can inform discussions on
the post-2015 development agenda and help to identify reasonable benchmarks.
5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we derive a new approach to decomposing the poverty headcount and
show that this fractional response approach outperforms earlier linear approximations.
Our main point is that the well-established non-linearity of the income and inequality
elasticities of poverty arises primarily from the bounded nature of the poverty headcount
ratio. Once this inherent non-linearity is taken into account, we can derive an empirical
approximation of the poverty decomposition that implies income and inequality (semi-)
elasticities with desirable properties.
We use this new approach to estimate income and inequality (semi-)elasticities of
poverty based on a large new data set. Fractional response models fit the data extremely
well. We provide evidence that the average income elasticity is around two and the
average inequality elasticity is about one and a half. However, since these two averages
are not very informative, we show that differences in income and inequality levels create
strong regional heterogeneity in the estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities. Studies
based on linear approximations do not fully capture this heterogeneity. Compared to
earlier results, our approach provides estimates that are often substantially different,
very stable and considerably more accurate. This holds for a wide range of different
combinations of income and inequality. While our approach restricts the nature of
the unobserved heterogeneity (measurement differences), it requires no distributional
assumptions other than a correctly specified conditional mean. In addition, we show that
classical measurement error in income attenuates the elasticity estimates and outweighs
systematic survey bias pointing in the opposite direction.
134 Chapter 5. The pace of poverty reduction
Functional form matters a lot when estimating poverty decompositions. Elasticities
and semi-elasticities of poverty estimated with fractional response models have properties
closely resembling those of their theoretical counterparts derived under the assumption of
log normality. Moreover, we emphasize that semi-elasticities rather than elasticities are
the policy relevant metric. This non-linearity also has direct implications for a reduced-
form literature interested in the poverty effects of more ultimate determinants or more
policy-oriented variables. The focus should be first on how a particular variable of interest
leads to changes in mean incomes and changes in distribution and, only in a second step,
on how these changes bring about different poverty outcomes. Only in this manner, the
non-linearity of the poverty-income-inequality relationship is properly taken into account.
To further illustrate the potential of the fractional response approach, we provide
poverty projections from 2010 until 2030 based on the simple assumption that average
historical consumption growth continues into the medium-term future. We show that the
regional landscape of poverty is likely to change dramatically over the next two decades.
Two findings stand out in particular. First, poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia will remain the overarching challenge in the twenty-first century. Second, in all other
regions poverty is projected to fall rapidly, so that there is a strong rationale for setting
the post-2015 development goals on the basis of the $2 a day poverty line.
It is tempting to interpret our findings as evidence of the primacy of growth. Yet, we
are by no means arguing that income growth is all that matters for poverty reduction.
It is important to emphasize that the causal effect of any particular policy on aggregate
household income and the relative distribution of income cannot be discerned from a
decomposition exercise such as this. What it does is help to identify how a given change
in average income or in distribution translates into poverty outcomes, and not how that
change is brought about. Hence, the importance of institutions, trade and a host of
other factors for poverty alleviation remains undiminished. There is a potentially large
‘double dividend’ to be reaped if growth can be achieved in combination with simultaneous
reductions in inequality.
Other important questions remain open. More work is needed on identifying viable
paths of poverty alleviation that actually combine redistribution with growth. Such
analyses require a more sophisticated political economy of redistribution and poverty than
currently available. In addition, the issue of statistical discrepancies between expenditure
surveys, national accounts and consumption proxies, and what these discrepancies imply
for the confidence we place into poverty estimates, is just beginning to be explored. In
our view, these are exciting areas for future research.
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Appendix A: Derivations
Let the poverty line (z) be fixed and assume the poverty headcount is described by a
two-parameter distribution, so that H(y¯t/z, σt) = H(y¯t, σt) = Ht. A Taylor linearization
of H(·) about (y¯t, σt) gives
H(y¯t + dy¯t, σt + dσt) = H(y¯t, σt) +
∂Ht
∂y¯t
dy¯t +
∂Ht
∂σt
dσt + ξt (A-1)
where dx denotes a differential change in x, and ξt is a second-order remainder. This is
easily extended to allow for a vector of Lorenz curve parameters as in Kakwani (1993).
Subtracting H(y¯t, σt) from both sides, dropping the remainder by approximation,
dividing through by Ht (provided Ht > 0), and multiplying the first (second) term by
y¯t/y¯t (σt/σt), we arrive at eq. (4) from the main text:
dHt
Ht
≈
(
∂Ht
∂y¯t
y¯t
Ht
)
dy¯t
y¯t
+
(
∂Ht
∂σt
σt
Ht
)
dσt
σt
= εHy¯t
dy¯t
y¯t
+ εHσt
dσt
σt
. (A-2)
If we do not divide by Ht, we get a decomposition of the (non-relative) change of poverty
in terms of income and inequality semi-elasticities (as in Klasen and Misselhorn, 2008).
Similar steps starting from H(y¯t, Gt) lead to a decomposition in terms of mean income
and Gini. Using the chain rule for elasticities, an expression for the Gini elasticity is
εHGt = ε
Hσ
t
(
dGt
dσt
σt
Gt
)−1
(A-3)
enabling us to write
dHt
Ht
≈ εHy¯t
dy¯t
y¯t
+ εHGt
dGt
Gt
= εHy¯t
dy¯t
y¯t
+ εHσt
(
dGt
dσt
σt
Gt
)−1
dGt
Gt
(A-4)
where eqs. (2) and (3) give εHy¯t and ε
Hσ
t under log normality, but we still need an
expression for dGt/dσt to get an explicit formula for ε
HG
t .
Even though we restricted our attention to one inequality parameter, the results thus
far are quite general. Now if we also assume log normality, we arrive at an explicit form
for the Gini elasticity. Using σt =
√
2Φ−1(Gt/2 + 1/2), we have
dGt
dσt
=
d[2Φ
(
σt/
√
2
)− 1]
dσt
=
√
2φ
(
σt√
2
)
. (A-5)
Inverting and substituting eq. (A-5) together with eq. (3) from the main text into
eq. (A-3) gives the Gini elasticity
εHGt =
(
ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)(
σt
Gt
√
2φ
(
σt√
2
))−1
λ
(− ln(y¯t/z)
σt
+
1
2
σt
)
(A-6)
where σt =
√
2Φ−1(Gt/2 + 1/2). This result corrects for the missing σt/Gt in Kalwij
and Verschoor (2007, p. 824). The Gini semi-elasticity (ηHGt ) is just eq. (A-6) with φ(·)
replacing λ(·). Clearly, both the Gini elasticity and the Gini semi-elasticity are highly
non-linear functions, as illustrated in Figure 2.
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Appendix B: Additional tables and figures
Figure B-1 – Transformed headcount ($2 a day) and log mean income, by region
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Figure B-2 – Transformed headcount ($2 a day) and log Gini, by region
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Table B-1 – Summary statistics by region (unweighted)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
East Asia and Pacific (N=80)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.502 0.267 0.023 0.978
Git – Gini coefficient 0.392 0.058 0.275 0.509
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 107.86 78.39 25.02 399.76
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (N=254)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.110 0.169 0.000 0.857
Git – Gini coefficient 0.330 0.056 0.210 0.537
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 251.99 136.11 37.66 766.78
Latin America and Caribbean (N=274)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.204 0.122 0.002 0.775
Git – Gini coefficient 0.523 0.054 0.344 0.633
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 246.63 90.55 55.53 671.04
Middle East and North Africa (N=37)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.166 0.111 0.003 0.466
Git – Gini coefficient 0.380 0.042 0.301 0.474
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 165.26 56.59 84.02 306.33
South Asia (N=35)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.672 0.226 0.122 0.936
Git – Gini coefficient 0.343 0.067 0.259 0.627
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 67.78 39.20 30.71 204.98
Sub-Saharan Africa (N=129)
Hit – Headcount (2$) 0.708 0.202 0.018 0.985
Git – Gini coefficient 0.453 0.087 0.289 0.743
y¯it – Mean income or expenditure 67.62 54.04 14.93 465.80
Notes: Mean income or expenditure in $ per month. 809 observations, 124 countries in total,
unbalanced sample from 1981 to 2010.
List B-1 – Included countries (number of surveys)
Albania (5), Algeria (2), Angola (2), Argentina (21), Armenia (11), Azerbaijan (3), Bangladesh (8),
Belarus (14), Belize (7), Benin (1), Bhutan (2), Bolivia, Plurinational State of (11), Bosnia and
Herzegovina (3), Botswana (2), Brazil (26), Bulgaria (7), Burkina Faso (4), Burundi (3), Cambodia (5),
Cameroon (3), Cape Verde (1), Central African Rep. (3), Chad (1), Chile (10), China (16), Colombia
(14), Comoros (1), Congo, Dem. Rep. of (1), Congo, Rep. of (1), Costa Rica (23), Cote D’Ivoire
(9), Croatia (7), Czech Rep. (2), Djibouti (1), Dominican Rep. (16), Ecuador (12), Egypt (5), El
Salvador (14), Estonia (9), Ethiopia (4), Fiji (2), Gabon (1), Gambia (2), Georgia (14), Ghana (5),
Guatemala (8), Guinea (4), Guinea-Bissau (2), Guyana (2), Haiti (1), Honduras (20), Hungary (10),
India (5), Indonesia (13), Iran, Islamic Rep. of (5), Iraq (1), Jamaica (7), Jordan (7), Kazakhstan
(11), Kenya (4), Kyrgyzstan (10), Lao People’s Dem. Rep. (4), Latvia (11), Lesotho (4), Liberia
(1), Lithuania (9), Macedonia, Rep. of (10), Madagascar (6), Malawi (3), Malaysia (9), Maldives
(2), Mali (4), Mauritania (6), Mexico (11), Micronesia, Federated States of (1), Moldova, Rep. of
(15), Montenegro (4), Morocco (5), Mozambique (3), Namibia (2), Nepal (4), Nicaragua (4), Niger
(4), Nigeria (5), Pakistan (8), Palestinian Territory, Occupied (2), Panama (13), Papua New Guinea
(1), Paraguay (14), Peru (16), Philippines (9), Poland (18), Romania (15), Russian Federation (13),
Rwanda (3), Saint Lucia (1), Sao Tome and Principe (1), Senegal (4), Serbia (9), Seychelles (1),
Sierra Leone (1), Slovakia (7), Slovenia (6), South Africa (5), Sri Lanka (6), Sudan (1), Suriname (1),
Swaziland (3), Syrian Arab Rep. (1), Tajikistan (5), Tanzania, United Rep. of (3), Thailand (14),
Timor-Leste (2), Togo (1), Trinidad and Tobago (2), Tunisia (6), Turkey (11), Turkmenistan (3), Uganda
(7), Ukraine (13), Uruguay (7), Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. of (13), Vietnam (6), Yemen (2), Zambia (7).
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Figure B-3 – Partial regression plot – first stage
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Notes: The figure plots two residual series, so that the plotted slope is identical to the slope of
lnPCEPit in the first stage. On the x-axis:
˜lnPCEPit = lnPCEPit − x′1itβˆ1 −
∑T
r=1 δTi,rϕˆ1r −
∑T
r=1 δTi,rx¯
′
iθˆ1r. On the y-axis:
l˜n y¯it = ln y¯it − x′1itβˆ1 −
∑T
r=1 δTi,rϕˆ1r −
∑T
r=1 δTi,rx¯
′
iθˆ1r. In both cases, x
′
1it includes only the log
of Gini but x¯′i contains the time averages of lnGit and lnPCE
P
it . Both regressions also contain
survey type and time dummies, as well as their time averages.
Figure B-4 – Inequality changes and income growth, 1981–2010
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Table B-2 – Linear models – Dependent variable: lnHit, $2 a day
OLS Two-Step GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Within Differences Differences Differences Differences Differences
R+C ’97 R+C ’97 Bourg. ’03 R+C ’97 Bourg. ’03 K+V ’07
∆ ln y¯it -1.895 -0.268 -2.028 2.046 -0.362
(0.170) (0.617) (0.271) (1.043) (3.216)
∆ ln y¯it × lnGi,t−1 1.108 3.445 2.097
(0.671) (1.192) (2.315)
∆ ln y¯it × ln(y¯i,t−1/z) -0.552 -0.995 -0.517
(0.179) (0.258) (0.785)
∆ lnGit 2.336 -0.527 1.664 1.257 -8.222
(0.311) (1.449) (1.008) (4.127) (11.185)
∆ lnGit × lnGi,t−1 -1.769 -1.416 -8.164
(1.586) (3.929) (8.296)
∆ lnGit×ln(y¯i,t−1/z) 1.261 -0.315 -1.382
(0.427) (1.172) (1.996)
ln y¯it -2.114
(0.204)
lnGit 3.024
(0.409)
lnGi,t−1 -0.129
(0.134)
ln(y¯i,t−1/z) -0.023
¯ˆεHy¯ -2.114 -1.895 -1.755 -2.028 -1.905 -2.684
¯ˆεHG 3.024 2.336 2.201 1.664 2.206 -2.345
N × T¯ 648 648 648 641 641 641
N 104 104 104 102 102 102
Hansen’s J (p-val.) – – – 0.0418 0.579 0.639
Notes: All standard errors are robust to clustering at the country-level. The GMM results are
estimated using two-step efficient GMM. Column (4) uses as instruments ∆PCEit, PCEi,t−1,
ln y¯i,t−1 and lnGi,t−1. Column (5) uses as instruments ∆PCEit, PCEi,t−1, ∆PCEit × lnGi,t−1,
∆PCEit × ln(y¯i,t−1/z), ln y¯i,t−1, ln y¯i,t−1 × lnGi,t−1, ln y¯i,t−1 × ln(y¯i,t−1/z), lnGi,t−1 and
lnGi,t−1 × lnGi,t−1. Column (6) uses the same instruments as column (5) but ln y¯i,t−1 and
lnGi,t−1 instrument for themselves. All models include a constant (not shown) and column (1)
includes a time trend (not shown). Columns (2) and (4) are similar to Ravallion and Chen (1997)
but we update their approach by also including the Gini as in Adams (2004), columns (3) and (5)
are similar to the “improved standard model 2” in Bourguignon (2003), and column (6) is in the
spirit of the preferred specification in Kalwij and Verschoor (2007). The latter also use the
annualized log difference of the population (∆ ln popit) as an instrument and rely on real GDP per
capita instead of real per capita consumption. A first-stage F -test shows that ∆ ln popit is an
extremely weak instrument. Kalwij and Verschoor (2007) also use interactions of lagged inequality
and lagged income with regional dummies as instruments. However, first stage diagnostics suggest
a weak IV problem (the F -stat with regional dummy interactions is always lower than without)
and thus we opt for a simpler instrument set. Further, in column (5) and equation (5) we do not
include the lagged levels of income and inequality. Column (6) includes them for comparison with
Kalwij and Verschoor (2007).
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Table B-3 – Predicted regional income semi-elasticities, preferred specification, $2 a day
Time period
1981–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
East Asia and Pacific -0.568 -0.573 -0.585 -0.583 -0.552
(0.034) (0.036) (0.046) (0.042) (0.051)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -0.031 -0.214 -0.260 -0.225 -0.134
(0.008) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010)
Latin America and Caribbean -0.374 -0.348 -0.334 -0.355 -0.194
(0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.013)
Middle East and North Africa -0.405 -0.422 -0.447 -0.463 -0.313
(0.034) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024)
South Asia -0.418 -0.458 -0.526 -0.572 -0.585
(0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.036) (0.044)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.532 -0.354 -0.353 -0.440 -0.459
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Notes: Standard errors obtained via a panel bootstrap using 999 replications. The predicted
semi-elasticities are based on estimated APEs at each region/time-period mean of ln y¯it and lnGit.
Table B-4 – Predicted regional Gini semi-elasticities, preferred specification, $2 a day
Time period
1981–1989 1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2004 2005–2010
East Asia and Pacific 0.419 0.423 0.432 0.431 0.408
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.054) (0.053)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.023 0.158 0.192 0.166 0.099
(0.007) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.012)
Latin America and Caribbean 0.276 0.257 0.247 0.262 0.143
(0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.029)
Middle East and North Africa 0.299 0.311 0.330 0.342 0.231
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.025)
South Asia 0.309 0.338 0.389 0.423 0.432
(0.056) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.393 0.261 0.261 0.325 0.339
(0.050) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
Notes: Standard errors obtained via a panel bootstrap using 999 replications. The predicted
semi-elasticities are based on estimated APEs at each region/time-period mean of ln y¯it and lnGit.
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Table B-5 – Growth in personal consumption expenditures per capita (in %)
Region Last 5 years Last 10 years Last 15 years Last 20 years
East Asia and Pacific 6.843 5.962 5.647 5.967
(1.041) (0.782) (0.837) (0.757)
Europe and Central Asia 4.532 6.033 4.793 2.856
(1.039) (1.063) (0.496) (0.423)
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.364 2.399 2.222 2.267
(0.746) (0.303) (0.172) (0.151)
Middle East and North Africa 2.705 3.778 2.911 2.499
(0.634) (0.560) (0.370) (0.349)
South Asia 5.563 4.684 4.123 3.636
(0.865) (0.556) (0.537) (0.438)
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.710 2.765 2.338 1.742
(1.599) (0.682) (0.577) (0.414)
N × T¯ 615 1222 1795 2332
N 123 123 123 123
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional means are population weighted.
Only the third column is relevant for the projections.
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Table B-6 – Fractional probit models (QMLE) – Dependent variable: Hit, $2 a day
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutions Human Capital Credit Trade
Hit APEs Hit APEs Hit APEs Hit APEs
ln y¯it -0.888 -0.285 -0.878 -0.284 -0.950 -0.289 -0.708 -0.302
(0.050) (0.012) (0.060) (0.011) (0.036) (0.009) (0.032) (0.012)
lnGit 0.779 0.250 0.805 0.261 0.765 0.233 0.581 0.248
(0.107) (0.028) (0.104) (0.027) (0.102) (0.027) (0.097) (0.033)
Executive Constraints 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
Year of Schooling -0.002 -0.001
(0.017) (0.006)
Private Credit / GDP -0.007 -0.002
(0.040) (0.012)
Trade Openness 0.005 0.002
(0.017) (0.007)
Scale factor 0.321 0.324 0.304 0.426
N × T¯ 678 705 697 385
N 85 87 93 81
AIC 894.8 914.1 887.6 552.5
lnL -276.4 -286.1 -282.8 -163.2√
MSE 0.0203 0.0211 0.0201 0.0233
Notes: The estimation samples are smaller due to less data coverage and all observations with
Ti = 1 are not used in estimation. All models include time averages (CRE), time dummies, survey
dummies, panel size dummies and interactions between the panel size dummies and the time
averages (CRE). The time averages are recomputed for each sample size. The coefficients of the
time average of the survey dummies and time effects are constrained to be equal across the panel
sizes. The variance equation depends on the panel size. The standard errors of the coefficients are
robust to clustering at the country level and the standard errors of the APEs are computed via the
delta method. Data on Executive Constraints is from the Polity IV database. Human capital is
measured as Total Years of Schooling from Barro and Lee (2013). We linearly interpolate the
quinquennial data to an annual series. Financial development measured as Private Credit / GDP
is from Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2010). De jure Trade Openness is the binary measure
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2008).
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Table B-7 – Fractional probit models (QMLE) – Dependent variable: Hit, $1.25 a day
(1) (2) (3)
Regular Unbalanced Unbalanced + Two-Step
Hit APEs Hit APEs Hit APEs
ln y¯it -1.212 -0.216 -0.668 -0.218 -0.800 -0.263
(0.056) (0.010) (0.038) (0.008) (0.180) (0.034)
lnGit 1.238 0.221 0.726 0.237 0.714 0.235
(0.121) (0.022) (0.074) (0.020) (0.180) (0.032)
νˆit 0.104
(0.104)
CRE (Corr. Rand. Effects) Yes Yes Yes
Survey type dummies Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Panel size dummies No Yes Yes
Panel size dummies × CRE No Yes Yes
Variance equation No Yes Yes
Scale factor 0.179 0.326 0.329
N × T¯ 768 768 754
N 103 103 102
pseudo R2 0.988 0.995 0.995
lnL -172.4 -244.7 -243.7√
MSE 0.0339 0.0214 0.0220
Notes: The $1.25 a day sample is smaller as for 20 observation we only have data at the $2 a day
line. 21 observations with Ti = 1 are not used in estimation. In columns (1) and (2), the standard
errors of the coefficients are robust to clustering at the country level and the standard errors of the
APEs are computed via the delta method. We include the time averages of the survey type and
time dummies in columns (2) and (3), but constrain their coefficients to be equal across the panel
sizes. The standard errors of the coefficients and the APEs in model (3) account for the first stage
estimation step with a panel bootstrap using 999 bootstrap replications. The linear projection in
the first stage uses lnPCEPit as an instrument for ln y¯it. The first-stage cluster-robust F-statistic
in column (3) is 24.40. Column (3) also excludes West Bank and Gaza entirely (2 observations)
and 12 observations from ECA countries pre-1990 for lack of PCE data.
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Table B-8 – Poverty projections (Hˆit × 100), preferred specification, $1.25 a day
2010 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Official Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
East Asia & Pacific 12.48 9.63 5.09 2.76 1.60 1.00
Europe & Central Asia 0.66 0.74 0.44 0.27 0.16 0.10
Latin America & the Caribbean 5.53 5.59 4.84 4.22 3.70 3.26
Middle East & North Africa 2.41 3.43 2.48 1.82 1.37 1.06
South Asia 31.03 33.81 23.89 16.09 10.53 6.89
Sub-Saharan Africa 48.47 46.87 42.95 39.84 37.20 34.86
World Total 20.63 20.44 15.82 12.66 10.58 9.27
Notes: Regional aggregates are based on the World Bank classification of low and middle income
countries in 1990. High income countries in 1990 are assumed to have no poor. The projections are
for 123 countries. West Bank and Gaza is excluded as we lack both PCE and population data.
Figure B-5 – Predicted regional poverty, $1.25 a day, 2010 to 2030
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Chapter 6
Poor trends
The pace of poverty reduction after the Millennium
Development Agenda∗
Abstract
This chapter reviews the origins of the dollar-a-day poverty line, discusses
historical poverty and inequality trends, and forecasts poverty rates until 2030
using a new fractional response approach. Three findings stand out. First,
global poverty reduction since 1981 has been rapid but regional trends are
heterogeneous. Second, the pace of poverty reduction at $1.25 a day will
slow down. Our optimistic scenarios suggest a poverty rate of 8-9% in 2030,
far short of the World Bank’s new 3% target. Third, rapid progress can be
maintained at $2 a day, with an additional one billion people crossing that
line by 2030.
Keywords: poverty, inequality, consumption growth
JEL Classification: I32, O10, O15
∗This chapter is based on Bluhm, R., de Crombrugghe, D., and A. Szirmai. 2013. Poor trends
- The pace of poverty reduction after the Millennium Development Agenda, MERIT Working Papers
006, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and
Technology (MERIT).
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1 Introduction
“We are at an auspicious moment in history, when the successes of past decades and an
increasingly favorable economic outlook combine to give developing countries a chance, for
the first time ever, to end extreme poverty within a generation” (Jim Yong Kim, World
Bank President, speaking at Georgetown University, April 3, 2013)
Only 13 years after the Millennium Summit in September 2000 at which world leaders
agreed on halving the 1990 global poverty rate at $1.25 a day by 2015, the end of
extreme poverty seems to be in sight. Recent estimates suggest that the first Millennium
Development Goal (MDG) was already reached in 2010 and about 700 million people
were lifted out of poverty. In 2013, the World Bank declared a new organizational goal of
ending extreme poverty by 2030, that is, reducing the $1.25 a day poverty rate to 3% by
2030. The last two decades clearly ushered in unprecedented success, but is 2030 really
likely to mark the end of extreme poverty? Our main contribution is to demonstrate that
this is unlikely.
In this chapter, we review the origins of the ‘dollar-a-day’ poverty line, discuss progress
over the last three decades, and forecast $1.25 and $2 a day poverty rates until 2030. It
is well-known that regional trends in poverty alleviation are very heterogeneous. In spite
of rising inequality, rapid growth in China was the driving force behind global progress
over the last two decades and accounts for more than three quarters of the reduction in
the number of people living below $1.25 a day. However, most of the poverty reduction
potential coming from China is now exhausted. Poverty reduction in the developing world
outside China has been considerably slower, although economic growth has accelerated
significantly since 2000. In 2010, three-fourths of the extremely poor lived in Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, as opposed to approximately 40% in 1981. This changing regional
composition of world poverty has important ramifications for future trends in poverty
reduction. The number of inhabitants of historically fast growing countries make up less
and less of the global poor.
Building on a new method for estimating poverty elasticities and predicting poverty
headcount ratios developed in Chapter 5, we show that the pace of poverty reduction at
$1.25 a day is likely to slow down significantly after 2015. Extreme poverty barely falls
below 8% in the most optimistic scenario. Ravallion (2013) first suggested the 3% target
relying on the assumption that consumption in developing countries would continue to
grow at the average post-2000 trend, or 4.5% per year. We find this ‘equal-growth’
assumption too optimistic. Poverty tends to be higher in countries with rapid population
growth and lower than average consumption growth. None of our scenarios predicts a
poverty rate near 3% once country-specific trends from 2000 to 2010 are used. However,
the $2 a day poverty rate may fall below 20% in 2030, while a slowdown happens only
late during the forecast period or not at all. A distinct advantage of our approach is that
it is computationally inexpensive. Hence, it can easily be used for benchmarking progress
as new data become available.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some of the controversies
surrounding the setting and updating of international poverty lines. Section 3 is a data-
driven review of global poverty and inequality trends with a particular focus on China,
India, Brazil and Nigeria. Section 4 presents projections of global and regional poverty
rates until 2030 at the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines using different growth and
inequality scenarios. Section 5 concludes and offers some policy recommendations.
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2 Drawing the line: international poverty lines
The dollar-a-day poverty line was first defined in a background paper to the 1990 World
Development Report (in 1985 PPPs), then updated to $1.08 (in 1993 PPPs) in 2000, and
again updated to $1.25 (in 2005 PPPs) in 2008. While the first update went by almost
unnoticed, the most recent change has sparked a controversy. Redefining extreme poverty
as living below $1.25 a day raised the global poverty headcount by about 10 percentage
points and reclassified approximately 450 million people as extremely poor (Chen and
Ravallion, 2010). In this section, we briefly review the origins of the $1 a day measure
and discuss shortcomings of the current updating procedure.
The problem of setting a global poverty line is far from trivial. Even if we could
use a ‘basic needs’ or calorie-intake approach to devise a minimum consumption bundle
for the entire world, it is inherently difficult to apply any such bundle in international
comparisons. Subsistence needs, relative prices, and purchasing power vary across
countries and over time. Faced with these problems, Ravallion, Datt, and van de Walle
(1991, henceforth RDV) suggested an original solution. Since many national poverty
lines are set using a basic needs or calorie-intake method, there should be a universal
lower bound among the absolute poverty lines which may be recovered from the data.
Converting 33 national poverty lines and the corresponding consumption levels from the
1970s and 1980s into international dollars, RDV showed that a poverty line of about $31
per month ($1.02 a day, in 1985 prices) was shared by the six poorest countries in their
sample, while those of two other countries came close. They argued that a rounded-off
poverty line of $1 a day was a sensible threshold for measuring global poverty, since any
one poverty line is likely to be estimated with error and the non-food allowance included
in the subsistence basket varies across countries. RDV also estimated a lower line of $23
per month (about 76 cents a day) for the poorest country in their sample. This lower line
was close to India’s poverty line at the time and became widely used as the international
poverty line during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Ahluwalia, Carter, and Chenery, 1979).
Setting the poverty line in international prices has the advantage that domestic
inflation is typically taken into account when average incomes or expenditures from
surveys are converted into (base year) international dollars, so that the line itself does
not have to be explicitly updated annually. However, purchasing power parities (PPPs)
change over time as countries grow richer (due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect). In
addition, the quality of PPP estimates has been improving substantially with each
round of the International Comparison Program (ICP), so that updates are needed
approximately every decade. When the 1993 ICP data became available, Chen and
Ravallion (2001) revised the $1 a day line to $1.08 in 1993 prices. Using the same data
as in the original study, they found that $1.08 a day was the median poverty line of the
ten poorest countries. However, when the 2005 ICP was completed, instead of converting
the old poverty line to 2005 prices, new data were collected and the poverty line was
redrawn. Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2009, henceforth RCS) compiled a data set
of 74 national poverty lines to update the original analysis. They found that national
poverty lines do not rise with per capita consumption until a certain turning point (about
$60 per month) but increase strongly thereafter (left panel, Figure 1). RCS set the global
line as the average poverty line of the 15 countries below this threshold, or $1.25 a day
in 2005 prices.
Deaton (2010), as well as Deaton and Dupriez (2011), take issue with this approach.
They argue that updating the international poverty line based on new data leads to
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“graduation effects” when countries move out of the reference group. They illustrate their
case using India and Guinea Bissau as examples. India was part of the initial reference
group in RDV, and both countries appear in RCS’s more recent reference group. India
has a relatively low poverty line ($0.90 a day in 2005 prices) and a population of more
than a billion people, whereas Guinea Bissau has a higher poverty line ($1.51 a day in
2005 prices) and is home to less than 1.5 million people. As average consumption in
India grew considerably until 2000, it crossed the $60 threshold and is no longer part
of the reference group. Even though the average Indian has become richer, both the
international poverty line and the global poverty headcount increased as a result of India
dropping out of the average. With Guinea Bissau the case is reversed. Its poverty line
is currently part of the average. A move out of the reference group would entail a fall in
the global poverty line and a reduction in global poverty that is many times greater than
the population of Guinea Bissau. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates this relationship.
The bold horizontal line marks the $60 per month threshold (labeled RCS’09).
Figure 1 – Poverty lines and consumption levels around 2000
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Notes: Authors’ calculations using the data reported in Ravallion et al. (2009) and following the
illustration of Deaton (2010). The non-linear trends are estimated using a (weighted) local linear
smoother with bandwidth 0.8.
A related issue is that the ICP data are primarily designed for comparing living standards
of entire populations, not just poor people. The typical consumption basket of the poor,
and the associated price level, may be very different than the reference basket used for
computing PPPs.
To address both the graduation issue and the PPP issue, Deaton and Dupriez (2011)
propose using an alternative procedure. Linking consumption surveys to ICP data for the
50 poorest countries, they simultaneously estimate the poverty line and PPPs of those
near the poverty line (PPPs for the poor, or P4s). This yields lower poverty lines in
between $0.92 and $1.19 a day. However, the effect of the P4s on the global poverty
counts – at similar poverty lines – is relatively small. The resulting estimates of global
poverty are lower primarily due to the lower poverty lines and not due to differences in
relative prices.
Drawing the line: international poverty lines 151
To an extent, the Deaton-Dupriez criticism can be addressed within the RCS approach
by (1) weighting the national poverty lines by population sizes, and (2) extending the
reference group of “poorest” countries. The Deaton-Dupriez proposal, labeled DD’11
below, is to select the 50 poorest countries to constitute a fixed reference group. Clearly,
the threshold of 50 countries is arbitrary. A possible alternative is to replicate the RCS
approach but estimate the consumption gradient using population weights instead of
equal weights (right panel, Figure 1). This is the approach proposed here. Examining
the plot to find the point where the slope of consumption begins to be positive, we visually
identify a threshold of about 5 log dollars or $148.41 per month (C∗), which is just under
$5 a day. There are 39 countries below this line, suggesting an alternative reference group
consisting of those 39 countries. A population-weighted average of the national poverty
lines for this group implies a global poverty line of $1.06 a day whereas the simple average
is $1.46 a day (both in 2005 prices).
Table 1 – Estimates of the international poverty line (Z∗)
Consumption International Poverty Lines (in 2005 PPPs)
Estimation Equally-weighted Population-weighted
Sample ln(C∗) C∗ Z¯ Z∗ Q50(Z) Z¯ Z∗ N
RCS’09 4.09 60.00 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.17 1.17 15
Alternative 5.00 148.41 1.46 1.46 1.38 1.06 1.06 39
DD’11 5.53 251.59 1.76 1.26 1.51 1.12 1.00 50
Full sample 6.50 668.31 2.91 1.46 2.00 1.84 1.06 74
Notes: Authors’ calculations using the data reported in Ravallion et al. (2009). Z¯ is the
(unweighted or weighted) average poverty line. Q50(Z) is the (unweighted) median poverty line.
The regression based columns estimate the average level of the poverty line before the
consumption gradient turns positive. Following Ravallion et al. (2009), we obtain Z∗ from
Zi = Z
∗Ii + (α+ βCi)× (1− Ii), where Zi is the national poverty line expressed in 2005 PPPs, Z∗
is the mean poverty line for the reference group, Ci is average per capita consumption in 2005
PPPs, and Ii is one if Ci ≤ C∗ and zero otherwise; that is, it indicates whether the country is in the
reference group. This method imposes that the slope is zero until a monthly consumption level C∗.
Table 1 provides alternative estimates of the international poverty line using different
approaches, references groups and weights. We can fully reproduce the main findings of
RCS. The average poverty of the poorest 15 countries is $1.25 a day and the full sample
median is $2 a day. Three other results stand out. First, all estimates are above or equal
to $1 a day in 2005 prices. Second, population weights lead to universally lower estimates
of the poverty line. Third, the estimated poverty line is fairly sensitive to both the choice
of C∗ and the summary measure (mean, median, weighted or not). While this lends
some support to the notion that $1.25 is a relatively high upward revision, the choice of
method, cutoff and weights remains subjective. Moreover, updating the old $1.08 poverty
line in 1993 prices to $1.25 in 2005 prices implies a (global) inflation rate of about 1.2%
per year. Precisely this point leads Chen and Ravallion (2010) to argue that “as long as
it is agreed that $1 in 1993 international prices is worth more than $1 at 2005 prices,
the qualitative result that the new ICP round implies a higher global poverty count is
robust” (p. 1612). In the following section, we will consider the policy consequences of
using both $1.25 a day and the full-sample median of $2 a day as absolute poverty lines
(a common practice in the literature, e.g. see Chen and Ravallion, 2010).
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Counting the global poor involves several difficult methodological choices on top of
choosing an international poverty line that can have large effects on the estimated poverty
rates.1 The inherent difficulty of convincingly solving these issues led some to suggest
that the current approach should be abandoned (e.g Klasen, 2009; Reddy and Pogge,
2010). One alternative is to set national poverty lines in local currencies using the same
method in each country. While this approach tries to sidestep the issue of purchasing
power parity comparisons altogether, it would certainly raise new problems. Alas, a
considerable degree of indeterminacy regarding the level of extreme poverty in the world
seems unavoidable (but more is known about rates of change which we discuss in the
next section).
3 Taking stock: poverty reduction over the past
three decades
While the global Millennium Development Goal (MGD) of halving the $1.25 a day poverty
rate in 1990 by 2015 was reached in 2010 (Chen and Ravallion, 2013), progress has been
very uneven across regions. Most poverty reduction over the last three decades occurred
in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, in South Asia. Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, on
the contrary, has hardly budged and the continent as a whole will – most probably – fail
to meet the first MDG by 2015.
Figure 2 shows population-weighted time trends estimated for each region using the
nationally representative household surveys available in the World Bank’s PovcalNet
database (using consumption-based data where available). A pooled weighted least
squares regression of the poverty headcount ratio on time for all developing countries
reveals that the poverty headcount at the $1.25 a day line fell by an average 1.5 percentage
points per year (cluster t2 = -4.11). There is substantial regional heterogeneity. On
average, poverty fell by 2.21 percentage points annually in East Asia and Pacific (cluster
t = -10.08), by about 1 percentage point in South Asia (cluster t = -4.82), but only
by 0.02 percentage points in Sub-Saharan Africa (cluster t = -0.05). In the other three
developing regions progress has been slow but steady. In Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa the estimated slopes imply an
expected annual fall of 0.05 (cluster t = -1.91), 0.30 (cluster t = -5.76) and 0.14 (cluster
t = -2.40) percentage points, respectively. Using an alternative $2 a day poverty line, the
magnitudes and differences in speeds across regions remain broadly similar.3
An important question is whether consumption growth or redistribution is driving
the decline in poverty. Estimating the historical contributions of growth and changes in
distribution during the 1980s and 1990s, Kraay (2006) found that most poverty reduction
was due to income or consumption growth. Our analysis broadly corroborates this finding
1For example, it is not clear that the ICP 2005 provides an adequate picture of the consumption
patterns in the 1980s or 1990s. Another issue is the use of survey means versus national accounts means.
The use of national accounts typically leads to much lower poverty estimates. See Sala-i-Martin (2006),
Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin (2009), and, in particular, Dhongde and Minoiu (2013) for a comparison
of different methods.
2Throughout the text, “cluster t” denotes a cluster-robust t-statistic, with clusters defined by
countries.
3East Asia and Pacific (slope = -2.31, cluster t= -7.33), Europe and Central Asia (slope=-0.26,
cluster t=-2.33), Latin America and Caribbean (slope=-.55, cluster t = -5.74), South Asia (slope =
-0.72, cluster t= -4.92), and Sub-Saharan Africa (slope = -0.02, cluster t= -0.07).
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Figure 2 – Population-weighted poverty trends by region, 1981 to 2010, $1.25 a day
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on surveys from PovcalNet.
(although we do not explicitly estimate contributions). The population-weighted growth
rate of the survey means from 1981 to 2010 across all countries is a very robust 4% per
year (cluster t = 3.03). Over the same period, within-country inequality, as measure by
the Gini coefficient, actually increased slightly by about 0.7% per year (cluster t = 1.64).
This implies that, on average, changes in distribution may have in fact moderately slowed
the pace of poverty reduction. Poverty reduction over the last three decades has mostly
been due to income and consumption growth. However, both the high average growth
rate in the survey means and the apparent rise in within-country inequality are driven
by China. Excluding China, the survey means grew about 1.8% per year (cluster t =
2.45) and inequality barely moved (increased 0.047% per year, cluster t = 0.13). In other
words, poverty reduction in the developing world outside China has been steady but slow
and has (on average) not been helped by improvements in distribution.4
These findings are also in line with estimates of poverty at the $1.25 a day poverty
line reported by the World Bank (see Appendix Table A-1). Chen and Ravallion’s (2010)
estimates indicate rapid progress in China, little improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and moderate poverty reduction elsewhere. The poverty headcount ratio in Sub-Saharan
Africa only fell by about three percentage points over the entire period from 1981 to
2010, and actually exceeded its 1981 value for most of the period. Combining these
trends with population growth rates reveals the dire absence of a robust positive trend
in terms of the number of global poor outside of East Asia. While China has lifted an
astonishing 680 million people out of poverty between 1981 and 2010, the rest of the
world has only about 50 million fewer extremely poor people in 2010 than in 1981. This
4Excluding India in addition to China from the sample does not qualitatively alter this result.
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trend is due to persistently high poverty rates coupled with strong population growth in
Sub-Saharan Africa and India. This is most evident in Sub-Saharan Africa where the
number of extremely poor has roughly doubled over three decades (in spite of the slight
decrease in the headcount ratio). The rise of China from a poor to a middle income
country also implies that the relative composition of world poverty is changing rapidly.
In 1981 about 40% of the world’s extremely poor lived in Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia, by 2010 their share has risen to 75%.
A very intuitive approach to illustrating past progress (or lack thereof) is to
approximate the shape of the income or expenditure distribution at various points in
time and examine how the features of the distribution (esp. quantiles) shift over time.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the lower tail (up to $400) of the monthly income or expenditure
distribution for the most populous country of the four poorest regions – East Asia, South
Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa – in 1985, 1990, 2000 and 2010. The
vertical lines are the $1.25 and $2 a day poverty lines in terms of monthly consumption.
After lining up the survey data in time, we estimate the different density functions using
a log-normal approximation.5 While the assumption of log-normality has its weaknesses6,
it usually provides a useful first estimate of the shape of the income distribution. A key
advantage is that it only requires knowledge of the mean and Gini coefficient.
We can illustrate a few essential concepts with these graphs. The area under the
curve to the left of the poverty line gives the fraction of the population that is poor (the
poverty headcount ratio), while the spread of the distribution reflects inequality. The raw
difference between two such areas under the curve is the absolute change in the poverty
headcount ratio in percentage points and the relative difference gives the percent change
in the poverty headcount ratio. The sensitivity of poverty reduction to changes in income
or inequality is often measured in the form of elasticities or semi-elasticities. The income
elasticity of poverty is the percent change in poverty for a one percent increase in incomes,
and the income semi-elasticity of poverty is the percentage point difference in poverty
for a one percent increase in incomes. The inequality elasticity and semi-elasticity are
defined analogously. An attractive feature of the semi-elasticity is that it first increases
and then decreases again during the development process. It measures the pace of poverty
reduction in terms of the percentage of the population lifted out of poverty. Hence, it
is usually more informative for policy-makers and more useful than reporting relative
changes.7
Figure 3 visualizes the tremendous progress in reducing poverty rates in China over
the last three decades.8 As noted before, poverty in China at $1.25 a day fell rapidly
5We interpolate and extrapolate the data as follows. First, we project mean consumption forward and
backward using the corresponding growth rates of personal consumption expenditures from the national
accounts. Second, we linearly interpolate between the available Gini coefficients and extrapolate beyond
the first or last available measure by keeping inequality constant. The same data set (with all countries
from PovcalNet) is later used for computing the inequality indices in the developing world.
6Log-normality typically works better with consumption surveys than with income surveys (Lopez
and Serven, 2006), tends to underestimate the level of poverty (Dhongde and Minoiu, 2013), and
overstates the pace of poverty reduction (Bresson, 2009).
7In relatively rich countries with low percentages of people below the poverty line, elasticities can be
very misleading. Small reductions in the poverty headcount rate can manifest themselves as very high
elasticities. For a more detailed discussion of the properties of elasticities and semi-elasticities of poverty
see Bourguignon (2003), Klasen and Misselhorn (2008), and Chapter 5.
8The implied poverty rates for China correspond well with the official World Bank estimates. At the
$1.25 a day poverty line, our estimates imply a poverty rate of 60.56% in 1985, 56.92% in 1990, 31.97%
in 2000 and 9.75% in 2010.
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Figure 3 – Estimates of the expenditure distribution: China and India, 1985–2010
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Notes: Author’s calculations. China’s expenditure distribution is estimated based on a weighted
mean and a rural-urban ln-mixture for the Gini coefficient. China’s surveys in PovcalNet are
consumption-based after 1987 and income-based before.
over the entire period. The biggest gains occurred early on, between 1985 and 2000,
when the peak of the distribution was close to the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines. By 2010,
the peak of the distribution has moved considerably to the right of both poverty lines
and the overall spread has widened. A great many Chinese are now considered part of
a developing country ‘middle class’ (if defined between $2 and $13 per day).9 However,
this also implies that the poverty reduction potential from China is largely exhausted.
The income semi-elasticity of the poverty headcount is far beyond its peak and steadily
approaching zero. In addition, inequality has increased remarkably over the same period.
In 1985, the Gini coefficient was 0.28 and by 2010 it has risen to 0.44.
In India, on the contrary, there remains much greater potential for poverty reduction
in the medium-term future. While the mode of the income distribution was near the
$1.25 line around 1985 and 1990, the peak of the distribution in 2000 and 2010 is located
between the two poverty lines. The process of “bunching up” in front of $2 a day observed
by Chen and Ravallion (2010) implies that, in the medium-term future, the pace of
poverty reduction in India (defined as the absolute change in the headcount) will be
particularly fast at the $2 a day line and continue at a fast but decelerating pace at the
$1.25 line. Put differently, India’s income semi-elasticity around 2010 is very high and
a moderate rate of growth will immediately have a large (but decreasing) effect on the
poverty headcount ratio at both thresholds.
Figure 4 illustrates two very different cases. The left panel shows that from 1985 to
1990 poverty reduction in Brazil was very slow, with some progress at the $2 a day line
but a nearly unchanged poverty rate at the $1.25 line. Yet, on average, Brazilians were
already considerably better-off in the 1990s than their Chinese or Indian counterparts in
9Ravallion (2010) defines the size of the ‘middle class’ by developing country standards as the
proportion of the population living on at least $2 per day but less than $13 per day, where the upper
bound is the poverty line in the United States. Naturally, this is one of many possible definitions.
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Figure 4 – Estimates of the expenditure distribution: Brazil and Nigeria, 1985– 2010
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Brazil’s distribution is based on incomes instead of expenditures.
The 2010 data for Nigeria was revised in late 2014 (not incorporated here).
2010. After 1990, the pace of poverty reduction accelerates and by 2010 only 4.92% of the
population were below the $1.25 a day poverty line.10 Lifting the remaining people out
of poverty will require sustained economic growth, as both the income and distribution
semi-elasticities of poverty in Latin America as a whole are rather low (see Chapter 5).
With a Gini of 0.56 in 1985 income inequality was initially very high in Brazil, peaked at
0.61 in 2000 and then fell again to 0.55 by 2010, thus positively contributing to poverty
reduction after 2000. The right panel illustrates that poverty in Nigeria was considerably
higher in 2000 or 2010 than in 1985. Nigeria’s plight is characteristic for most of Sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, as real consumption on the subcontinent was
declining at a pace of about 0.82% per year. Only after 2000 did expenditures recover
and the poverty headcount ratio began to decline. Yet even by 2010, the peak of the
expenditure distribution is still noticeably to the left of the poverty line and the implied
poverty rate at $1.25 a day is 65.96%.11 In addition, inequality in Nigeria increases over
the observed period, starting from a Gini of 0.39 in 1985 to 0.49 in 2010.
Taken together, these four distributions exemplify the changing composition of global
poverty and broadly represent the trends in their respective regions. Over the last
three decades, most poverty reduction occurred in East Asia where consumption growth
was fastest, some poverty reduction occurred in India where real consumption growth
was steady, and little poverty reduction occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa where real
consumption growth was slow and volatile. This suggests that without significantly faster
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the past, possibly coupled with improvements in the
income or expenditure distribution, the global pace of poverty reduction will inevitably
slow down in the near future.
Another essential aspect of poverty analysis is studying the evolution of inequality.
In this part, we focus only on inequality among citizens of developing countries, as
10The World Bank estimated a poverty rate of 5.38% at $1.25 a day for Brazil in 2010.
11The World Bank estimated a poverty rate of 67.98% at $1.25 a day for Nigeria in 2010.
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our interest is the changing relative position of people in the developing world rather
than their position vis-a`-vis rich countries. Interestingly, many of the global trends are
also evident even when we restrict our attention to this truncated distribution. We
compute three measures of inequality by applying Young’s (2011) mixture of log-normal
distributions approach to the PovcalNet data. ‘Overall inequality’ is the Gini coefficient
for citizens of developing countries regardless of their country of residency. ‘Within
inequality’ is a population-weighted summary measure of inequality within each country.
Last, ‘between inequality’ is the population-weighted Gini coefficient of average incomes
among all developing countries. In other words, the first measure encompasses both
the within-country and between-country components that make up overall inequality in
the developing world. Naturally, global inequality – including the citizens of developed
countries – is typically estimated to be considerably higher. Recent estimates of the global
Gini suggest that it is around 0.65-0.70, and may be even higher if underreporting of top-
incomes is taken into account (e.g. see Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin, 2009; Milanovic,
2012; Chotikapanich, Griffiths, Rao, and Valencia, 2012; Lakner and Milanovic, 2013).
Table 2 – Inequality in the developing world, 1980–2010
Gini coefficient
Year Overall Within Between
Mean
Consumption
Population N
1980 0.596 0.356 0.486 73.29 2907.8 83
1985 0.555 0.353 0.421 79.05 3223.2 86
1990 0.578 0.367 0.449 95.98 4049.3 104
1995 0.559 0.385 0.411 98.41 4555.2 114
2000 0.537 0.395 0.374 102.45 4931.4 121
2005 0.535 0.399 0.372 120.34 5285.6 123
2010 0.554 0.404 0.399 150.72 5625.1 123
∆ 1980-2010 (in %) -7.19 13.63 -17.82 – – –
∆ 1990-2010 (in %) -4.17 10.10 -11.08 – – –
∆ 2000-2010 (in %) 3.07 2.20 6.64 – – –
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The sample size varies over the years. A total of 124 countries are
recorded in PovcalNet but we lack PCE data for West Bank and Gaza. The results are very
similar if we constrain the developing world to consist of the 104 countries from which we have
(interpolated) data from 1990 onwards. Due to the lower coverage, the results for the 1980s should
be interpreted with caution. For details on the ln-mixture calculations refer to Young (2011).
Table 2 reveals some interesting trends. Overall inequality in the developing world has
been falling between 1990 and 2005, but it exhibits an increase in 2010. At the same
time, within-country inequality has been rising steadily since the mid-1980s. Between-
country inequality fell over most of the period but also shows a slight increase between
2005 and 2010. If we exclude China from the computations given that its weight is
very high, then these trends are considerably muted or even non-existent.12 Hence, two
12Overall inequality is estimated as 58.33 in 1990 and 58.36 in 2010, within-country inequality is
estimated as 38.36 in 1990 and 39.12 in 2010, and between-country inequality is estimated as 45.04 in
1990 and 45.44 in 2010. Removing India in addition to China has little effect on the trends in the
inequality measures.
158 Chapter 6. Poor trends
developments drive the overall change. First, inequality of incomes within China has been
increasing significantly and, second, its relative position among developing countries has
been changing rapidly. Rising mean incomes in China from the 1980s onwards initially
implied a reduction of between-country inequality as the average citizen in China was
moving from the bottom towards the middle of the developing country ranks, but they
now put upward pressure on overall inequality as incomes in China continue to grow and
the distance from incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa increases.13
4 Going forward: poverty projections until 2030
As the expiration date of the MDGs is approaching quickly, new goals will have to be
selected. Picking from among a wide range of possible benchmarks invariably involves
formulating expectations towards a fundamentally uncertain future. Thus, it becomes
important to ask: what can the current data and methods tell us about the prospects
for poverty alleviation over the next two decades? The list of policy-relevant questions is
long. What level of poverty do we expect to prevail in 2030? Will it be feasible to truly
eradicate extreme poverty by 2030? Or, how quickly do we expect poverty rates under
the $2 a day poverty line to decrease? Here, we provide both a glimpse into several likely
futures and some potential answers to these questions.
This section draws heavily on Chapter 5, where we develop a ‘fractional response
approach’ for estimating income and inequality (semi-) elasticities of poverty. Among
other things, we that this new method can be used to easily forecast global poverty rates
using only two variables (the survey mean and the Gini coefficient). A key advantage of
this approach over, say, linear trend extrapolations, is that it builds in the non-linearity
of the poverty-income-inequality relationship. Neither the income or inequality elasticity
nor the income or inequality semi-elasticity is assumed to be constant. The method
accounts for the fact that income growth will have an increasing effect in very poor
countries, where the mass of the distribution is to the left of the poverty line, and less
and less of an effect in rich countries, where the mass of the distribution is far to the
right of the poverty line.14 Similarly, the effect of changes in distribution will indirectly
depend on the prevailing levels of both income and inequality.
We are of course not the first to present poverty projections over the next two decades.
Ravallion (2013), for example, outlines an aspirational scenario where an additional billion
people are lifted out of extreme poverty by 2025-2030. Karver, Kenny, and Sumner (2012)
discuss the future of the MDGs more generally and simulate poverty rates at the $1.25
and $2 a day poverty lines for 2030.15 Yet there are some important conceptual and
13This trend is corroborated by the literature on global inequality. According to Lakner and Milanovic
(2013), average incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa were $742 in 1988 and only $762 in 2008 (in 2005 PPPs),
while Chinese incomes increased by 228.9% and no longer make up a large part of the lower tail of the
global income distribution. They also show that inequality within China has risen between 1988 and
2008.
14The inability to account for countries that have relatively high incomes and zero poverty at some
point in time (typically the beginning or end of a spell) is a key weakness of studies investigating poverty
elasticities.
15Karver et al. (2012) allow for country-specific growth rates but use older data (their PovcalNet
reference year is 2008) and disregard the difference between GDP per capita growth and growth of the
survey mean. This leads them to overestimate the speed of poverty reduction relative to our forecasts.
A recent study by Chandy, Ledlie, and Penciakova (2013) echoes some of our results. They use GDP per
capita rather than consumption expenditure data for most of the period, but apply a conversion factor,
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methodological differences between our approach and these studies. First, the assumption
that the developing world will continue growing at the accelerated 2000 to 2010 pace
for another twenty years (our optimistic scenario) is questionable. There is a well-
known instability of growth rates across decades that should not be ignored (Easterly
et al., 1993), especially since the high average growth rates in the developing world were
driven by rapid growth in China. A more conservative assumption is that countries
will grow at rates much closer to their individual long-run growth path. Second, the
changing composition of the countries contributing to global poverty matters a lot for
the expected speed of global poverty reduction. Unless there is a persistent acceleration
of consumption growth in Sub-Saharan Africa on top of the post-2000 growth rates and
sustained consumption growth in India, we can show that the pace of poverty reduction at
the $1.25 line is likely to experience a pronounced slowdown in all of our forecast scenarios
(defined below). Third, pro-poor growth can potentially make a sizable difference in the
expected poverty rates, while a rise in within-country inequality will hasten the arrival
of the slowdown. Fourth, our method approximates the ‘official’ PovcalNet results at a
fraction of the computational cost, so that a variety of scenarios can be easily estimated
(and frequently updated with the arrival of new data).
We define three different constant growth scenarios on the basis of the historical
personal consumption expenditure (PCE) growth rates from the national accounts.16 An
‘optimistic’ scenario uses the average PCE growth rate of each country from 2000-2010,
during which period growth rates were significantly higher than before 2000. A ‘moderate’
growth scenario uses the average PCE growth rate of each country from 1980 to 2010
– the long run average over the entire data set. Finally, a ‘pessimistic’ growth scenario
uses the 1980 to 2000 average PCE growth rates. The latter scenario assumes that mean
consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa is shrinking at a rate of about 0.82% per year.17
Table A-2 in the Appendix reports the population-weighted average regional growth rates
over several different periods to illustrate the implied regional income dynamics.
For each growth scenario, we also simulate three different inequality patterns. ‘Pro-
poor growth’ implies an annual decline in the Gini coefficient of approximately -0.5%,
‘distribution-neutral growth’ keeps inequality constant at the level prevailing in 2010,
and ‘pro-rich growth’ implies an increase in the Gini coefficient of approximately 0.5%
per year.18 As an illustration, if a country’s Gini coefficient is 0.40 in 2010 and we apply
the pro-poor pattern, then by 2030 we project a Gini coefficient of about 0.36. If we
apply the pro-rich pattern, then the Gini coefficient is about 0.44 in 2030. Changes of
this magnitude are in line with the population-weighted regional trends obtained from
the surveys.
We forecast the poverty rates until 2030 as follows. First, we estimate the model
outlined in Chapter 5 for the $1.25 a day poverty line using all nationally-representative
surveys recorded in PovcalNet over the period from 1981 to 2010. Next, after lining up
all surveys in 2010, we apply each of the nine growth and distribution scenarios to project
the income and inequality data forward to 2030, country by country.19 Then, we predict
and report lower poverty estimates.
16The term ‘national accounts’ refers to data from the World Development Indicators or the Penn
World Table 7.1, whichever has more data over the 30 year horizon.
17Owing to the post-communist transition, consumption and incomes in Europe and Central Asia
were shrinking over the same period. However, given the small number of poor in 2010, the influence of
that region on the global poverty headcount in 2030 is minimal.
18All reported growth rates (in percent) are computed as log differences if not otherwise noted.
19To line up all surveys in 2010, we use the actually observed PCE growth rates from the national
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the poverty headcount ratios in five-year intervals over the period 2015 to 2030, country
by country. Finally, we calculate population-weighted regional poverty rates and apply
these to the projected total population in each region. For consistency with PovcalNet,
the population projections are also taken from the World Bank and the ‘developing world’
is defined as in 1990 – the countries targeted by the MDGs – no matter how high we
forecast the average level of consumption to be in 2030. Contrary to the World Bank’s
recent redefinition of the denominator, we still focus on the percent of poor population
in the developing world and not the entire world.
Figure 5 – Actual and projected poverty headcount ratios at $1.25 a day, 1981–2030
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Chapter 5 and survey data from PovcalNet. The solid black
line beyond 2010 refers to the moderate (distribution-neutral) growth scenario in Table 3, while
the solid grey lines represent the distribution-neutral variants of the optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios. The pro-poor and pro-rich variants are shown as grey dotted lines and are located above
or below a solid line.
Figure 5 plots the historical evolution of the poverty headcount from 1981 to 2010, a
linear trend fitted through the observed data and then extrapolated until 2030, and our
different scenarios. The linear trend serves as a reference for the non-linear projections.
Several points are noteworthy. First, only the linear extrapolation predicts a poverty
rate in the vicinity of zero by 2030. Regressing the global poverty rate at $1.25 a day
on time one obtains a slope of about one percentage point per year (see also Ravallion,
2013).20 As the global poverty rate was about 20.6% in 2010, the linear trend predicts
accounts to extrapolate the survey means from the latest available survey. In doing so, we keep inequality
constant at the last observed Gini coefficient. In 2010, the average year when the last survey was
conducted is 2006.7, so about 3 years prior to 2010. More than 40% of the last surveys were conducted
in 2009 or 2010.
20This differs from the 1.5 percentage points estimated in the previous section as the global poverty
rate is measured by lining up and weighting all surveys at reference years (three year intervals from
1981 onwards), whereas in the previous section we were using an unbalanced panel of unequally-spaced,
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that extreme poverty will have vanished by 2030. Second, all our projections show a
decelerating rate of poverty reduction. Even in the most optimistic scenario, the pace
of poverty reduction slows down. Most forecasts show a decelerating trend early on. In
the optimistic scenario the slowdown only becomes noticeable by about 2020. Third, all
scenarios but the optimistic pro-poor growth or optimistic distribution-neutral growth
scenarios imply a poverty rate higher than 10% in 2030 at the $1.25 a day line. The
optimistic pro-poor growth and distribution-neutral scenarios suggest a poverty rate in
2030 of 7.9% and 9.1%, respectively. In a nutshell, 2030 is not likely to mark the end of
extreme poverty, even under very optimistic assumptions. Our projections suggest that
the World Bank’s goal of 3% extreme poverty in 2030 is not likely to be reached.
Table 3 provides the corresponding regional and total poverty rates in 2030 including
the expected number of poor in the various scenarios. Our moderate growth estimate
suggests a global poverty rate of 13.2% in 2030, implying about 950 million poor versus 1.2
billion poor people in 2010. The pace of poverty reduction will have slowed significantly
both in terms of relative changes and in terms of numbers of poor people. In this scenario,
about 70% of the world’s poor live in Sub-Saharan Africa and about 23% in South Asia
by 2030. In contrast, the (distribution-neutral) optimistic result suggests a poverty rate
of 9.11%, with about 655 million people remaining extremely poor. About 76% percent
live in Sub-Saharan Africa and about 17% in South Asia. The pessimistic case suggests
next to no progress at all. Given an unchanged distribution, the poverty headcount ratio
is estimated at 16.82% and the world is still home to 1.2 billion extremely poor people.
Even if growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa were to double relative to the post-2000 trend,
the global poverty rate in 2030 is still projected to be 6.50% with pro-poor growth, 7.67%
with distribution-neutral growth, and 8.81% with pro-rich growth.
All of these estimates imply that it will take considerably longer than 2030 to lift
the remaining 1.2 billion people out of poverty. The good news is that by 2030 extreme
poverty in Europe and Central Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and Middle East and
North Africa may virtually disappear (projected to be less than 5% in most forecasts).
However, we predict a strong increase in the (relative) share of global poverty located in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which suggests that a non-trivial fraction of extreme poverty may
be concentrated in ‘fragile states’. Whether these countries will overcome civil strife,
political instability and corruption will ultimately decide whether there is a lower bound
at which extreme poverty will continue to exist.
Gradual changes in inequality raise or lower the overall headcount in between 1.2
and 2.1 percentage points and account for about 100 million poor people more or less.
Contrary to suggesting that inequality does not matter (we only assume slow changes),
this finding hints at two crucial points. First, if the developing world as a whole is to truly
maintain the impressive record in poverty reduction of the last decades, then this requires
both sustained high growth at the level experienced since 2000 and improvements in
distribution. Second, any systematic worsening of within-country inequality, particularly
in large and largely poor countries like India or Nigeria, will reinforce the slowdown and
thus more strongly decelerate the global rate of poverty reduction.
Readers may wonder why these results are so different from the projections reported
in Ravallion (2013). Our results differ mainly because Ravallion (2013) uses the average
growth rate of the developing world to project poverty in countries with very different
track records, while we use country-specific average growth rates. Otherwise there are
only minor differences in the data used and our method closely approximates results
population-weighted survey data with a wide yet somewhat selective coverage.
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obtained using PovcalNet. Ravallion (2013) calculates that a PCE growth rate of 4.5%
per year may bring the global poverty rate down to 3% by 2027. However, he makes the
(in our view implausible) assumption that all developing countries will continue to grow
equally fast at this common rate of 4.5%. Likewise, the linear projection of the global
poverty rate on time ignores all issues of aggregation and provides an overly optimistic
picture of the medium-term future.21 Yet composition matters, even if we incorporate
the optimistic assumption that the post-2000 trend will continue. The average hides
that rapid growth is less likely in some countries than in others. As we have shown,
this has direct consequences for when a slowdown will be observed and how strong the
deceleration will be. However, even if we assume a uniform growth rate for all developing
countries, a deceleration appears sooner or later within the next two decades (although
it may actually be preceded by a brief acceleration if we assume growth rates in excess
of 5% p.a.). It is comforting that, in line with Ravallion (2013), our method implies that
if consumption in the entire developing world grew at a distributional-neutral pace of
7.6% per year, then extreme poverty would indeed virtually disappear by 2030 (fall to
1.1%). The 3% target can be reached with a uniform distribution-neutral growth rate of
approximately 5.5% per year.22
We repeat this exercise at the $2 a day poverty line. The results are reported in
Table 4 and Figure A-1 in the Appendix. Interestingly, the linear projection is a much
better approximation of progress at the $2 poverty line than at the $1.25 poverty line.
This is not due to a slower historical poverty reduction record: a regression of the global
poverty rate at $2 a day on time also yields a slope of approximately one percentage point
per year. However, the composition of countries (or people) near the $2 a day poverty
line in 2010 is more reminiscent of its $1.25 counterpart in the early 2000s. At the start
of the decade in 2010, the total $2 poverty rate is 40.67% – roughly double the $1.25
poverty rate. Fast growing East Asia and moderately fast growing South Asia still make
up more than half of global poverty, implying that progress in these two regions will have
a large effect on the overall poverty headcount.
Our moderate growth scenario predicts that about 1.87 billion people (26%) live
on less than $2 a day in 2030 versus about 2.4 billion people in 2010. Considerably
greater gains are possible. Global poverty at the $2 line falls below 20% in the optimistic
distribution-neutral and pro-poor scenarios. If this occurs in 2030, then more than one
billion people will have left poverty at the $2 a day line – undeniably a remarkable
achievement. In most scenarios we also observe a slowdown at the $2 a day line but this
slowdown tends to occur later and is less pronounced than at the lower threshold. In the
most optimistic scenario, the rate of poverty reduction actually accelerates somewhat to
about 1.16 percentage points per year, while the moderate growth scenario gives a trend
of 0.73 percentage points per year over the projection period.
Examining the regional distribution, we find that poverty in East Asia is likely to
fall to around 5% by 2030, down from 29.7% in 2010. Nearly everyone in East Asia
will have entered the middle class (by developing country standards), but this forecast
partially hinges on fast growth in China. In fact, some observers suggest that there is
21We do not mean to imply that Ravallion (2013) is not aware of the aggregation issues. In fact, he uses
PovcalNet precisely to confirm that his ‘optimistic scenario’ is possible once the intrinsic non-linearity of
the poverty-income-inequality relationship is accounted for. Our point is rather that he envisions “the
best possible world” to be used as a benchmark for future progress while we also focus on other, more
likely, scenarios.
22Interestingly, a recent working paper by Yoshida et al. (2014), independently and using different
methods, comes to very similar conclusions.
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reason to believe that China runs a non-negligible risk of falling into a ‘middle-income
trap’ (Eichengreen, Park, and Shin, 2013) which might make it harder to achieve less
than 10% poverty at $2 a day by 2030.23 Progress in South Asia is also likely to be
rapid. According to our moderate growth estimate the expected poverty rate is 35.9%
in 2030, implying about 716 million poor, down from 66.7% and about 1.1 billion poor
in 2010. In the optimistic pro-poor growth case, the headcount ratio falls by about one
third to less than 20% and the number of poor decreases to less than 400 million. As a
stark contrast, the $2 a day poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to remain
very high. Our moderate growth scenario predicts a poverty rate of about 66%, down
from 69.9% in 2010, which at current population projections implies almost one billion
poor in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. Even in the optimistic distribution-neutral growth
scenario, we project a poverty rate of about 55% and more than 750 million poor. This
is underlined by the analysis in the preceding section where we suggest that the mass of
the consumption distribution is far to the left of the $2 a day poverty line in 2010 for
most of the subcontinent. Poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa remains the primary
development challenge of the first half of the 21st century.
5 Concluding remarks and policy recommendations
The main contribution of this chapter is to forecast global poverty rates until 2030. To set
the stage, we first highlighted that there is a fundamental uncertainty about the precise
levels of extreme poverty. For the sake of comparison, we selected the standard poverty
lines of $1.25 and $2 a day (in 2005 PPPs). We then discussed a robust set of global
poverty and inequality trends. The global MDG of halving the 1990 extreme poverty level
was reached in 2010 but this apparent progress hides substantial regional heterogeneity.
Most of the global success was driven by rapid growth in China. Inequality among the
citizens of developing countries and between developing countries was declining until
2005, while average within-country inequality was rising steadily until 2010.
The changing composition of global poverty has profound implications for the medium-
term future. After 2010, fast growing East Asia will contribute less and less to global
poverty reduction, while the share of the global poor residing in Sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia will continue to rise. All of our projections show that the global rate of
poverty reduction at $1.25 a day will slow down markedly between 2020 and 2025. None
of our nine scenarios predicts a poverty rate near zero by 2030. This stands in stark
contrast to earlier studies and the ‘3% by 2030’ target recently announced by the World
Bank. The Bank’s target can only be reached if we make the unrealistic assumption
of equally rapid growth in all developing countries. Once country-specific growth rates
are used, even our most optimistic scenarios suggest a poverty rate of between 7.9% and
10.5%, depending on the evolution of inequality. At $2 a day, the slowdown will occur
much later and remarkable gains are possible if the post-2000 growth trends continue.
An optimistic estimate suggests that the $2 a day poverty rate may fall below 20% by
2030, implying one billion fewer poor people than in 2010.
We propose two new ‘twin targets’ on the basis of these findings. An aspirational
but realistic benchmark for progress would be to “reduce the proportion of the population
living below $1.25 to 8% by 2030 and reduce the proportion of the population living below
23However, our estimates suggest that this would require an exceptionally large slowdown. For poverty
in East Asia to remain above 10% at $2 a day, growth needs to be less than half of the 2000-2010 trend.
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$2 a day to 18% by 2030.” Both of these targets are firmly anchored in our optimistic
pro-poor growth scenarios. The $2 a day poverty line should receive more attention in
the future to better track continued progress in East Asia and, later on, South Asia.
Partly for the same reason, China has recently raised its own national poverty line to
about $1.80 a day.
These targets can be reached in a variety of ways but not only through a continuation
of the current path. They will require either an additional acceleration of growth in poorer
countries, or improvements in distribution. Reversing the trend of rising within-country
inequalities would speed up the pace of poverty reduction and still ensure progress at
more moderate growth rates. The returns to redistribution are increasingly high in East
and South Asia, and remain relatively large in Latin America. However, in some regions
growth takes precedent. Rapid poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa still requires a
significant and sustained acceleration in consumption growth.
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Appendix A: Additional tables and figures
Table A-1 – World Bank poverty estimates by region, 1981 to 2010 (selected years)
Year
1981 1990 1999 2005 2010
Panel (a) – Headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (in percent)
East Asia and Pacific 77.18 56.24 35.58 17.11 12.48
China 84.02 60.18 35.63 16.25 11.62
Europe and Central Asia 1.91 1.91 3.79 1.33 0.66
Latin America and Caribbean 11.89 12.24 11.86 8.66 5.53
Middle East and North Africa 9.56 5.75 5.01 3.45 2.41
South Asia 61.14 53.81 45.11 39.43 31.03
India 59.83 51.31 45.62 40.82 32.67
Sub-Saharan Africa 51.45 56.53 57.89 52.31 48.47
Total 52.16 43.05 34.07 25.09 20.63
Panel (b) – Poor population at $1.25 a day (in millions)
East Asia and Pacific 1096.5 926.42 655.59 332.08 250.90
China 835.07 683.15 446.35 211.85 155.51
Europe and Central Asia 8.21 8.87 17.83 6.26 3.15
Latin America and Caribbean 43.33 53.43 60.10 47.60 32.29
Middle East and North Africa 16.48 12.96 13.64 10.47 7.98
South Asia 568.38 617.26 619.46 598.26 506.77
India 428.68 448.34 472.74 466.30 400.08
Sub-Saharan Africa 204.93 289.68 375.97 394.78 413.73
Total 1937.83 1908.45 1742.53 1389.2 1214.98
Total excl. China 1102.76 1225.30 1296.18 1177.35 1059.31
Notes: Based on PovcalNet and Chen and Ravallion (2010, 2013).
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Table A-2 – Population-weighted regional PCE growth rates over various periods
Period
2000 −
2010
1990 −
2010
1980 −
2010
1980 −
2000
1990 −
2000
East Asia and Pacific 5.906 5.772 5.598 5.377 5.608
(0.813) (0.653) (0.725) (0.677) (0.508)
Europe and Central Asia 6.085 2.755 2.558 -0.769 -1.225
(0.989) (0.412) (0.411) (0.916) (1.027)
Latin America and Caribbean 2.444 2.219 1.445 0.677 1.931
(0.239) (0.140) (0.098) (0.171) (0.337)
Middle East and North Africa 3.495 2.532 1.851 0.495 1.253
(0.443) (0.440) (0.293) (0.545) (0.648)
South Asia 4.448 3.612 3.179 2.173 2.511
(0.489) (0.388) (0.351) (0.284) (0.294)
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.382 1.419 0.698 -0.818 0.016
(0.689) (0.470) (0.472) (0.540) (0.688)
Overall average 4.544 3.809 3.437 2.565 2.862
(0.152) (0.132) (0.114) (0.161) (0.225)
N 123 123 123 122 122
T¯ 10.99 20.64 27.16 16.30 9.730
N × T¯ 1352 2539 3341 1989 1187
Notes: Authors’ calculations. We use growth in per capita consumption from World Development
Indicators or Penn World Table 7.1, depending on which series is longer. Cluster-robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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Figure A-1 – Actual and projected poverty headcount ratios at $2 a day, 1981–2030
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Chapter 5 and survey data from PovcalNet. The solid black
line beyond 2010 refers to the moderate (distribution-neutral) growth scenario in Table 4, while
the solid grey lines represent the distribution-neutral variants of the optimistic and pessimistic
scenarios. The pro-poor and pro-rich variants are shown as grey dotted lines and are located above
or below a solid line.

Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
The research presented in this dissertation asked two overarching questions:
• How do political institutions affect economic crises?
• How much does poverty react to changes in average income and distribution?
In the following, I briefly summarize the main findings from each chapter and outline
how they together form an answer to these questions that (hopefully) exceeds the sum of
its constituent parts.
The first part of this dissertation is devoted to the political economics of crises. An
obvious question which arises right away is: why only study periods of negative growth
and not levels or growth rates of GDP per capita directly? The starting point is an
empirical observation. The previous literature has robustly linked institutional quality
to levels of GDP per capita, but struggles to identify a role for political institutions in
determining post-WWII growth rates. Similarly, studies of growth accelerations hardly
find any evidence linking political factors to the start of an acceleration. In fact, often
the converse is found. Democratization, for example, is often followed by periods of lower
growth. This dissertation suggests that we have been looking in the wrong places. Growth
accelerations occur relatively frequently and are caused by idiosyncratic macroeconomic
factors that have little to do with the institutional environment. In contrast, crises are
ubiquitous, often long and deep in the developing world, but comparatively rare, short
and shallow in the developed world. This dissertation shows that it is not only the lack of
rapid growth which creates the dividing line between catching up and falling behind, but
also the failure to achieve sustained growth and to preserve earlier welfare gains. Weak
institutions and social conflict play a significant role in how countries deal with negative
growth shocks.
Chapter 2 is a first attempt to study research question one. It looks at stagnation
episodes, defined as periods where GDP per capita is at a peak, then declines and then
recovers to its previous level, so that there was no development. In studying the switching
in and out of these episodes, it pays attention to two sub-questions: i) can we predict
the onset of stagnation episodes with institutional and macroeconomic factors, and ii)
do the variables which determine the onset of stagnation also affect the probability of
continuation of a stagnation spell? The answers are mixed. On the one hand, we find
no evidence that the quality of political institutions (measured by the Polity IV score)
affects the onset or continuation of stagnation; that is, it does not seem to be linked to
the incidence of stagnation. On the other hand, negative regime changes have the single
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largest adverse effect on the probability of stagnation. This suggests that institutional
shocks are indeed a problem for maintaining positive growth. Several macroeconomic
factors are associated with the incidence of stagnation. Open economies, in terms
of trade and finance, with an undervalued exchange rate seem to run a lower risk of
experiencing a stagnation spell. Not so surprisingly, high inflation signals macroeconomic
mismanagement and is associated with a higher probability of stagnation. Only trade
openness has a differential impact. It reduces the chances of falling into stagnation but
does not speed up the recovery. Chapter 2 also offers insights into what cannot be
learned from panel studies of annual transitions in and out of an episode. Variables like
institutional quality are slow moving, but the between-country variation will be wiped
out by fixed effects or correlated random effects, leaving little within-country variation
to work with.
Chapter 3 digs deeper. It relaxes several assumptions that were implicit in our study
of stagnation spells. We no longer treat the decline and recovery phases as one, but only
focus on the former. The underlying idea is that policy responses to declines depend on
political institutions as well as the level of heterogeneity among ethno-political groups
that have to agree on coordinated responses to an economic decline. In addition, we
now focus only on large economic slumps to exclude business cycle fluctuations which are
unlikely to be determined by political institutions. Much of the chapter is concerned with
the econometric identification of economic slumps. We show that a restricted structural
change approach coupled with a parametric bootstrap works well for finding and dating
slumps. It turns out that severe downward volatility occurs often and has substantial
welfare implications for low income countries. We then establish that stronger constraints
on the executive shorten the duration of declines, while greater ethnic divisions prolong
the duration. In fact, the positive impact of constraints on the executive on the duration
of declines appears to depend on the level of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity; it is largest in
very diverse societies. We also show that these two variables similarly affect the overall
depth of declines and that their effects on depth run through the duration of the decline
phase, as opposed to the average rate of decline. Macroeconomic factors still play a role,
as in the previous chapter, but the effects of executive constraints and ethnic cleavages
seem to operate independently of macroeconomic variables. Moreover, many structural
features of modern economies are only likely to emerge together with strong institutions
guaranteeing the security of transactions, among other things. An interesting stylized
fact is that we observe broad-based institutional reforms following the onset of a slump.
We interpret this finding both as evidence of the endogeneity of political institutions and
as a sign that deep recessions offer windows of opportunity for institutional reforms.
Chapter 4 offers a theory of why we observe such long declines in heterogeneous
countries with weak executive constraints. It models this situation as an infinite horizon
cooperation game where political groups decide on whether to formulate a response to
an exogenous shock. We show that group heterogeneity in a divided society and weak
constraints on the political executive potentially lead to delayed cooperation during the
decline phase of a slump. This is due to a commitment problem between winners and
losers of the recovery process after a crisis. Uncertain post-recovery incomes and weak
constraints on the executive create a ‘winner-take-all’ effect. Groups anticipate this
uncertainty and may find it beneficial to hold out. We derive four theoretical results
based on this setup. First, delay can occur in equilibrium. Second, stronger constraints
on the executive shorten the time to recovery. Third, decreasing political concentration
can make delay more likely under certain conditions. Fourth, an increase in the number
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of groups makes delay more likely. The empirics are consistent with the proposed theory.
Using detailed data on ethnic power configurations and the data set of slumps from
Chapter 3, we show that heterogeneity is indeed a problem when the political executive is
relatively unconstrained. Our empirics also suggest that this problem primarily arises as a
consequence of an increase in the number of equally powerful groups, rather than political
constellations where one or few groups wield all power. In fact, greater group asymmetries
work in the opposite direction. This chapter has an important policy implication: ethnic
diversity is not necessarily a problem. Political institutions can be designed to contain
the adversarial element of ethnic heterogeneity and may help to ensure that recent welfare
gains are not lost in the next crisis.
Taken together, the three essays offer an answer to the first research question.
Chapter 2 shows that negative regime transitions raise the probability of a crisis occurring
but otherwise political institutions do not seem to be linked to the incidence of stagnation
spells. Chapter 3 then demonstrates a robust association of political institutions and
ethnic diversity with the duration of economic slumps. Their effects on the expected
time until the recovery starts are economically very large. Chapter 4 suggests that these
long declines may occur due to a commitment problem among winners and losers of the
crisis; there are no enforceable contracts where groups return what they expropriated from
a weaker group after the recovery. Guaranteeing that this does not happen is precisely
one of the roles played by strong political institutions. Given this body of empirical and
theoretical evidence it seems safe to conclude that political institutions do indeed play a
significant role during economic crises. Many important issues have not been addressed
in this part of the dissertation. An integrated empirical comparison of the relative welfare
effects of accelerations and growth collapses would be an interesting extension of this line
of research. In addition, considerably more work is needed to arrive at a unified theory
of the institutional causes of uneven growth.
The second part of this dissertation shifts the focus away from economic growth
towards the poverty of people. It seeks to understand how different growth experiences
translate into poverty reduction and how inequality moderates this relationship. This
part of the dissertation first examines how changes in average income (consumption)
and changes in inequality have historically translated into poverty reduction. At the
micro-level, there is little mystery in this question. All we need to do is to estimate
the Lorenz curve, take point derivatives with respect to mean income or a measure of
inequality and we learn how much of a change in either of these two variables translates
into poverty reduction. At the cross-country level, we typically only have average incomes
and the Gini coefficient. Chapter 5 shows that with just these two data points, we can
very closely approximate the underlying elasticities and semi-elasticities. Nevertheless,
finding a particular average value for the income elasticity of poverty in the past does
not imply that poverty will respond the same in the future. In Chapter 6, we turn to the
question of how this process is likely to continue if we look forward to 2030.
Chapter 5 outlines a new econometric method for estimating the impacts of changes
in average incomes and changes in inequality. We propose a fractional response approach
which explicitly takes the bounded nature of the poverty headcount ratio into account;
that is, the fact that it cannot exceed the unit interval. This approach allows us to
derive estimates of the income (and inequality) elasticities and semi-elasticities that have
desirable properties, such as being bounded at zero when incomes are so small that no one
is lifted out of poverty due to one percent income growth. We then extend this approach
to deal with unobserved differences in the underlying household surveys, measurement
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error in income (consumption) and uneven spacing of surveys. We first show that the
income elasticity of poverty from 1981 to 2010 was about two and the inequality elasticity
was about one and a half. The chapter offers two additional findings: i) elasticities
are not very informative and underrepresent the contribution of inequality, and ii) we
learn very little from these historical averages as they apply to no country in particular.
Instead, we argue that both the academic literature and policy makers should focus on
semi-elasticities. Semi-elasticities measure how much of a one percent change in average
income (inequality) translates into a change in the fraction of the total population that is
poor (a percentage point change in the poverty rate). We illustrate that our method can
trace out the entire distribution of these quantities. Semi-elasticities vary a lot over the
development process. They express that the poverty reduction potential of a country is
increasing until the mass of the distribution is right in front of the poverty line and then
decreases to zero as fewer and fewer poor people are left. We also briefly explore how
other variables, such as political institutions, can influence poverty reduction and show
that they only do so indirectly through average incomes and inequality. In theory and
practice, elasticities and semi-elasticities are only non-linear functions of initial levels and
changes in both average incomes and inequality.
Chapter 6 turns to the future. It illustrates a fundamental insight from Chapter 5 with
an important policy question. If the income and inequality semi-elasticities of poverty are
falling after some point as countries grow richer, then the income level of poor countries
near the global poverty line matters for the speed of poverty reduction. We use precisely
this fact to show that the pace of poverty reduction at the $1.25 a day poverty line is
likely to slow down. Fast growing East Asia will contribute less and less to global poverty
reduction in the future, while more and more of the world’s poor will be concentrated in
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. While several countries on these two subcontinents
have experienced substantially faster GDP per capita growth rates since the early 2000s,
achieving the World Bank’s new global goal of 3% poverty by 2030 at the $1.25 a day
poverty line requires unrealistic assumptions regarding income and consumption growth.
All of our projections show that the pace of poverty reduction at $1.25 a day will slow
down. The global poverty rate only reaches about 8-9% in 2030 under very optimistic
assumptions. In contrast, the situation at the $2 a day poverty line is more reminiscent
of the recent past. East Asia still has plenty of people living on incomes between $1.25
and $2 a day, so that the historical speed of poverty reduction of one percentage point per
annum can be maintained. Our optimistic scenarios suggest that the $2 a day poverty
rate may fall below 20% by 2030 down from about 40% in 2010, implying at least one
billion fewer poor people than in 2010. On this basis, we suggest two global targets:
1) reducing the proportion of the population living below $1.25 to 8% by 2030, and 2)
reducing the proportion of the population living below $2 a day to 18% by 2030.
In a nutshell, the answer to research question two is: it depends. Chapter 5 shows that
estimates of the average response of poverty to changes in incomes and distribution are
not very informative. Both elasticities and semi-elasticities change systematically over the
development process. Elasticities continually increase in absolute value, whereas semi-
elasticities are first increasing and then decreasing in average income. Our framework
can be used to predict the point (semi-)elasticity using only a country’s average income
level and Gini coefficient. Chapter 6 adds that this functional form also implies that a
slowdown in the pace of poverty reduction is very likely. Although poverty reduction in
the past has mostly been driven by income growth, there is nothing about this relationship
that suggests redistribution could not play a larger role in the future. We also established
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that institutions only affect poverty indirectly, through the levels of (and changes in)
average incomes and inequality. Yet, our knowledge of the transmission channels is still
very incomplete. The links between political institutions and inequality in particular are
interesting avenues for future research.

Addendum on valorization
In accordance with article 23.5 of the “Regulation governing the attainment of
doctoral degrees at Maastricht University” decreed by resolution of the Board
of Deans, dated 3 July 2013, an addendum must be added about valorization.
Testament to the social relevance of this research is the fact that this doctoral
dissertation has been funded by the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD, the
French development agency), within a larger multi-year research project on ‘Institutions
and Long-term Growth’. The project originated as an attempt to understand, both
theoretically and empirically, the conceptual and econometric relationships between
institutions and long-term growth. The French development agency was particularly
interested in better understanding the institutional determinants of long-term economic,
social, and political trajectories.
The five studies presented in this doctoral dissertation contribute to advance our
understanding of each of these three themes. Their social and economic implications are
of considerable importance for the welfare of nations and the welfare of people. However,
not all of these implications can be easily translated into policy prescriptions.
The first part of the thesis, on the political economics of crises, is concerned with the
fundamental question of how political institutions affect economic crises. The relevance
of such a question can hardly be understated at a time when much of the developed world
is still dealing with the consequences of the Great Depression and parts of the developing
world are experiencing economic uncertainty due to political upheaval, such as the Arab
spring or other political crises. Development aid today, too, has shifted away from purely
economic investments towards supporting institutions, improved governance, capability
building and civil society. Aid investments in the productive sector (agriculture, industry,
tourism, banking, etc.), for example, have decreased from 36.6% of total bilateral aid in
1967 to 13.4% 2012, while the relative share of aid supporting the social infrastructure
(education, health, government, etc.) has increased by 23.3 percentage points over the
same period (from 8.3% to 31.6%).1
The overarching insight from the first part of the dissertation is that well-developed
checks and balances (constraints) on the executive help to avert long and deep crises,
even in the face of ethnic and political heterogeneity. Apart from this general finding,
this part contains several insights for policy makers that are worth highlighting:
• Negative regime changes have the single largest effect on the probability of falling
into a stagnation spell. Contrary to the widespread notion of the benefits of a
“strong ruler”, institutional shocks involving an increase in executive power and
reduction of political competition are not necessarily beneficial to growth, even in
the short run.
1Table 14.6 from Adam Szirmai, www.dynamicsofdevelopment.com, 2015.
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• Open economies with an undervalued exchange rate seem to run a lower risk of
experiencing a stagnation episode. This finding has direct implications for policy
makers in central banks and those in the government engaged in trade policy.
• Severe downward volatility occurs often and has significant welfare implications for
low income countries. Stronger constraints on the executive shorten the duration of
declines, while greater ethnic divisions prolong the duration. It is important for the
governments of developing countries to recognize where they are on this continuum,
so as to appropriately manage economic crises.
• Ethnic diversity is not necessarily a problem. Political institutions can be designed
to contain the adversarial element of ethnic heterogeneity, namely institutions
that constrain the power of ruling elites to expropriate others. While the precise
nature of these institutions requires further research, this finding is important for
countries undergoing, or considering, constitutional reforms and complements a
larger literature on the economic effects of political constitutions.
The second part of the thesis, on the speed of poverty reduction, is concerned with
how poverty rates react to changes in average income and changes in income inequality.
Even though past progress in the quest to reduce global poverty has been substantial –
the proportion of the global population living on less than $1.25 a day declined from
about 52% in 1981 to about 20% in 2010 – there are substantial challenges ahead.
Research in this field is of obvious social importance, as entire agencies such as the World
Bank have been designed around the sole mandate of promoting long-term economic
development and poverty reduction. Recently, the World Bank even ambitiously redefined
its own mission as “ending extreme poverty within a generation and promoting shared
prosperity”.
A principal result from the second part of the dissertation is that the past will not
be a good guide for the future, at least when it comes to the pace of poverty reduction.
This occurs for three reasons which are detailed below. Each of these three points has
significant implications for policy makers and the larger development community.
• The geography of world poverty is changing rapidly. While China and India have
contributed significantly to poverty reduction at the $1.25 a day poverty line in
the past, their contribution will rapidly decrease in the coming decades. The
relative share of the global poor residing in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia
will rise. Even though per capita consumption growth has accelerated in Sub-
Saharan Africa since about 2000, it has lagged far behind that of other developing
countries, trailing the growth rate of the rest by about 2.5 percentage points per
annum. This highlights the importance of developing sustained sources of economic
growth on the subcontinent, such as further improving agricultural productivity, so
as to free up workers for the industrial or service sector.
• Within-country inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) has been more or
less constant in the developing world. The research presented here shows that
reductions in inequality can have potentially large effects on the poverty headcount
ratio, especially when viewed in terms of percentage point changes in poverty rates.
Nevertheless, we have seen few examples of countries that have reduced poverty
and inequality simultaneously, while there are about as many examples of countries,
where the distribution was becoming more unequal over time. This finding stands
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in sharp contrast to the development community’s rhetoric of ‘pro-poor growth’,
or, more recently, ‘shared prosperity’. The evidence presented here suggests that
both have been the exception rather than the rule.
• Extreme poverty is not likely to end by 2030. The World Bank’s target can only
be reached if we make the unrealistic assumption of equally rapid growth in all
developing countries. Instead, the projections show that the global rate of poverty
reduction at $1.25 a day will slow down markedly. Moreover, in absolute terms, the
number of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa is even likely to rise due to unabated
population growth. On the other hand, at $2 a day, remarkable gains are possible
if the post-2000 growth trends continue. An optimistic estimate suggests that the
$2 a day poverty rate may fall below 20% by 2030 (down from about 40% in 2010),
implying one billion fewer poor people than in 2010. Improvements in distribution
are much needed to counteract unfavorable trends and ensure continued progress.
Chapter 6 of this dissertation then distilled these findings into a recommendation to
the UN’s high-level panel on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The chapter
proposes two new goals, namely to “reduce the proportion of the population living below
$1.25 to 8% by 2030 and reduce the proportion of the population living below $2 a day
to 18% by 2030.”
Last but not least, the work on this dissertation resulted in several ancillary outputs,
in particular software components for estimating econometric models that have previously
not been implemented. Some programs are add-ons to the commercial software Statar,
but the source code is publicly available at the author’s website and subject to open source
licensing. Other programs have been written for the open source software R. Additional
programs and data sets will be made available once the results are published (either on
the author’s website or as part of the open data initiatives of academic journals). Making
the code and data public serves to spread the use of these techniques and uphold the
standards of reproducible research.
A core target group of this research consists of policy makers in international agencies
(UN, World Bank, IMF, European Commission, regional investment banks, etc.). Other
target groups of this research are national aid agencies (e.g. DFID, GIZ), central banks,
national governments and statistical offices.
The French development agency played a key role in disseminating the work done
within this project to other policy institutions. Several works have been reprinted as
AFD working papers and/or have been summarized in policy briefs. Following a political
economy workshop in Dresden, Chapter 3 has been released as CESifo working paper
(one of the largest economic research networks in the world with a wide readership).
All research outputs were presented at annual workshops at the AFD, several academic
conferences, and policy institutions, such as the World Bank and the Center for Global
Development.
The policy-oriented results from Chapter 6 are part of a joint research project
funded by the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement (AFD), the Institute for Development
Studies (IDS) and the Japanese Development Cooperation (JICA). The chapter has been
published in a book called “Growth is dead, long live growth: The quality of economic
growth and why it matters” edited by Lawrence Haddad (IDS), Hiroshi Kato (JICA) and
Nicolas Meisel (AFD). The results of this research project have been publicly presented
to policy makers on January 26th 2015 in a high-level panel together with the respective
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directors of these institutions. The project was subsequently covered in the international
media, such as the website of the Guardian.
Furthermore, an extended version of the literature review that informed the discussion
in the introduction was commissioned by the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in
Florence (Italy) and presented there in 2011. A follow-up project to the second part of
this dissertation on “Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa” is being funded by DG EuropeAid
of the European Commission.
The research also targets the wider academic community as well as the readership
of journals and blogs (such as the UNU-MERIT blog). The output of two papers was
discussed in a short interview, available on YouTube, as part of the dissemination efforts.
All research in this dissertation is to be published in peer-reviewed and internationally
acclaimed journals. As a first step in this direction, Chapter 2 is forthcoming in
Macroeconomic Dynamics and the remaining chapters are currently under review.
Given the nature of this dissertation, it contains no proposals for commercial products
or commercially exploitable activities, such as patents or services, and no innovation
regarding existing products, services, processes, activities and commercial activities.
Therefore, the dissertation contains no proposals for exploiting market opportunities in
the future.
Samenvatting
Het voorliggende proefschrift bestudeert verschillende aspecten van de
ontwikkelingspuzzel, in het bijzonder de empirie en de politieke economie van groei en
ongelijkheid. Het laat zich in twee delen opsplitsen. Deel I bevat drie essays over de
theorie en empirie van economische crisissen en politieke instellingen. Deel II bestaat uit
twee empirische analyses van groei, verdeling en armoede. In deze samenvatting worden
de aanpak en bevindingen van elk hoofdstuk in het kort geschetst.
De overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag voor de hoofdstukken in deel I is: Welke invloed
hebben politieke instellingen op het ontstaan en de duur van economische crisissen? Een
eerste antwoord vindt men in Hoofdstuk 2, vertrekkende van de eenvoudigste definitie van
economische stagnatie. Een episode van stagnatie begint met een krimping van het BBP
per hoofd van de bevolking in een tijd waarin het hoger was dan ooit tevoren, en eindigt
wanneer het weer het initie¨le niveau bereikt of overtreft. Wij zoeken dergelijke episodes
van economische stagnatie op en analyseren ze in een wereldwijd panel van landen. We
behandelen in het bijzonder twee vragen die betrekking hebben op de instabiliteit van de
groei. Ten eerste, we onderzoeken of institutionele kenmerken en politieke schokken
merkbare effecten hebben op de frequentie van stagnatie, en hoe dergelijke effecten
zich verhouden tot standaard macro-economische verklaringen. Wat betreft politieke
variabelen gaat het om regimewijzigingen, het plotse aftreden van leiders, oorlogen en
burgeroorlogen. Wat betreft macro-economische variabelen gaat het voornamelijk om
inflatie en de openheid van de grenzen voor financie¨le en handelsstromen. Ten tweede,
we gaan na of de opgenomen variabelen dezelfde invloed hebben op de frequentie en op
de duur van stagnatie. Met andere woorden, we onderzoeken of de variabelen die de kans
op stagnatie verhogen of verlagen dezelfde zijn als de variabelen die de kans om te blijven
stagneren verhogen of verlagen.
De antwoorden zijn meervoudig. Enerzijds vinden we geen aanwijzing dat de kwaliteit
van politieke instellingen, zoals gemeten door de “Polity IV”-score, van invloed is op het
ontstaan of de voortzetting van stagnatie. Anderzijds is het wel duidelijk dat negatieve
regimewijzigingen de kans op stagnatie verhogen. Institutionele schokken kunnen dus wel
degelijk in de weg staan van positieve groei. Verder zijn verschillende macrofactoren van
belang. Economiee¨n die heel open zijn voor financie¨le en handelsstromen of waarvan de
munt ondergewaardeerd is lijken minder risico op stagnatie te lopen. Hoge inflatie is (niet
verrassend) een signaal van macro-economisch wanbeleid en een voorbode van stagnatie.
Openheid voor handel is de enige verklarende factor met duidelijk verschillende effecten
op het optreden en de continuering van stagnatie: open grenzen verminderen de frequentie
van stagnatie, maar versnellen het herstel niet.
Hoofdstuk 3 probeert een andere benadering. Daar worden economische crisissen
gekarakteriseerd door een specifiek type trendbreuk of verschuiving in het groeiregime.
De motivering is tweeledig. We willen cyclische periodes van laagconjunctuur uitsluiten
en in plaats daarvan focussen op grote, onverwachte en negatieve afwijkingen van een
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eerder positieve trend in het BBP per hoofd van de bevolking; alleen de bedoelde
episodes noemen we “crisissen”. Bovendien willen we de aandacht nu ook beperken
tot de neergaande fase van de crisis, laat ons zeggen de “inzinking”. Theoretisch zowel
als empirisch kan de dynamiek van achteruitgang erg verschillen van de dynamiek van
herstel, vandaar de noodzaak om de neergaande fase af te zonderen. We gaan nader
in op drie specifieke onderzoeksvragen. Ten eerste, hoe kunnen we economische crisissen
empirisch identificeren? Ten tweede, zijn er aanwijzingen van institutionele veranderingen
in of rond de crisistijd? Ten derde, als het eenmaal crisis is, zal de duur van de inzinking
dan afhangen van het type en de kwaliteit van de instellingen?
Een groot deel van het hoofdstuk wordt gewijd aan de econometrische identificatie van
economische crisissen. We inventariseren de structurele trendbreuken die aan specifieke
vereisten voldoen en laten zien dat deze aanpak in combinatie met een parametrische
bootstrap effectief in staat is om crisissen te vinden en te dateren. We stellen vast
dat neerwaartse volatiliteit vaak voorkomt en aanzienlijke gevolgen heeft voor het
welzijn van lage-inkomenslanden. Vervolgens blijkt dat beperkingen opgelegd aan de
uitvoerende macht de duur van inzinkingen verkort, terwijl etnische verdeeldheid hun
duur verlengt. Daarenboven lijkt het gunstige effect van beperkingen opgelegd aan de
uitvoerende macht sterk af te hangen van het niveau van de etnische verdeeldheid; de
weerslag is het grootst in de meest heterogene samenlevingen. We tonen vervolgens
aan dat machtsbeperking en etnische verdeeldheid een soortgelijke invloed hebben op de
uiteindelijke diepte van inzinkingen, een invloed die uitgeoefend wordt via de duur en niet
het tempo van de daling. Macro-economische factoren spelen eveneens een rol, net zoals
in het vorige hoofdstuk, maar de effecten van beperkingen van de uitvoerende macht
en etnische scheidingslijnen blijken onafhankelijk van macro-economische variabelen
te werken. Bovendien vinden we dat bepaalde structurele kenmerken van moderne
economiee¨n enkel en alleen ontstaan in de aanwezigheid van sterke instellingen die (onder
andere) de veiligheid van transacties kunnen garanderen. Een interessante vaststelling
hierbij is dat we vaak brede institutionele hervormingen waarnemen kort na het begin
van een inzinking. We interpreteren deze bevinding niet alleen als een mogelijk teken van
de endogeniteit van politieke instellingen, maar ook als een aanwijzing dat zware crisissen
kansen bieden voor diepgaande institutionele hervormingen.
Hoofdstuk 4 begint met een politiek-economische theorie van uitgesteld herstel dat
bedoeld is om de empirische bevindingen van hoofdstuk 3 te verklaren, en vervolgt
met een empirische toetsing van die theorie. De focus ligt nu op de machtsstrijd
tussen politieke groepen omtrent het te voeren beleid tijdens een inzinking of crisis.
We modelleren de situatie als een coo¨peratief spel met oneindige horizon, waarbij
partijen onderhandelen over de mogelijke beleidsreactie op een exogene schok. We laten
zien dat verdeeldheid in de samenleving en een uitvoerende macht zonder beperkingen
wellicht leiden tot uitstel van samenwerking tijdens een economische neergangsfase. De
verklaring is het gebrek aan een afdwingbare verbintenis tussen de uiteindelijke winnaars
en verliezers van het verwachte herstel. Onzekerheid over de inkomensverdeling na het
herstel en onbeperktheid van de uitvoerende macht leiden tot een ‘winner-take-all’ effect.
Afzonderlijke groepen anticiperen op deze onzekerheid en kunnen er voordeel uit halen
om samenwerking lange tijd uit te stellen.
Uit deze analyse volgen vier theoretische resultaten. Ten eerste, uitstel van
samenwerking komt vaak voor in een evenwicht. Ten tweede, betrouwbare beperkingen
van de uitvoerende macht kunnen het herstel versnellen. Ten derde, hoe dunner de
politieke macht gespreid is, hoe hoger de kans op uitstel van samenwerking. Ten vierde,
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hoe groter het aantal politieke groepen waarin de maatschappij verdeeld is, hoe hoger
de kans op uitstel. De empirische bevindingen zijn consistent met de voorgestelde
theorie. We beschikken over gedetailleerde gegevens omtrent de etnische-lingu¨ıstische
samenstelling van de bevolking en de machtsconfiguraties in de meeste landen van de
wereld. Door deze te combineren met de crisisdata uit hoofdstuk 3 vinden we dat
heterogeniteit inderdaad een probleem vormt in landen waar de uitvoerende macht weinig
beperkingen kent. Het probleem lijkt voornamelijk voor te komen bij een relatief hoog
aantal concurrerende machtsgroepen, eerder dan in politieke constellaties waar e´e´n of twee
groepen dominant zijn, of waar er een sterke asymmetrie heerst tussen machtsgroepen.
Hieruit volgt een belangrijke beleidsimplicatie: etnische diversiteit hoeft niet noodzakelijk
problematisch te zijn. Politieke instellingen kunnen zodanig worden ontworpen dat
spanningen tussen etnische groepen beheerst blijven en dat welzijnsaanwinsten niet
meteen verloren gaan in een volgende crisis.
Samen genomen bieden de drie eerste essays een antwoord op de eerste
onderzoeksvraag. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat negatieve regimewijzigingen de kans op
een crisis verhogen, maar voor het overige lijken politieke instellingen weinig invloed
te hebben op de frequentie van crisissen. Hoofdstuk 3 laat echter zien dat de duur van
economische crisissen wel afhangt van politieke instellingen, etnische heterogeniteit en
machtsstructuren. In landen met zwakke instellingen en een grote verdeeldheid laat
het herstel veel langer op zich wachten, met erg ingrijpende economische gevolgen.
Hoofdstuk 4 suggereert dat langdurige inzinkingen het gevolg kunnen zijn van een gebrek
aan verbintenis tussen toekomstige winnaars en verliezers; er zijn geen afdwingbare
contracten waarbij machtsgroepen na het herstel moeten herverdelen wat afgenomen is
van zwakkere groepen tijdens de crisis. Dat soort verbintenissen garanderen is precies een
van de positieve rollen die degelijke politieke instellingen kunnen spelen. In het licht van
onze theoretische en empirische resultaten kunnen wij besluiten dat politieke instellingen
inderdaad een belangrijke rol te spelen hebben tijdens en rond economische crisissen.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift verschuift de aandacht van economische groei
naar armoede. De centrale onderzoeksvraag in dit deel is: Hoeveel verandert het
percentage mensen dat onder de armoedegrens leeft wanneer het gemiddelde inkomen
of de inkomensverdeling wijzigen? We onderzoeken deze kwestie op twee complementaire
manieren: i) welke invloed hebben inkomens- of consumptiegroei en herverdeling op
de armoedecijfers gehad in het recente verleden (tussen 1981 en 2010); en ii) welke
ontwikkelingen kan men verwachten of hopen in de nabije toekomst? In het bijzonder,
wat zijn zinvolle armoededoelstellingen voor de komende decennia?
Hoofdstuk 5 heropent het debat over de doelmatigheid van armoedebestrijding door
groei versus herverdeling. Eerdere bijdragen in de ontwikkelingseconomie hebben reeds
belangrijke inzichten opgeleverd. Zo weten we bijvoorbeeld goed dat armoede gebonden
is aan inkomensniveau en inkomensverdeling door een mathematische relatie, en dat
de initie¨le niveaus van inkomens en van ongelijkheid parameters zijn in deze relatie.
We stellen echter vast dat de literatuur tot nog toe de theoretische eigenschappen
van armoederatio’s onvolledig heeft uitgebaat. Het percentage mensen dat onder de
armoedegrens leeft is een fractie met een beperkt bereik tussen 0 en 1, wat in de Engelse
terminologie een “fractionele respons” heet. Het is goed mogelijk hoewel ongebruikelijk
om deze inherente begrensdheid in een analytisch model in te bouwen, en daaruit
elasticiteiten en semi-elasticiteiten van de armoede ten opzichte van het inkomensniveau
en de inkomensongelijkheid af te leiden. Dit stelt ons dan weer in staat om de verdeling
van inkomens of consumptie in de nabijheid van de armoedegrens zeer nauwkeurig te
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benaderen, zonder dat specifieke aannames over de vorm van de inkomensverdeling nodig
zijn. Wij verkrijgen dan ook schattingen van de elasticiteiten en semi-elasticiteiten met
de wenselijke eigenschappen. Zo zijn semi-elasticiteiten laag bij initie¨le inkomens ver
onder (dan wel boven) de armoedegrens, aangezien plausibele wijzigingen in het niveau
of de verdeling van de inkomens niemand boven de armoedegrens zullen tillen (dan
wel eronder zullen brengen). We breiden dit model uit om rekening te houden met
verschillende storende omstandigheden, zoals onbenoemde verschillen in de onderliggende
gezinsenqueˆtes, meetfouten in inkomens- of consumptiegegevens, en de onregelmatige
timing van de enqueˆtes.
Het uitgebreide model leidt tot de volgende vaststellingen. De inkomenselasticiteit
van armoede was van 1981 tot 2010 door de band genomen ongeveer twee, en de
ongelijkheidselasticiteit ongeveer anderhalf. Hierbij horen twee kanttekeningen te worden
gemaakt: i) elasticiteiten (hoewel veelvuldig gebruikt) zijn in dit verband niet erg
informatief en onderschatten de bijdrage van ongelijkheid; en ii) historische gemiddelden
leren ons erg weinig over de historische ontwikkeling en lokale omstandigheden. In
plaats daarvan zouden zowel onderzoekers als beleidsmakers zich moeten baseren op
geactualiseerde semi-elasticiteiten. Semi-elasticiteiten meten hoe een stijging van e´e´n
procent in het gemiddeld inkomen of in de ongelijkheid zich vertaalt in procentpunten
meer of minder van het armoedepercentage. We illustreren hoe onze methode de
volledige evolutie van deze kwantiteiten kan traceren. Semi-elasticiteiten varie¨ren
aanzienlijk tijdens het ontwikkelingsproces. Men kan eraan zien dat het potentieel voor
armoedebestrijding in een land toeneemt zolang de piek van de inkomensverdeling zich
onder de armoedegrens bevindt. Eenmaal de piek de armoedegrens voorbij is neemt het
potentieel voor armoedebestrijding geleidelijk af, omdat het aandeel armen steeds kleiner
wordt.
Hoofdstuk 6 gebruikt hetzelfde empirische kader als hoofdstuk 5 maar is meer
beleidsgericht. We gaan er de haalbaarheid na van de recent door de Wereldbank
aangekondigde doelstelling om het armoedepercentage in de wereld terug te dringen,
in termen van de armoedegrens van $1,25 per dag, van ongeveer 20% in 2010 tot 3%
in 2030. We herinneren eerst de oorsprong van de “e´e´n-dollar-per-dag” armoedegrens
(tegenwoordig opgehoogd tot 1,25 dollar in verband met prijsinflatie). We voeren dan
een gevoeligheidsanalyse van deze grens uit, en beschrijven de historische trends van
armoede en ongelijkheid in de wereld. Dit dient twee doelen. Ten eerste willen we
duidelijk maken dat de extreme armoedegrens van $1,25 per dag niet absoluut vast staat,
maar behept is met een aanzienlijke mate van onzekerheid. Veel andere grenzen zouden
minstens even zinvol zijn. Ten tweede willen we benadrukken dat de landen die historisch
gezien het meest hebben bijgedragen tot de vermindering van de wereldarmoedecijfers
niet dezelfde zijn als de landen die dit in de toekomst zullen doen; zij zijn immers in
de laatste twee decennia aan een buitengewoon snel tempo gegroeid, en hebben hun
voorraad extreem armen grotendeels “uitgeput”. De geografie van de extreme armoede
in de wereld is ingrijpend veranderd en dit zal zijn weerslag hebben op het tempo van de
armoedebestrijding in de toekomst.
De lessen uit Hoofdstuk 5 laten een nieuw licht schijnen op de belangrijke beleidsvraag
van Hoofdstuk 6. We hebben gezien dat de semi-elasticiteiten van armoede ten opzichte
van inkomensniveau en ongelijkheid gaan dalen naarmate landen rijk(er) worden. Het
inkomensniveau van arme landen in de buurt van de armoedegrens is het meest bepalend
voor de snelheid waarmee de armoede verder teruggedrongen kan worden. Dit feit leidt
ertoe dat het tempo waarmee de extreme armoede in de wereld daalt in de nabije
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toekomst onvermijdelijk zal vertragen. De snel groeiende economiee¨n van Oost-Azie¨
zullen geleidelijk minder bijdragen tot de daling van de traditionele armoedemetingen, en
een stijgend aandeel van de armen in de wereld zal geconcentreerd zijn in Zwart Afrika
en Zuid-Azie¨. Het is waar dat verschillende landen op deze twee subcontinenten een
aanzienlijk versnelde groei van het BBP per hoofd van de bevolking hebben gekend sinds
de vroege jaren 2000. Toch stelt de nieuwe doelstelling van de Wereldbank, om tegen 2030
het aantal arme mensen onder de $1,25-per-dag grens te drukken tot 3%, onrealistische
vereisten aan de inkomens- en consumptiegroei. Uit alle scenario’s voor de toekomst die
wij onderzocht hebben blijkt dat het tempo van de armoededaling bij de gebruikelijke
$1,25 grens zal vertragen. Het wereldwijde aandeel van extreem armen zal onder de meest
optimistische veronderstellingen nog steeds 8 a` 9% bereiken in 2030. Echter, indien we
de armoedegrens op $2 per dag zouden plaatsen, dan krijgen we een ander beeld dat
veel nauwer aansluit met het recente verleden. In Oost-Azie¨ leven nog steeds heel veel
mensen van inkomens tussen $1,25 en $2 per dag, zodat een daling met e´e´n procentpunt
per jaar van het aantal mensen die van $2 moeten leven nog decennialang binnen bereik
ligt. Onze optimistische scenario’s suggereren dat de armoede onder $2 per dag terug zou
kunnen vallen van ongeveer 40% in 2010 tot 20% tegen 2030. Dit betekent minstens een
miljard minder “arme” mensen in 2030 dan in 2010. Op basis hiervan stellen we twee
zinvolle globale doelstellingen voorop: 1) de vermindering van het aantal armen die leven
van hoogstens $1,25 per dag tot 8% tegen 2030; en 2) de vermindering van het aantal
armen die leven van hoogstens $2 per dag tot 18% tegen 2030.
Het antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 2 luidt dus: het hangt ervan af. Uit Hoofdstuk
5 blijkt dat schattingen van de gemiddelde respons van de armoedecijfers op stijgende
inkomens en inkomensherverdelingen niet erg informatief zijn. Elasticiteiten en semi-
elasticiteiten volgen een systematische evolutie gedurende het ontwikkelingsproces. Als
functies van het gemiddelde inkomen stijgen elasticiteiten monotoon in absolute waarde,
terwijl semi-elasticiteiten eerst stijgen en dan dalen. Ons model houdt rekening met de
ingebouwde functionele beperkingen en laat toe beide evoluties precies te voorspellen
voor ieder land, gegeven het niveau van het gemiddelde inkomen en de Gini-coe¨fficie¨nt.
Uit Hoofdstuk 6 blijkt dat deze voorspellingen een vertraging in het tempo van de
armoededaling impliceren in de nabije toekomst. Wellicht is het tijd om de traditionele
armoedegrens en andere uitgangspunten van de armoedebestrijding te herzien. Hoewel
armoedebestrijding in het verleden voornamelijk gedreven werd door inkomensgroei, is
er niets in de relatie dat herverdeling belet een grotere rol te gaan spelen in de toekomst.
We hebben tevens kunnen vaststellen dat de invloed van de instellingen op de armoede
noodzakelijkerwijs loopt via gemiddelde inkomensniveaus en de ongelijkheid. Onze kennis
van de betreffende transmissiekanalen blijft echter erg onvolledig. De verhouding tussen
politieke instellingen en ongelijkheid in het bijzonder is een interessant thema voor
toekomstig onderzoek.
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